UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 9592 / June 3, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15902
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-DESIST
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION
8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A
CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

In the Matter of
Erik T. Voorhees,
Respondent.

I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that public
cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) against Erik T. Voorhees (“Respondent”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings
herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these
proceedings, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Ceaseand-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings,
and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.

III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
Summary
These proceedings arise out of unregistered offerings of shares of FeedZeBirds and
SatoshiDICE, two separate entities co-owned by Voorhees and others. Voorhees is a well-known
Bitcoin proponent, and the shares were offered and sold in exchange for bitcoins, commonly
referred to as “virtual currency.” 1 Bitcoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer payment network; bitcoin
transactions are recorded by the network on an electronic public ledger known as the “block chain.”
Bitcoins can be used to purchase real-world goods and services and can be exchanged for fiat
currencies on certain online exchanges. From May 2012, the time of the first offering, to the
present, the exchange rate of U.S. dollars (“USD”) to bitcoins has fluctuated between a low of
approximately $5 per bitcoin and a high of approximately $1,200 per bitcoin.
In May 2012, FeedZeBirds offered and sold 30,000 shares, and raised 2,600 bitcoins in
connection with that unregistered offer and sale. At the time of the FeedZeBirds offering, the USD
value of the bitcoins raised was approximately $15,000. From August 2012 through February
2013, in two separate offerings, SatoshiDICE offered and sold 13 million shares, and raised 50,600
bitcoins in connection with those unregistered offers and sales. At the time of the SatoshiDICE
offerings, the USD value of the total bitcoins raised was approximately $722,659. In July 2013,
SatoshiDICE bought back all outstanding SatoshiDICE shares from investors at a price of 0.0035
bitcoins per share, for a total of 45,500 bitcoins. Due to the significant rise in the exchange rate of
bitcoin, the total USD amount paid to investors in the SatoshiDICE buy-back transaction
(approximately $3.8 million) exceeded the total USD amount raised.
Respondent and Relevant Entities
1.
Voorhees, age 29, is a U.S. citizen who, at the time of the FeedZeBirds and
SatoshiDICE offerings, was living in the United States.
2.
FeedZeBirds is not a registered corporation. FeedZeBirds purports to pay
individuals who use Twitter, an online text messaging service, a fee in bitcoins in exchange for
1

For purposes of this Order, a “virtual currency” is a digital representation of value that can be
digitally traded and functions as a medium of exchange; a unit of account; and/or a store of
value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal
offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and
fulfills the above functions only by agreement within the community of users of the virtual
currency. Virtual currency is distinct from fiat currency, which is the coin and paper money of a
country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a
medium of exchange in the issuing country. It also is distinct from e-money, which is a digital
representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated in fiat currency,
i.e., e-money electronically transfers value that has legal tender status.
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forwarding sponsored text messages. During the relevant time period, Voorhees co-owned
FeedZeBirds, which had a website (feedzebirds.com) that launched in November 2011.
3.
SatoshiDICE is not a registered corporation. SatoshiDICE purports to be a
gambling website that takes bets and pays out winnings in bitcoins. Voorhees launched the
SatoshiDICE website (satoshidice.com) in April 2012, and co-owned the company until July 2013,
when he and the other co-owners sold it.
Offering of FeedZeBirds Shares
4.
On May 24, 2012, FeedZeBirds offered 30,000 shares, representing 30% of the
company, priced at 0.08667 bitcoins per share. 2 The shares were listed on an entity known as the
Global Bitcoin Stock Exchange (“GLBSE”), which purported to run a Bitcoin stock exchange. 3
5.
Voorhees published a prospectus for the FeedZeBirds offering, which he made
publicly available on the Internet. The prospectus was never filed with the Commission. In
addition, Voorhees made general solicitations to sell FeedZeBirds shares over the Internet, which
included posts on an internet website dedicated to Bitcoin known as the Bitcoin Forum
(bitcointalk.org), on Facebook.com, and on other Bitcoin-related websites.
6.
For example, prior to the offering, on May 21, 2012, Voorhees posted on the
Bitcoin Forum the following: “FeedZeBirds.com (http://FeedZeBirds.com), the Bitcoin Twitter
advertising platform with nearly 3,000 users and over 40,000,000 ad impressions served thus far, is
launching shares on Thursday, May 24, at 15:30 EST via GLBSE.com.” (Emphasis removed from
original.)
7.
Also on May 21, 2012, the website FreedomsPhoenix.com posted the following
announcement titled “FeedZeBirds IPO”:
FeedZeBirds is proud to announce that you can now own a piece of feedzebirds.com. On
Thursday, May 24, at 15:30 EST FeedZeBirds will release 30% of the company as 30,000
shares on GLBSE, the Bitcoin stock exchange …. A share will be sold at 0.08667 BTC
each.”
8.
The FeedZeBirds offering raised 2,600 bitcoins. At the time of the offering, 2,600
bitcoins were worth approximately $15,000.
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One bitcoin is divisible into 100,000,000 units, with the smallest unit (0.0000001 bitcoin)
called a “Satoshi.”
3

In October 2012, GLBSE ceased operations.
3

Offerings of SatoshiDICE Shares
9.
In a first SatoshiDICE offering, which took place from August 2012 through
January 2013, SatoshiDICE offered and sold 10 million shares, which represented a 10% interest
in the company. SatoshiDICE offered these shares in three separate tranches at prices between
0.0032 and 0.0037 bitcoins per share. The shares of SatoshiDICE were listed on MPEx, a
purported Bitcoin trading platform based in Romania.
10.
Voorhees published a prospectus for this first SatoshiDICE offering, which he
made widely available on the Internet. According to a summary prospectus, SatoshiDICE sought
to “raise IPO capital through an equity offering on the MPEx platform by releasing 10% of its
100,000,000 shares. Starting from the first full calendar month after the IPO, shares will pay
dividends equal to 100% of SatoshiDICE net profits ….” The prospectus was never filed with the
Commission.
11.
In addition, Voorhees made general solicitations over the Internet, which included
posts on the Bitcoin Forum, on Facebook.com, and on other Bitcoin-related websites.
12.
According to the prospectus and statements made by Voorhees, 10% of the funds
raised in the offering would be used on a “high profile print marketing campaign in European
gaming publications.” Voorhees also posted on the Bitcoin Forum that he planned to use the
remaining proceeds to fund two undisclosed startups. Finally, the prospectus included statistics
about SatoshiDICE’s earnings and expenses.
13.
The first SatoshiDICE offering raised 34,500 bitcoins. At the time of the offering,
34,500 bitcoins were worth approximately $371,910.
14.
In a second SatoshiDICE offering, which took place in February 2013,
SatoshiDICE offered and sold an additional 3 million of its shares at prices between 0.0044 and
0.0062 bitcoins per share, which raised 16,100 bitcoins. At the time of this second offering, 16,100
bitcoins were worth approximately $337,827.
15.
On July 17, 2013, Voorhees announced on the Bitcoin Forum that SatoshiDICE
was being sold and that in anticipation of the sale, SatoshiDICE would buy back all outstanding
shares from investors. Voorhees posted that SatoshiDICE would buy the shares at 0.0035 bitcoins
per share, which was at a 277% premium over the per share price that SatoshiDICE received in the
sale of the company and roughly a 175% premium over the current market price of the
SatoshiDICE shares listed on MPEx.
16.
Just prior to the sale, SatoshiDICE bought back all 13 million outstanding
SatoshiDICE shares from investors at a price of 0.0035 bitcoins per share, for a total of 45,500
bitcoins. Due to the significant rise in the exchange rate of bitcoin, the total USD amount paid to
investors in the buy-back transaction (approximately $3.8 million) exceeded the total USD amount
raised (approximately $722,659).
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17.
On July 18, 2013, Voorhees announced on the Bitcoin Forum that the buy-back had
been completed, SatoshiDICE had been sold to a private party and that shares of SatoshiDICE had
been “delisted.”
18.
No registration statement was filed for the FeedZeBirds or SatoshiDICE offerings,
and no exemption from registration was applicable to these transactions.
19.
Voorhees used the Internet in connection with these offers and sales of
FeedZeBirds and SatoshiDICE shares.
20.
As a result of the conduct described above, Voorhees violated Sections 5(a) and
5(c) of the Securities Act, which prohibit the direct or indirect sale of securities, offer to sell or
offer to buy securities through the mails or interstate commerce unless a registration statement has
been filed or is in effect.

Undertaking
Respondent has undertaken to:
Forgo directly or indirectly, including, but not limited to, through any entity owned or
controlled by Respondent, participating in any issuance of any security in an unregistered
transaction, in exchange for bitcoins or other virtual currency, for a period of five years.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondent’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
A.
Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Respondent cease and desist from
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the
Securities Act.
B.

Respondent shall comply with the undertaking enumerated in Section III above.

C.
Respondent shall, within twenty (20) days of the entry of this Order, pay
disgorgement of $15,000 and prejudgment interest of $843.98 to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule
of Practice 600.
C.
Respondent shall, within twenty (20) days of the entry of this Order, pay civil
money penalties of $35,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If timely payment is not
made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §3717.
5

D.

The foregoing payments must be made in one of the following ways:

(1) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the
SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(2) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal
money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and handdelivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying Erik T.
Voorhees as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy
of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Valerie A. Szczepanik, Assistant
Regional Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, New York
Regional Office, Brookfield Place, 200 Vesey Street, Suite 400, New York, NY 10281-1022.

By the Commission.

Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Release No. 9685 / December 8, 2014
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 73783 / December 8, 2014
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
Release No. 31366 / December 8, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-16307
In the Matter of
BTC TRADING, CORP.
AND ETHAN BURNSIDE,
Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-ANDDESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933, SECTIONS 15(b) AND 21C OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, AND SECTION 9(b) OF THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASEAND-DESIST ORDER

I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate and in
the public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby
are, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), Sections
15(b), and 21C of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and Section 9(b)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”), against BTC Trading,
Corp. (“BTC Trading”) and Ethan Burnside (“Burnside”) (collectively “Respondents”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted an
Offer of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for
the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the
findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of
these proceedings, which are admitted, and except as provided herein in Section V, Respondents
consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings

Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange
Act of 1934, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Making Findings, and
Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offer, the Commission finds that:
Summary
This matter involves two enterprises -- LTC-Global Virtual Stock Exchange (“LTCGlobal”) and BTC Virtual Stock Exchange (“BTCT Co.”) -- that Burnside and BTC Trading
operated as unregistered, online, virtual currency-denominated securities exchanges and brokerdealers during the period from August 2012 through October 2013.1 Each enterprise launched
and operated its own website (www.litecoinglobal.com and www.btct.co) and required interested
persons to complete an online registration to open an account and access services. Registered
accountholders (“users”) could buy, sell and trade securities of businesses listed on the websites
using the virtual currencies Bitcoin and Litecoin, and the businesses were themselves primarily
virtual currency-related enterprises. Burnside, an experienced computer programmer, and his
company, BTC Trading, launched the two website enterprises during the early stages of the
adoption and use of these virtual currencies. Through the websites, Burnside also offered shares
in unregistered transactions in exchange for bitcoins and litecoins in LTC-Global and LTCMining, another virtual currency enterprise founded by Burnside.
Respondents
1.
Burnside, age 37, resides in El Segundo, California. Burnside has a background
in computer science and has extensive experience as a computer programmer and computer
systems engineer. Currently, he is employed as a systems engineer and manager in Los Angeles,
California, by a multiplayer online social gaming company. Burnside has never been registered
with the Commission in any capacity.
2.
BTC Trading, Corp. is a Belize corporation and the alter ego of Burnside that he
founded in November 2012. BTC Trading’s sole business was the operation of LTC-Global and
BTCT Co. BTC Trading is 100% owned and operated by Burnside and has never been
registered with the Commission in any capacity.
1

For purposes of this Order, a “virtual currency” is a digital representation of value that can be
digitally traded and functions as a medium of exchange; a unit of account; and/or a store of
value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal
offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and
fulfills the above functions only by agreement within the community of users of the virtual
currency. Virtual currency is distinct from fiat currency, which is the coin and paper money of a
country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a
medium of exchange in the issuing country. It also is distinct from e-money, which is a digital
representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated in fiat currency,
i.e., e-money electronically transfers value that has legal tender status.
2

Other Entities
3.
LTC-Global Virtual Stock Exchange was founded and developed by Burnside and
BTC Trading as an online, litecoin-denominated “securities exchange.” Burnside launched
LTC-Global’s website (www.litecoinglobal.com) in August 2012, and offered and sold shares of
LTC-Global as one of the listings on its website. LTC-Global is not an incorporated entity and
has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. In October 2013, LTC-Global
ceased operating.
4.
BTC Virtual Stock Exchange was founded and developed by Burnside and BTC
Trading as an online, bitcoin-denominated “securities exchange.” In December 2012, Burnside
launched BTCT Co’s website (www.btct.co). BCTC Co. is not an incorporated entity and has
never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. In October 2013, BTCT Co. ceased
operating.
5.
LTC-Mining is a litecoin mining business owned and operated by Burnside.2 In
July and September 2012, Burnside offered and sold litecoin- and bitcoin-denominated “LTC
Mining bonds,” which entitled “bondholders” to share in any profits LTC Mining earned from
mining litecoins. LTC Mining is not an incorporated entity and has never been registered with
the Commission in any capacity. In late 2013, LTC-Mining ceased operating.
Respondents Operated as Unregistered Exchanges and Unregistered Broker-Dealers
6.
In August 2012, Burnside and BTC Trading launched LTC-Global
(www.litecoinglobal.com) as an online, litecoin-denominated securities exchange. Through the
website, in exchange for litecoins, registered users bought, sold, and traded securities in initial
and secondary securities offerings of businesses (or “issuers’) listed on the website.
7.
In December 2012, Burnside and BTC Trading launched BTCT Co.’s website
(www.btct.co) as an online, bitcoin-denominated securities exchange. BTCT Co. operated
almost identically to LTC-Global, but accepted bitcoins, instead of litecoins, as payment.
8.
According to its website, BTCT Co. allowed users to “experiment with virtual
currency investing by purchasing stock in virtual currency” and/or “start a virtual currency
company and issue stock to raise funds” for that company. Although anyone was permitted to
register with either website, the websites were marketed to and popular with virtual currency
enthusiasts. Issuers listed on the websites primarily were virtual currency-related businesses,
such as virtual currency mining operations.

2

A virtual currency “miner” is an individual or entity that participates in a decentralized virtual
currency network by running special software to solve complex algorithms in a distributed proofof-work or other distributed proof system used to validate transactions in the virtual currency
system. Certain virtual currencies (e.g., Bitcoin and Litecoin), self-generate units of the currency
by rewarding miners with newly created coins.
3

9.
Burnside launched the two websites when the exchange rates to U.S. dollars
(“USD”) of Litecoin and Bitcoin were low. From August 2012 to the present, the exchange rate
to USD of Litecoin has fluctuated between a low of $0.02 per litecoin on August 27, 2012 and a
high of $40.73 per litecoin on November 28, 2013. From December 2012 to the present,
the exchange rate to USD of Bitcoin has fluctuated between a low of $12.56 per bitcoin on
December 2, 2012 and a high of $1,209.94 per bitcoin on November 30, 2013.
Account Opening, Deposits, and Custody of Customer Funds
10.
Any individual or group was permitted to open an account and access the
websites’ services after completing an online registration form. The only information required
for registration was a valid email address, which allowed users of each website to maintain a
certain level of anonymity. Registration was free. Once registered, users could view their
account history and balance online.
11.
Both websites maintained custody of users’ litecoins and bitcoins. Registered
users deposited litecoins and bitcoins with each site by accessing certain computer software that
allowed them to digitally transfer funds. Each website maintained custody of its users’ funds,
which were co-mingled in the website’s virtual currency wallet.3 Users could request to
withdraw their funds at any time. Neither website, however, offered users the ability to convert
virtual currency into USD or any other fiat currency.
12.
Through posts on an internet website dedicated to Bitcoin known as the Bitcoin
Forum (bitcointalk.org) and other websites dedicated to virtual currency, Burnside solicited users
to open accounts and access the websites’ services. During the relevant operating periods,
approximately 2,655 users opened online accounts with LTC-Global and approximately 7,959
users opened online accounts with BTCT Co.
Listing of Initial and Secondary Securities Offerings and Issuance of Shares
13.
In order to list the offer and sale of securities on either website, an issuer
submitted an online application that included an “investment contract” prepared by the issuer.
An investment contact typically included a description of the issuer’s operation and the
investment being offered. LTC-Global and BTCT Co. charged each issuer a flat listing fee of
250 litecoins and 5 bitcoins respectively. There was also a “terms of service” for the websites
that, among other provisions, required that the issuer’s business or operation was “legal in the
United States.”
14.
LTC-Global shareholders had to approve a new listing application through an
online voting process operated by Burnside. Once a listing application was approved, registered
users of either website could create issuances of stock and list initial and secondary offerings of
securities. The shares of stock were uncertified; the issuance and subsequent ownership of
shares by shareholders was reflected in the online account statements that the website maintained
3

A virtual currency wallet is a means (software application or other mechanism/medium) for
holding, storing and transferring virtual currency.
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for all registered users. The website provided each issuer with a list of its shareholders and their
holdings every 12 hours so that the issuer could continue to operate its listing if either website
ever shut down.
15.
Issuers could also advertise their listing by posting a prospectus and business plan
online. Issuers could directly post notifications on the websites and, if they did so, all
shareholders in that particular issuer automatically received a copy of the notification by email.
Although issuers were responsible for posting and updating their content online, Burnside
maintained limited moderator-type rights over the websites.
16.
Burnside regularly posted information on the Bitcoin Forum and other websites
dedicated to virtual currency advertising LTC-Global and BTCT Co.’s listing services. Through
these posts, Burnside solicited issuers to utilize the websites’ listing services. As a result, during
the relevant operating periods, approximately 52 issuers entered into contracts to list their shares
with LTC-Global and paid a total of 11,450 litecoins in listing fees and approximately 69 issuers
entered into contracts to list their shares with BTCT Co. and paid a total of 210 bitcoins in listing
fees. None of the issuers registered a class of securities with the Commission under the
Exchange Act, and none of the issuers registered an offering of securities with the Commission
under the Securities Act.
Trading, Trade Execution, and Trade Reporting
17.
In addition to providing a platform to invest in securities offerings, registered
users could initiate and place different types of trades, including options trades, through each
website. In exchange for these services, Burnside and BTC Trading received transaction-based
compensation based directly on the size or type of securities transaction.
18.
In order to initiate and place a trade, registered users entered “bids” and “asks”
through an online order book maintained on each website, and each website used a nondiscretionary system to match and execute trades according to price and time priority. Neither
website received any external orders for securities or routed orders to any other online virtual
currency exchange. Both websites reported and publicly displayed all trades, quotes and
dividends paid. The websites also reported trading volume for each listed security.
19.
Through posts on the Bitcoin Forum and other websites dedicated to virtual
currency, Burnside and BTC Trading solicited users to place trades in listed securities in
exchange for transaction-based compensation. As a result, during the relevant operating periods,
LTC-Global users executed approximately 60,496 trades through LTC-Global’s website, paying
a total of 12,081 litecoins in transaction-based compensation and BTCT Co. users executed
approximately 366,490 trades through BTCT Co.’s website, paying a total of 2,141 bitcoins in
transaction-based compensation.
Burnside Winds Down LTC-Global and BTCT Co.
20.
Beginning in September 2013, shortly after the Commission staff contacted
Burnside, he began an orderly wind down of the operations of both websites. This included
disabling the registration and trading functions of the websites while maintaining the users’
5

ability to request the withdrawal of their funds. Burnside provided the websites’ users with
advance notice of the wind down and established procedures intended to prevent user losses.
During the wind down period, users withdrew funds totaling approximately 200,000 litecoins
and 20,000 bitcoins, which were held in virtual currency wallets maintained by each website. By
October 31, 2013, both websites had ceased operating.
The Offering of Shares in Unregistered Transactions
21.
In separate unregistered transactions, Burnside offered to sell and buy shares of
two virtual currency enterprises that he owned and operated.
Offer and Sale of LTC-Global Securities
22.
From August 2012 through August 2013, Burnside offered and sold 1,322
dividend-paying shares of LTC-Global, with a maximum of 951 shares outstanding at any given
time. The price of the shares ranged between 25 and 399 litecoins per share, and four shares sold
for 2 bitcoins per share. The shares were offered on LTC-Global’s website as one of its stock
listings.
23.
Burnside made general solicitations to sell shares of LTC-Global over the
Internet, which included posts on the Bitcoin Forum and other Bitcoin-related websites.
24.
Burnside raised 109,387 litecoins and 8 bitcoins from the sale of LTC-Global
shares. At the time Burnside sold the shares, the total USD value of the litecoins and bitcoins he
raised was approximately $92,954.
25.
Pursuant to the investment contract with LTC-Global shareholders, Burnside
distributed to LTC-Global shareholders 100% of the profits earned from the operation of both
websites as dividends. Burnside, who owned approximately 90.5% of the shares of LTC-Global,
received dividends totaling 67,751 litecoins. The total USD value of the dividends received by
Burnside at the time the dividends were paid was approximately $102,653.
26.
Beginning in August 2012, in another unregistered transaction, Burnside began
buying back outstanding shares of LTC-Global from investors who wished to sell them, some of
which he resold to other investors. In September 2013, in connection with Burnside’s decision
to shut down the operations of both websites, Burnside agreed to buy back all outstanding shares
of LTC-Global from investors. During the period from August 2012 through November 2013,
Burnside purchased a total of 1,278 shares for a total of 54,798 litecoins (an average of
approximately 43 litecoins per share) and 44 shares for a total of 11 bitcoins (0.25 bitcoins per
share). Due to the significant rise in the exchange rate of litecoin, the total USD amount paid to
investors in the buy-back transactions (approximately $142,457) exceeded the total USD amount
raised (approximately $92,954).
Offer and Sale of LTC-Mining Securities
27.
In two unregistered transactions in July and September 2012, Burnside offered for
sale “LTC-Mining bonds,” which entitled “bondholders” to an interest in the profits LTC Mining
6

earned from mining litecoins. Although Burnside called the investment a bond, it was in essence
preferred stock that paid dividends.
28.
In the first of these unregistered transactions, Burnside offered and sold 789 LTCMining shares for 0.43 bitcoins per share. The shares were first listed on the Global Bitcoin
Stock Exchange (“GLBSE”), which purported to run a bitcoin-denominated stock exchange4 and
later on BTCT Co.’s website. 5
29.
Burnside solicited investors in the first offering by regularly posting information
on the Bitcoin Forum in a thread titled “The First Perpetual LTC-Mining Bond.” Burnside
provided certain disclosures as part of this offering, posting extensive information about himself,
how the mining operation worked, his involvement in the operation, and the terms of the
offering.
30.
The first LTC-Mining offering raised 339 bitcoins. Burnside used the proceeds of
the offering to buy computers and specialized graphic cards to support his mining operation. At
the time of the offering, 339 bitcoins were worth approximately $2,644.
31.
In a second unregistered transaction in September 2012, Burnside offered and
sold an additional 500 shares of “LTC-Mining bonds” for an average of 129.74 litecoins per
share. Burnside offered the bonds on LTC-Global, his newly launched litecoin-denominated
stock exchange and in contrast to the first unregistered LTC-Mining bond offering, sought
payment in litecoins rather than bitcoins.
32.
Burnside solicited investors in the second LTC-Mining bond offering through
posts he made on the Bitcoin Forum. On September 27, 2012, Burnside posted that the litecoin
and bitcoin-denominated LTC-Mining bonds were identical and that the only difference between
the two offerings was that “you get paid [dividends] in LTC instead of BTC.”
33.
The second LTC-Mining bond offering raised 64,870 litecoins, which was worth
approximately $2,834 at the time of the offering.
34.
In June 2013, in a third unregistered transaction and almost a year after the first
LTC-Mining bond offering, Burnside offered to buy back the “bonds” from all existing
bondholders due to the unprofitability of the investment and the rise in value of bitcoins and
litecoins. In connection with the buy-back transactions, Burnside paid LTC-Mining shareholders
a total of 33,100 litecoins and 236 bitcoins. Due to the significant rise in the exchange rate of
bitcoins and litecoins, the total USD amount paid to investors in the buy-back transactions
(approximately $59,504) exceeded the total USD amount raised (approximately $5,490). Also,
4

In October 2012, GLBSE ceased operations.
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Burnside launched BTCT Co. shortly after the GLBSE ceased operating and offered GLBSE
issuers the ability to transfer their stock listings and holdings from the GLBSE to BTCT Co. at
no charge. Burnside transferred his listing of LTC-Mining from GLBSE to BTCT Co. and
created user accounts for all LTC-Mining shareholders.
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shareholders who purchased shares in the IPO received approximately a 10% return on their
investment.
Legal Analysis
35.
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act provides that, unless a registration statement is
in effect as to a security, it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to engage in the
unregistered offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act
provides a similar prohibition against offers to sell, or offers to buy, unless a registration
statement has been filed. Thus, both Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibit the
unregistered offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce, unless the offerings are exempt.
See 15 USC §77e.
36.
As described above, Burnside offered to buy and sell shares of LTC-Global and
LTC-Mining over the Internet and was required to register the offerings with the Commission or
qualify for an exemption. No registration statement was filed for the LTC-Global or LTCMining offerings, and no exemption from registration was applicable to these transactions. As a
result, Burnside willfully violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.
37.
Section 5 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any broker, dealer, or
exchange, directly or indirectly, to effect any transaction in a security, or to report any such
transaction, in interstate commerce, unless the exchange is registered as a national securities
exchange under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, or is exempted from such registration. See 15
USC §78e. Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act defines an “exchange” as “any organization,
association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of
securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly
performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood … .” 15 USC §78c(a)(1).
Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 further defines an exchange to mean an organization, association, or
group of persons that: (1) brings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers;
and (2) uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or
by setting rules) under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers
entering such orders agree to the terms of the trade. 17 CFR 240.3b-16(a). The Commission has
also stated that “an exchange or contract market would be required to register under Section 5 of
the Exchange Act if it provides direct electronic access to persons located in the U.S.” Exchange
Act Rel. No. 34-60194 (June 30, 2009), 74 FR 32200, 32204 (July 7, 2009) (order granting
exemptions).
38.
As described above, Burnside and BTC Trading operated LTC-Global and BTCT
Co. as “virtual stock exchanges.” Section 5 of the Exchange Act required them to register both
enterprises with the Commission or obtain a formal exemption from registration. Both LTCGlobal and BTCT Co. operations provided issuers the ability to create and list initial and
secondary securities offerings through their websites in exchange for a flat listing fee. During
the relevant time period, approximately 52 issuers entered into contracts to list their shares with
LTC-Global and they paid a total of 11,450 litecoins in listing fees. Approximately 69 issuers
entered into contracts with BTCT Co. and paid a total of 210 bitcoins in listing fees. Registered
users could also invest and trade in any listed security through each website, which used a non8

discretionary system to match and execute trades. By failing to register LTC-Global and BTCT
Co. as national securities exchanges, or to obtain an exemption from such registration, Burnside
and BTC Trading willfully violated Section 5 of the Exchange Act.
39.
Subject to limited exceptions and exceptions not applicable to Burnside and BTC
Trading, Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer “to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale, of any security … unless
such broker or dealer is registered” in accordance with Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act. 15
USC §78o. Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines a “broker” as a person, including a
company, engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.
A person is engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions if he or she regularly
“participates in securities transactions at key points in the chain of distribution.” See
Massachusetts Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 411, 415 (D. Mass.
1976), aff’d, 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976). Such participation includes, among other activities,
assisting an issuer to structure prospective securities transactions, helping an issuer to identify
potential purchasers of securities, and soliciting securities transactions. See Strengthening the
Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-47265
(Jan. 28, 2003), 68 FR 6006, 6014-15 n.82 (Feb. 5, 2003) (adopting release).
40.
As described above, LTC-Global’s and BTCT Co.’s business, directed by
Burnside, was to effect transactions in securities for the accounts of others. BTC Trading,
directed by Burnside, actively solicited the public to open accounts by advertising the websites
on the Bitcoin Forum and other websites dedicated to virtual currency. As a result of these
solicitation efforts, during the relevant operating periods, approximately 2,655 users opened
online accounts with LTC-Global and executed approximately 60,496 trades through the
website, paying a total of 12,081 litecoins in transaction-based compensation. Approximately
7,959 users opened online accounts with BTCT Co. and executed approximately 366,490 trades
through the website, paying a total of 2,141 bitcoins in transaction-based compensation. As a
result of this conduct, Burnside and BTC Trading were required to register with the Commission
as a broker or dealer. By failing to register as a broker or dealer and as a result of their conduct
described in this Order, Burnside and BTC Trading willfully violated Section 15(a) of the
Exchange Act.
Respondents’ Remedial Efforts
In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts promptly
undertaken by Respondents and cooperation afforded the Commission staff. Beginning in
September 2013, in immediate response to the Commission staff’s investigation, Burnside began
an orderly wind down of both websites. Since September 2013, users have withdrawn funds
totaling approximately 200,000 litecoins and 20,000 bitcoins, and in October 2013, both websites
ceased operating. Throughout the investigation, Burnside fully cooperated with the Commission
staff, providing early and substantial assistance. He made himself available to Commission staff
upon request, translated data into accessible formats while producing the raw data to permit
independent verification, and he retained financial audit experts to assist in the generation and
formatting of reports in order to enable the staff to quickly ascertain the scope and operation of
9

his enterprises. Burnside’s efforts facilitated the staff’s investigation involving an emerging
technology.
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public
interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents’ Offer.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Sections 15(b), and 21C of the
Exchange Act, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, it is hereby ordered that:
A.
Respondent Burnside cease and desist from committing or causing any violations
and any future violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.
B.
Respondents Burnside and BTC Trading cease and desist from committing or
causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 5 and 15(a) of the Exchange Act.
C.

Respondent Burnside be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities
dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating
organization;
prohibited from serving or acting as an employee, officer, director, member of an advisory
board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered
investment company or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or principal
underwriter; and
barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a
promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a
broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or
inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock;
with the right to apply for reentry after two (2) years to the appropriate self-regulatory
organization, or if there is none, to the Commission.
D.
Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the
applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned
upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the
following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the
Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration
award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any selfregulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct
that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a selfregulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the
Commission order.
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E.
Respondent Burnside shall pay disgorgement, which represents profits gained as a
result of the conduct described herein, of $55,000 and prejudgment interest of $3,387.07, for a
total of $58,387.07, to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the United States
Treasury. Payments shall be made in the following installments.
(1) $10,000 within ten days of the entry of this Order;
(2) $24,193.54 within 180 days of entry of the Order; and
(3) $24,193.54 plus prejudgment interest on the payments described in Section IV.E(2)
and IV.E.(3) pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600, within 360 days of entry of the Order.
Prior to making the payment described in Section IV.E(3), Respondent Burnside shall
contact the Commission staff to ensure the inclusion of prejudgment interest. If any payment is
not made by the date the payment is required by this Section IV.E, the entire outstanding balance
of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, plus any additional interest accrued pursuant to SEC Rule
600, shall be due and payable immediately, without further application.
F.
Respondent Burnside shall, within 10 days of this Order, pay civil money
penalties of $10,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the United States
Treasury. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
§3717.
G.

Payments under this Order must be made in one of the following ways:
1. Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission,
which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon
request;
2. Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov
through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
3. Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United
States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying Ethan
Burnside and BTC Trading, Corp. as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of
these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Valerie
A. Szczepanik, Assistant Regional Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission, New York Regional Office, Brookfield Place, 200 Vesey Street, Suite 400, New
York, NY 10281-1022, or such other person or address as the Commission staff may provide.
11

H.
Respondents acknowledge that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty in
excess of $10,000 based upon their cooperation in a Commission investigation. If at any time
following the entry of the Order, the Division of Enforcement (“Division”) obtains information
indicating that Respondents knowingly provided materially false or misleading information or
materials to the Commission or in a related proceeding, the Division may, at its sole discretion
and with prior notice to the Respondents, petition the Commission to reopen this matter and seek
an order directing that the Respondents pay an additional civil penalty. Respondents may contest
by way of defense in any resulting administrative proceeding whether it knowingly provided
materially false or misleading information, but may not: (1) contest the findings in the Order; or
(2) assert any defense to liability or remedy, including, but not limited to, any statute of
limitations defense.
V.
It is further Ordered that, solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section
523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, the findings in this Order are true and admitted by
Burnside, and further, any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other
amounts due by Burnside under this Order or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or
settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by
Burnside of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set
forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(19).
By the Commission.

Brent J. Fields
Secretary
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
___________________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
HOMERO JOSHUA GARZA,
)
GAW MINERS, LLC, and
)
ZENMINER, LLC (d/b/a ZEN CLOUD),
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________________ )
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Case No.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“the Commission”) alleges
the following against Defendants Homero Joshua Garza (“Garza”), GAW Miners, LLC (“GAW
Miners”), and ZenMiner, LLC (d/b/a ZenCloud) (“ZenMiner”), and hereby demands a jury trial:
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1.

Defendants used the lure of quick riches from a twenty-first century payment

system known as virtual currency to defraud investors. Though cloaked in technological
sophistication and jargon, defendants’ fraud was simple at its core – defendants sold what they
did not own, and misrepresented the nature of what they were selling.
2.

From approximately August 2014 through December 2014, defendants sold – to

over 10,000 investors – investment contracts representing shares in the profits they claimed
would be generated from using their purported computing power to “mine” for virtual currency.
“Mining” for virtual currency means applying computer power to try to solve complex equations
that verify a group of transactions in that virtual currency. The first computer (or collection of
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computers) to solve such an equation is awarded new units of that virtual currency. This process
is known as “mining,” and the computer equipment used in this process, and the humans who
own it, are known as “miners.”
3.

Defendants sold shares in the returns from their purported mining operations, via

investment contracts that they named “Hashlets.” Hashlet contracts entitled their purchasers to a
share of the profits from defendants’ purported “hashing power,” or the computing power
(measured in megahash per second), that defendants purportedly devoted to virtual currency
mining. In reality, defendants sold far more Hashlets worth of computing power than they
actually had in their computing centers. There was no computer equipment to back up the vast
majority of Hashlets that defendants sold.
4.

Defendants earned about $19 million in revenue from their sales of Hashlets.

5.

Defendants Garza and GAW Miners made many false and misleading statements

about GAW Miners’ virtual currency mining operations to potential and actual investors. For
example, they misrepresented:
a. that all of the Hashlets of computing power purchased by investors would be
pooled together to engage in virtual currency mining, and that investors’
returns, or “payouts,” would be calculated based on the success of those
collective virtual currency mining operations;
b. that buying a Hashlet would allow investors to mine virtual currency without
the expense and expertise that would be required to purchase and maintain
their own virtual currency mining equipment;
c. the profitability and life-span of Hashlets;
d. the extent of GAW Miners’ mining activities; and
2
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e.

how the payouts for Hashlets were derived.

Garza and GAW Miners knew that each of these statements was false at the time it was made.
6.

Defendants’ Hashlet sales had many of the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme. Because

defendants sold far more computing power than they owned and dedicated to virtual currency
mining, they owed investors a daily return that was larger than any actual return they were
making on their limited mining operations. Instead, investors were simply paid back gradually
over time, as “returns,” the money that they, and others, had invested. As a result, some
investors’ funds were used to make payments to other investors. Most Hashlet investors never
recovered the full amount of their investments, and few made a profit.
7.

Through the activities alleged in this Complaint, defendants have engaged in

fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in violation of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and various subparts of Rule 10b-5
thereunder; and fraud in the offer or sale of securities, in violation of various subparts of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). Defendants have also engaged in the offer
and sale of unregistered securities, in violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.
8.

Based on these violations, the Commission seeks:
a. the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from
further violations of the relevant provisions of the federal securities
laws;
b. disgorgement of defendants’ ill-gotten gains, plus pre-judgment
interest; and
c. the imposition of civil penalties due to the egregious nature of
defendants’ violations.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9.

The Commission seeks a permanent injunction and disgorgement pursuant to

Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(b)], and Section 21(d)(1) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(1)]. The Commission seeks the imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to
Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(d)], and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(3)].
10.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(d) and 22(a) of

the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§77t(d), 77v(a)], and Sections 21(d), 21(e) and 27 of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§78u(d), 78u(e), 78aa].
11.

Venue is proper in this District because, at all relevant times, GAW Miners, LLC,

and ZenMiner, LLC maintained offices in Connecticut and conducted business in Connecticut;
and Homero Joshua Garza lived in Connecticut. A substantial part of the actions that give rise to
the Commission’s claims occurred in Connecticut.
12.

In connection with the conduct described in this Complaint, defendants directly or

indirectly made use of the mails or the means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce.
13.

Defendants’ conduct involved fraud, deceit, or deliberate or reckless disregard of

regulatory requirements, and resulted in substantial loss, or significant risk of substantial loss, to
other persons.
DEFENDANTS
14.

Homero Joshua Garza (“Garza”), age 30, presently lives in Brattleboro,

Vermont, though he lived in Somers, Connecticut during 2014. During all of 2014, he was the

4
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founder and CEO of GAW Miners, LLC, and he owned and controlled ZenMiner. In those
positions, which he held since those companies were founded, he directed their strategy, their
financial decisions, and had ultimate control over their day-to-day operations.
15.

GAW Miners, LLC (“GAW Miners”) is a Delaware limited liability company

whose principal place of business is in Bloomfield, Connecticut. GAW Miners was formed in
May 2014. Garza is the Managing Member and majority owner of GAW Miners. During all
relevant times, Garza has controlled GAW Miners and directed its day-to-day activities.
16.

ZenMiner, LLC (“ZenMiner”) is a Delaware limited liability company, which

shares a principal place of business with GAW Miners in Bloomfield, Connecticut, and was
formed in July 2014. ZenMiner also does business under the name ZenCloud, and utilized the
website www.zencloud.com. Garza is the Managing Member and majority owner of ZenMiner.
During all relevant times, Garza controlled ZenMiner and directed its day-to-day activities.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background on Virtual Currency and Its “Mining”
17.

“Virtual currency” is a digital representation of value that can be traded and

functions as a medium of exchange; a unit of account; and/or a store of value, but does not have
legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any
jurisdiction. Virtual currency generally is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction or
government, and its value is decided by consensus within the community of users of the virtual
currency. The most widely adopted virtual currency is bitcoin, although there are many other
virtual currencies used today, known as “altcoins.” Virtual currency is distinct from fiat
currency, which is the money designated by a country as its legal tender. An example of fiat
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currency is the United States dollar. Virtual currencies may be traded on online exchanges for
fiat currencies, including the United States dollar, or used to purchase goods and services.
18.

Bitcoin, and some other virtual currencies, can be “mined.” A virtual currency

“miner” is an individual or entity, and her or its computer equipment, that runs special computer
software to solve complex algorithms that validate groups of transactions in that virtual currency.
19.

Each unit of virtual currency has a “blockchain,” which is an electronic public

ledger of all transactions in that currency.
20.

Certain virtual currencies, including bitcoin, self-generate units of the currency by

rewarding miners with newly created coins when they are the first to solve the algorithms that
validate transactions in the currency. Using bitcoin as an example, the bitcoin network collects
all transactions made during a set time period, usually around ten minutes, into a list called a
"block." Bitcoin miners compete to be the first to confirm the transactions in the block and write
them into the blockchain. The first miner to solve the algorithm that confirms a transaction is
rewarded with a preset amount of newly-issued bitcoins by the bitcoin protocol. This process of
solving equations to confirm transactions and to earn new coins is known as “mining” that
currency.
21.

As interest in bitcoin, and corresponding competition among miners, increased,

more computer processing power became required in order for a miner to have a chance of
solving blocks, and thus obtain the rewards of mining. The processing power of computers used
to confirm virtual currency transactions is measured by their "hash rate," or the number of
calculations they can perform per second (e.g., a computer with a hash rate of 10 megahash can
make 10 million calculations per second). The greater a computer’s hash rate, the greater that

6

Case 3:15-cv-01760 Document 1 Filed 12/01/15 Page 7 of 23

computer’s chance to solve the equation that confirms transactions, and the more virtual currency
coins the miner may earn.
22.

Given the increasing competition to solve the equations that confirm blockchain

transactions, miners frequently combine their computing power into mining “pools.” As a
general rule, the more computing power directed to a particular mining pool, the better the
chance that pool will be the first to confirm a block of transactions and receive the payout for
mining. Generally, pool participants’ shares of the mining reward depend upon the proportional
amount of computing power each contributes to the pool.
23.

From August 2014, when defendants first offered Hashlets for sale, to the present,

the exchange rate of U.S. dollars to bitcoins has fluctuated between a low of approximately $177
per bitcoin and a high of approximately $600 per bitcoin.
GAW Miners and ZenMiner’s Rapidly Evolving Businesses
24.

In approximately March 2014, Garza began operating a business to purchase

virtual currency mining equipment from its overseas manufacturers and to resell it to customers.
He founded GAW Miners in May 2014, and thereafter conducted his hardware resale business
under the GAW Miners name. Until approximately May or June of 2014, GAW Miners’
primary business was to sell virtual currency mining equipment.
25.

In the spring of 2014, GAW Miners began offering its customers a new service

called Hardware Hosted Mining. Instead of shipping to its customers the computer hardware
they ordered from GAW Miners, GAW Miners offered to host the computer hardware that the
customers purchased in its own datacenter. Customers paid GAW Miners a fee to cover the
expenses that GAW Miners incurred to operate their hardware, such as maintenance, electricity,
cooling, and Internet connectivity. While the customers’ mining equipment physically resided in
7
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GAW Miners’ datacenter in Connecticut, customers maintained complete and direct control over
how they used their equipment to engage in mining, by accessing their equipment remotely
through their personal computers over the Internet.
26.

Within weeks of beginning to offer Hardware Hosted Mining, in approximately

June 2014, GAW Miners again changed the focus of its business. It began encouraging its
customers to switch from Hardware Hosted Mining to a new service called Cloud Hosted
Mining.
27.

In May 2014, Garza created a company named ZenMiner, which was formally

incorporated in July 2014. Though he persuaded other individuals to represent to customers and
the public that ZenMiner was an independent company, Garza owned and controlled ZenMiner
at all times. On information and belief, Garza perpetuated this deception because he believed
that GAW Miners could not offer cloud-based hosted mining services without alienating its
original hardware-purchasing customers.
28.

Cloud Hosted Mining was marketed as a partnership between ZenMiner and

GAW Miners. GAW Miners offered customers the ability to purchase their mining hardware
from it, and then house their equipment in ZenMiner’s datacenters for a fee. Customers could
control their mining equipment through the Internet by logging on to the accounts they
established on ZenMiner’s website interface called ZenCloud. ZenCloud promised customers
that “you don’t pay for shipping, cooling, or electricity. Let us cover all of that for you.”
29.

Customers who switched from GAW Miners’ Hardware Hosted Mining service to

Cloud Hosted Mining through ZenCloud lost some control over how they used their equipment
to engage in mining. ZenCloud users could only direct their equipment to engage in mining
through one of the handful of mining pools offered on the ZenCloud website.
8
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30.

GAW Miners gave their Cloud Hosted Mining customers the option to end their

ZenCloud hosted service at any time and receive their physical equipment in the mail from GAW
Miners.
31.

Cloud Hosted Mining was a fraudulent scheme in at least two respects.

32.

First, even though Garza fully controlled ZenMiner, he marketed it to the public

as a business entity that was distinct from GAW Miners.
33.

For example, on or about May 23, 2014, Garza participated in an interview with a

reporter for Cryptocoinsnews.com, during which he convinced a family member of a GAW
Miners’ investor to pretend that ZenMiner was that person’s company and idea. At the time of
the interview, Garza expected that the reporter would publish a story containing the
misrepresentations that ZenMiner was an entity separate from GAW Miners. That story was
published on or about May 23, 2014.
34.

This charade continued when, on or about August 24, 2014, GAW Miners issued

a press release announcing that its parent company (which was also owned and controlled by
Garza), had purchased a controlling stake in ZenMiner for $8 million, and that ZenMiner had
become a division of GAW Miners. This statement was false; no such transaction occurred
because Garza had always owned and controlled ZenMiner. Garza authorized and approved the
issuance of GAW Miners’ false press release. The purported ZenMiner transaction was
marketed as proof that GAW Miners was a leader in the virtual currency industry by bridging the
gap between hardware sellers and hosted mining services.
35.

Second, contrary to its stated reason for existence, no mining actually occurred

through ZenMiner’s ZenCloud interface. Though customers paid for equipment that they
believed they were directing to mine in various pools available through the ZenCloud interface,
9
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and also paid for hosting services, very few pieces of the mining equipment purchased by
customers actually existed in a ZenMiner datacenter. Most customers paid for a phantom piece
of equipment that neither GAW Miners nor ZenMiner owned. Neither GAW Miners nor
ZenMiner was directing customers’ computing power to any pools at all, much less the ones
customers believed they were choosing.
36.

Soon after GAW Miners’ Cloud Hosting Mining service launched, customers

began to complain that they could not see the increase in power in the mining pools they
believed they had chosen to mine through ZenCloud. These complaints were made public
through message boards dedicated to virtual currency mining.
37.

Cloud Hosted Mining customers were entitled to request that the computer

equipment they had purportedly purchased be sent to them, but neither GAW Miners nor
ZenMiner owned that equipment to ship. Facing potential mass customer demands that their
equipment be shipped, GAW Miners and ZenMiner again changed business models. GAW
Miners offered all of its customers the opportunity to convert their ZenCloud Cloud Hosted
machines to “Hashlets.”
GAW Miners and ZenMiner Create and Offer Investments in Hashlets
a.

What Are Hashlets?

38.

Beginning in August 2014, GAW Miners and ZenMiner decided to sell

“Hashlets” to the public. Buying a Hashlet entitled an investor to a share of the profits that
GAW Miners and/or ZenMiner would purportedly earn by mining virtual currencies using the
computers that were maintained in their data centers. Hashlets were purported to earn a return
based on the number of virtual currency units generated when the pools to which their computing
power was directed succeeded in processing and confirming virtual currency transactions. As
10
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ZenMiner’s terms of service stated, a Hashlet was “a divisible and assignable allocation of
hashing power from GAW-owned and hosted mining hardware.”
39.

Unlike Cloud Hosted Mining customers, Hashlet customers were not buying

computer hardware. Hashlet customers had no right to receive any piece of computer hardware
at the end of their Hashlet contract. Instead, Hashlet customers were buying the rights to profit
from a slice of the computing power owned by GAW Miners and/or ZenMiner (by then,
purportedly, a division of GAW Miners).
40.

Hashlet investors were required to do very little to purportedly mine virtual

currency. Investors only needed to log into their ZenCloud accounts and click-and-drag their
Hashlet icons over to the icons of the mining pools in which they wished their Hashlets to mine.
From there, investors relied solely on the efforts of GAW Miners and/or ZenMiner to generate
Hashlets’ expected profits by owning, housing, operating, maintaining, and connecting the
computer hardware that would engage in mining. If GAW Miners had received payouts from its
purported mining activities, Hashlet investors’ shares of those payouts would have been
calculated and deposited by GAW Miners into investors’ ZenCloud accounts.
41.

The majority of investors bought Hashlets through a web-based shopping portal

by paying with U.S. currency or with bitcoin. Some investors who were Cloud Hosted Mining
customers also bought Hashlets through their existing ZenCloud accounts, in part by converting
the value of their Cloud Hosted Mining equipment. Once an investor owned one Hashlet, she
could also buy additional Hashlets through her ZenCloud account, including by reinvesting the
“payouts” from her existing Hashlets into additional Hashlets.
42.

Investors were told that they could log on to their ZenCloud accounts, activate

their Hashlets using a code that was provided at the time of purchase, and then direct their
11
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Hashlets to engage in mining in one of the mining pools available through ZenCloud. One of the
mining pools, ZenPool, was purportedly operated by GAW Miners and/or ZenMiner and was
advertised as the “most profitable pool.”
43.

Investors’ shares of the profits that they purportedly earned as a result of their

Hashlets’ mining in pools were posted to their ZenCloud accounts daily. Investors were also
charged maintenance fees to pay for the purported physical upkeep of the equipment behind the
Hashlets. Those maintenance fees were deducted from investors’ ZenCloud accounts daily.
Investors could request a withdrawal, in bitcoin, from their ZenCloud accounts.
44.

GAW Miners’ press releases and website, and Garza’s posts on the company’s

message board variously described Hashlets as “the world’s first digital cloud miner” and as
“designed from the start to be the easiest, most convenient miner to own.” GAW Miners and
Garza marketed Hashlets specifically to non-technical people interested in virtual currency
mining, touting a Hashlet as being “so easy to use that it is ‘Grandma approved’”, and claiming
that “[i]f you can open an email, you can setup and operate a Hashlet.”
b.

GAW Miners and ZenMiner Oversold Hashlets

45.

GAW Miners began selling Hashlets in mid-August 2014. GAW Miners’ press

releases dated August 24 and August 26, 2014 claimed that “thousands of units per second” were
sold during their first day, and millions of dollars of Hashlets were sold during their first week,
of availability.
46.

There were two basic types of Hashlets – those that were purportedly able to mine

for bitcoin and those that were purportedly able to mine for altcoin. Bitcoin mining required
computers to solve a different algorithm than that used to mine for altcoin.

12
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47.

Prices for Hashlets ranged between about $10 and $50 per unit, depending on

their features, including which pools they were able to mine. A “unit” of a Hashlet was a
measurement of its hashing power, or the number of calculations it could perform per second.
Hashlets that mined bitcoin were sold in multiples of 1 gigahash per second units, and Hashlets
that mined altcoin were sold in multiples of 1 megahash per second units.
48.

During their first week of availability alone, GAW Miners and ZenMiner oversold

-- between triple and quadruple -- the number of Hashlets for which they had the supporting
computing power. Yet, their sales continued.
49.

By October 2014, GAW Miners had oversold Hashlets to an even more extreme

degree. It had oversold altcoin-mining Hashlets by at least about 100 times its computing
capacity, and bitcoin-mining Hashlets by at least about 5 times its computing capacity.
50.

Though GAW Miners built a data center that, by November 2014, contained

significant computing capacity for mining bitcoin, it made no increases to its computing capacity
for mining altcoin.
51.

Throughout the time that Hashlets were sold, from mid-August 2014 through

December 2014, GAW Miners and ZenMiner sold at least $19 million of Hashlets, to more than
10,000 investors.
52.

From the time that Hashlets went on sale in August 2014, and throughout the

entire time they were sold, Garza was provided information about how many units of Hashlets
were sold. Garza knew or should have known, from August 2014 onward, that GAW Miners
and ZenMiner did not have the computing capacity to support the units of Hashlets that they
sold.

13
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53.

Garza was responsible for GAW Miners’ and ZenMiner’s decision to keep selling

Hashlets despite his knowledge (or reckless or negligent disregard) that the companies lacked the
computing power they purported to be selling to investors.
54.

As a result of dramatically overselling their computing capacity, GAW Miners

and ZenMiner did not engage in mining with even approximately the amount of computing
power they had sold in Hashlets. As a further result, GAW Miners’ and ZenMiner’s revenues
from mining bitcoin were minimal, and their revenues from mining altcoin were virtually
nonexistent.
55.

Between August and December 2014, GAW Miners created several types of

Hashlets with different features. Garza approved the creation of these Hashlet varieties, and
frequently announced their availability on GAW Miners’ website and through posts on the
company’s message board.
56.

For example, on or about September 11, 2014, GAW Miners announced the

creation of the limited edition “Remember” Hashlet with the logo of “9/11” to commemorate
those whose lives were lost in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Garza announced that
GAW Miners would only sell 500 Remember Hashlets, and would donate all of the proceeds
(approximately $10,000) to “the 9/11 memorial fund.” He specified that “GAW will in no way
be profiting from any sales related to the cause.” After selling approximately 2,290 Remember
Hashlets for a total of approximately $48,000, GAW Miners donated only $10,000 to a 9/11
related charity. Garza knew or should have known that GAW Miners actually profited from the
sale of Remember Hashlets, contrary to his representations.
c.

GAW Miners and Garza Misrepresented Critical Aspects of Hashlets

57.

Garza directed many of GAW Miners’ publicity efforts for its Hashlet offerings.
14
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Garza had ultimate authority and control over GAW Miners’ promotional materials, including
the company’s website, and posts he made on the company’s message board. Garza also
frequently spoke to reporters for publications covering the virtual currency industry, and posted
information about GAW Miners and its products on social media outlets.
58.

GAW Miners and Garza made three basic types of misrepresentations to Hashlet

investors. First, they misleadingly claimed that Hashlets would be always profitable and never
obsolete, when they had no reasonable basis to support those claims. Second, they misleadingly
claimed that Hashlets were engaged in mining for virtual currency through pools available in
ZenCloud, when they knew that few Hashlets were supported by actual mining activity. Third,
they misleadingly claimed that ZenPool engaged in mining, when they knew that it never did.
59.

First, from approximately August through December 2014, GAW Miners’

website, and other promotional materials, described Hashlets as always profitable and never
obsolete. Garza also claimed on numerous occasions, including in a Hashtalk.org post in August
2014, words to the effect that “there will never be a time a Hashlet cost[s] more to run than you
make, and they will always make money.” GAW Miners also claimed, on its website, that
Hashlets would never break down or expire and this “guarantees your investment is protected
and secure, so you can enjoy many years of owning the world’s most advanced miner.”
60.

At the time GAW Miners and Garza made, or Garza authorized, these statements,

they knew or should have known that these statements were untrue. They knew or should have
known that the profitability of virtual currency mining depended on many unforeseeable factors,
including the market price of those virtual currencies, the cost of the electricity and cooling for
the equipment, and the extent to which the speed of developments in computing technology
made any equipment they owned obsolete. GAW Miners and Garza thus had no reasonable basis
15
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for these statements at the time they made or authorized them.
61.

GAW Miners’ and Garza’s statements about profitability and longevity were

material to Hashlet investors. GAW Miners conducted a marketing survey of hundreds of people
who purchased Hashlets during their first week of availability. Approximately 70 percent of
investors identified the Hashlets’ promised return on investment as the most important, or one of
the most important, factors in their decision to purchase a Hashlet. Garza reviewed the results of
this survey and thus knew that these factors were material.
62.

By November 2014, Hashlets became unprofitable. That is, the Hashlets’ daily

maintenance fees exceeded their purported mining payouts.
63.

By January 2015, Hashlets were obsolete. GAW Miners announced the

termination of its purported Hashlet mining operations at the end of January 2015, stating that
“GAW and ZenCloud mining operations have been indefinitely put on hold, effective
immediately.”
64.

Second, despite marketing Hashlets as capable of mining in the various pools

available through ZenCloud, and pricing different types of Hashlets differently based on which
pools they were purportedly able to mine, Hashlets did not mine in those pools.
65.

The operators of the pools purportedly available through ZenCloud confirmed that

GAW Miners did not establish accounts with those pools, and did not direct any of its computing
power towards those pools. Thus, GAW Miners was not receiving any mining payouts from
those pools.
66.

After numerous customer questions about where their hashing power was being

used, Garza admitted, in early October 2014, that GAW Miners was not sending its computing
power to the pools Hashlet investors selected. Instead, Garza and GAW Miners claimed, it was
16
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“sending our hashing power to our own private pools, but keeping your payouts 100% based on
the pool you select.” This representation too, was false. At the time, as Garza and GAW Miners
knew or should have known, the company had nowhere near the amount of computing power
that would support the units of hashing power that had been sold through Hashlets. As a result,
GAW Miners engaged in minimal bitcoin mining – in private pools or elsewhere – and
effectively no altcoin mining. At the time Garza made this statement, he knew or should have
known that GAW Miners could not, and did not, fund its daily payouts to investors with the
revenue from its mining activities.
67.

In order to conceal from investors that the mining activity associated with

Hashlets did not produce sufficient revenues to fund the payouts that had been promised to
investors, GAW Miners used revenues from ongoing Hashlet sales to fund payouts to investors.
Thus, Hashlets operated as a Ponzi scheme, in which investors’ returns were mostly paid by
using the money invested by others.
68.

In September and October 2014, GAW Miners did not always have enough

investors purchasing Hashlets with bitcoin to cover its daily bitcoin payout obligations to
existing Hashlet owners. As a result, GAW Miners, at Garza’s direction, converted some of the
United States dollars the company had received as revenue from Hashlet sales into bitcoin.
GAW Miners then used the bitcoin it had purchased to make daily payouts to existing Hashlet
investors. In September and October 2014 alone, GAW Miners, at Garza’s direction, converted
over $1.5 million in cash to bitcoin to make mining payouts and thus perpetuate their fraud.
69.

Third, ZenPool was a purported mining pool created and operated by GAW

Miners exclusively for certain Hashlet owners. GAW Miners claimed that ZenPool had the
“highest and most reliable payout of any multipool in the world.” A multipool is a pool that
17
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mines both bitcoin and altcoin, depending on the profitability of each coin at the time.
70.

GAW Miners and Garza advertised ZenPool as an enticement for investors to pay

more for “Zen Hashlets” and “Prime Hashlets,” the only two types of Hashlet capable of mining
in ZenPool. These two types of Hashlets were significantly more expensive than other types of
Hashlets that did not allow investors to access ZenPool.
71.

Contrary to GAW Miners’ and Garza’s representations, there was no ZenPool.

GAW Miners did not operate a pool that engaged in mining. GAW Miners did not direct the
hashing power represented by its sales of Zen Hashlets or Prime Hashlets to a pool it owned and
operated for investors’ benefit.
72.

Instead, GAW Miners determined what the daily payout from ZenPool would be

by examining the publicly-available payouts of other pools that were mining that day, and
picking a higher number.
73.

When GAW Miners and Garza made false and misleading statements about

ZenPool, they knew or should have known that there was no such pool engaged in mining.
d.

The Hashlet Scheme Unraveled and the Next Scheme Began

74.

During the fall of 2014, mining for virtual currency became less profitable as the

value of many virtual currencies fell and the technological difficulty of mining increased. Faced
with a drop in their revenue stream from selling Hashlets, and faced with the fact that Hashlets
were no longer profitable by November 2014, GAW Miners and Garza solicited many investors
to redeem their Hashlets for new investment opportunities.
75.

GAW Miners announced, in November 2014, that it was planning to launch a new

form of virtual currency, called PayCoin, and it offered for sale new digital wallets designed to
hold PayCoin, called HashStakers. GAW Miners sold HashStakers to new customers, and also
18
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offered existing Hashlet investors the chance to “upgrade” their Hashlets to HashStakers.
76.

Garza made the decision that GAW Miners would offer and sell HashStakers, and

launch PayCoin. He controlled GAW Miners’ strategic direction, and the content of the
advertising that GAW Miners did for these new offerings.
77.

In offering HashStakers to Hashlet investors, GAW Miners and Garza attempted

to prolong their scheme and prevent the collapse of GAW Miners.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of Securities in Violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Thereunder
78.

The Commission repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations in

paragraphs 1-77 above as if set forth fully herein.
79.

Hashlets constitute investment contracts, and thus “securities” under Section

3(a)(10) [15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10)] of the Exchange Act.
80.

All defendants engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct by which they oversold

the investment returns from their virtual currency mining operation. In addition, GAW Miners
and Garza’s fraudulent course of conduct included their misrepresentations to investors about the
nature and profitability of the investment they were selling.
81.

By engaging in the conduct described above, all defendants, directly or indirectly,

acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, by the use of means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or of the mails, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities: have
employed or are employing devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; and have engaged or are
engaging in acts, practices or courses of business which operate as a fraud or deceit upon certain
persons.
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82.

By engaging in the conduct described above, GAW Miners and Garza, directly or

indirectly, acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, by the use of means or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or of the mails, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, have
made or are making untrue statements of material fact or have omitted or are omitting to state
material facts necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.
83.

As a result, defendants have violated and, unless enjoined, will continue to violate

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5].
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fraud in the Offer or Sale of Securities in
Violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
84.

The Commission repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations in

paragraphs 1-77 above as if set forth fully herein.
85.

Hashlets constitute investment contracts, and thus “securities” under Section

2(a)(1) [15 U.S.C. §77b(1)] of the Securities Act.
86.

All defendants engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct by which they oversold

the investment returns from their virtual currency mining operation. In addition, GAW Miners
and Garza’s fraudulent course of conduct included their misrepresentations to investors about the
nature and profitability of the investment they were selling.
87.

By engaging in the conduct described above, all defendants, directly and

indirectly, acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, in the offer or sale of securities by the
use of the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails: have employed or are employing devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; or
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have engaged or are engaging in transactions, practices or courses of business which operate as a
fraud or deceit upon purchasers of the securities.
88.

By engaging in the conduct described above, GAW Miners and Garza, directly

and indirectly, acting intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, in the offer or sale of securities by
the use of the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, have obtained or are obtaining money or property by means of untrue
statements of material fact or omissions to state material facts necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
89.

As a result, defendants have violated and, unless enjoined, will continue to violate

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77q(a)].
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Offer and Sale of Unregistered Securities
Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act
90.

The Commission repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations in

paragraphs 1-77 above as if set forth fully herein.
91.

Hashlets constitute investment contracts, and thus “securities” under Section

2(a)(1) [15 U.S.C. §77b(1)] of the Securities Act.
92.

No registration statement was filed with respect to the Hashlets sold by

defendants, and no exemption from registration was available for these securities.
93.

By engaging in the conduct described above, defendants, directly or indirectly: (a)

have made use of the means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise,
securities as to which no registration statement has been in effect and for which no exemption
from registration has been available; and/or (b) have made use of the means or instruments of
21
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transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell, through
the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement
has been filed and for which no exemption from registration has been available.
94.

As a result, defendants have violated and, unless enjoined, will continue to

violate, Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C §77e(a), (c)].

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Commission requests that this Court:
A.

Enter a permanent injunction restraining defendants and each of their agents,

servants, employees and attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise, including facsimile
transmission or overnight delivery service, from directly or indirectly engaging in the conduct
described above, or in conduct of similar purport and effect, in violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5]; and
Sections 5(a) and 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§77e(a), (c), 77q(a)].
B.

Require defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, plus pre-judgment interest;

C.

Require defendants to pay an appropriate civil monetary penalty pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77t(d)], and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(3)];
D.

Retain jurisdiction over this action to implement and carry out the terms of all

orders and decrees that may be entered;
E.

Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
By its attorneys,
/s/ Kathleen B. Shields
Kathleen B. Shields (Mass. Bar No. 637438,
phv 04710)
Gretchen Lundgren (Mass. Bar No. 644742)
Michele Perillo (Mass. Bar No. 629343)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
33 Arch Street, 23rd Floor
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 573-8904 (Shields direct)
(617) 573-4590 (fax)
shieldska@sec.gov (Shields email)
Local Counsel:

/s/ John B. Hughes
John B. Hughes (Fed. Bar No. CT 05289)
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
United States Attorney’s Office
Connecticut Financial Center
157 Church St., 23rd Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Phone: (203) 821-3700
Fax: (203) 773-5373
DATED: December 1, 2015
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United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
v.
TRENDON T. SHAVERS and BITCOIN
SAVINGS AND TRUST

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Case No. 4:13-CV-416
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative,
for Default Judgment (Dkt. #32). Having considered the motion, and the lack of response thereto,
the Court finds that the motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND1
Defendant Trendon T. Shavers (“Shavers”) founded and operated Defendant Bitcoin Savings
and Trust (“BTCST”) from his McKinney, Texas home. BTCST was an unincorporated online
investment scheme in which Shavers solicited and accepted all investments, and paid all purported
returns, in the digital currency known as Bitcoin. Shavers’ offer and sale of BTCST securities was
not registered with the Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”).
From at least February 2011 through August 2012, as he admits, Shavers offered for sale and
sold, directly and indirectly, what purported to be investments in BTCST over the Internet. Shavers
admits he alone created and operated BTCST. During February 2011 through August 2012, as he
admits, Shavers, operating under the internet name “pirateat40,” solicited BTCST investors in online
chat rooms dedicated to Bitcoin and on the Bitcoin Forum, a publicly available website dedicated
to Bitcoin where, among other things, numerous bitcoin-denominated investment opportunities were

1

The facts are taken from the Commission’s motion for summary judgment and the exhibits attached thereto
(Dkt. #32).
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posted.
During the relevant period, Shavers falsely promised BTCST investors up to 1% interest
daily to be paid every three days at first, or 7% interest weekly, purportedly based on Shavers’
trading of bitcoin against the U.S. dollar.
Bitcoin is a decentralized digital currency that may be used to purchase goods and services
online, or traded on online exchanges for conventional currencies, including the U.S. dollar. Bitcoin
was created by the pseudonymous developer (or developers) Satoshi Nakamoto; it has no single
administrator, or central authority or repository. Since its introduction in 2009, bitcoin’s value has
been volatile, ranging from less than $2 per bitcoin to more than $1,200 per bitcoin. Currently, there
are more than 12.2 million bitcoins in circulation.
Bitcoins are held at, and sent to and from, bitcoin “addresses.” A bitcoin “wallet” is a
software file that holds bitcoin addresses. Along with each bitcoin address, a bitcoin wallet stores
the “private key” for the address, essentially a password used by the holder to access the bitcoins
held at the address, as well as the transaction history associated with the address. Whoever has the
private key for a bitcoin address controls the bitcoins held at that address.
From February 2011 through August 2012, the only information Shavers required from new
BTCST investors was an internet username, an email address, and a bitcoin address Shavers could
use to send bitcoins to withdrawing investors. Shavers admits that he provided each new BTCST
investor with a unique bitcoin address for the purpose of making deposits to his or her BTCST
account. Shavers admits that he provided each BTCST investor with a unique deposit address
because it was his way of accounting for which investor was making which deposit. Shavers admits
he held the private keys to the deposit addresses he provided to BTCST investors and, thus,
controlled the bitcoins the investors sent to those addresses. Shavers admits he held the BTCST
2
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investor deposit addresses and the private keys for those addresses in a single bitcoin wallet which
he referred to as his “main operating wallet.”
From February 2011 through August 2012, Shavers used his main operating wallet to take
deposits from, and pay withdrawals and purported returns to, BTCST investors. Shavers admits that,
from February 2011 through August 2012, he used the main operating wallet also for personal
transactions and transactions related to GPUMAX Technologies LLC (“GPUMAX”), a bitcoin
mining company Shavers co-founded with others. Shavers admits the main operating wallet was
a single bitcoin wallet containing commingled funds, including bitcoins Shavers received from
BTCST investors, his personal bitcoins, and bitcoins related to his GPUMAX activities.
From February 2011 through August 2012, Shavers admits that, during the relevant period,
he maintained a “reserve fund” of bitcoins to pay withdrawals and purported returns to BTCST
investors. Shavers admits the “reserve fund” was “just coins sitting in” the main operating wallet,
including bitcoins Shavers received from BTCST investors. Shavers admits that, from February
2011 through August 2012, he used this “reserve fund” to honor BTCST investor withdrawal
requests whenever he failed to generate sufficient returns, in a timely fashion, from BTCST’s
purported investment activities to cover the withdrawals.
On or about November 3, 2011, Shavers posted a general solicitation for BTCST on the
Bitcoin Forum. The November 3, 2011 post on the Bitcoin Forum was the first post in an internet
discussion thread Shavers started for the purpose of soliciting BTCST investors and communicating
with them. The solicitation stated that a minimum of 50 bitcoins was required to invest. In the
November 3, 2011 solicitation on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers falsely wrote that he was in the
business of “selling BTC to a group of local people” and offered investors up to 1% interest daily,
to be paid every three days, “until either you withdraw the funds or my local dealings dry up and I
3
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can no longer be profitable.”
On or about November 11, 2011, when asked by another Bitcoin Forum participant how he
was able to make such high profits, Shavers falsely replied: “Groups of people that want to be off
the radar, buy large quantities and instant availability. I would say it’s the Hard Money sector of
Bitcoin.” On or about November 13, 2011, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers falsely wrote:
“Hey all, I have some big orders coming in this week. I just wanted to thank all of my investors as
I’m able to fulfill them without the risk of them going elsewhere. Still looking for about 1,000 BTC
total in lenders based on negotiations with my buyers in the coming weeks. It’s growing, it’s
growing!”
On or about November 22, 2011, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers falsely wrote: “As
with any movements in the market up or down I have enough order activity going on that my risk
is very limited. In most cases the coins go uncovered less than a few hours, I have yet to come close
to taking a loss on any deal. With that said, in the event there was a huge change in the market and
I needed to personally cover the difference I am more than willing to do so.”
On or about December 19, 2011, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers falsely wrote: “My
clients deal in cash only and I don’t move a single coin until the cash is in hand and I’m out of harms
[sic] way (just in case :)). So risk is almost 0.” On the same day, in a subsequent post on the Bitcoin
Forum, Shavers falsely wrote: “The prices for picking up coins from my clients selling coins is set
prior to the purchases most of the time. Anything not covered is hedged or I take the risk
personally.” On or about January 19, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers wrote: “If my
business is illegal then anyone trading coins for cash and back to coins is doing something illegal.
:)”
Shavers admits that, beginning on or about February 9, 2012, he imposed a 100 bitcoin
4
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minimum on new BTCST accounts and, beginning on or about February 10, 2012, he permitted
BTCST investors to set up their accounts to have their returns reinvested automatically, rather than
being paid out.
Beginning on or about February 10, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers wrote that
anyone wishing to open a new BTCST account needed a referral, although he did not indicate
whether the referral had to be from an existing BTCST investor or otherwise. Beginning on or about
April 8, 2012, as he admits, Shavers authorized larger BTCST account holders to “grow their own
market” by offering “pass-thru” investments to BTCST. Shavers admits that, beginning on or about
April 8, 2012, with his knowledge and consent, pass-thru operators accepted deposits for the purpose
of reinvesting the funds in BTCST from, and paid returns directly to, their own investors. Shavers
referred to these pass-thru operators as “Trust Accounts”; they also came to be known as “Pirate
Pass-Thrus” or “PPTs.” Shavers admits the only identifying information he required from Trust
Account operators was an internet username and an email address.
On or about April 10, 2012, as he admits, Shavers launched a new website for BTCST, called
btcst.com, and changed the name of his investment scheme from First Pirate Savings & Trust to
BTCST. Shavers provided each BTCST investor with a username and password necessary to access
information on btcst.com. From at least early April 2012 through August 2012 (when Shavers shut
down BTCST), once a BTCST investor logged on to btcst.com, the investor could view his or her
BTCST account balance and transaction history.
On or about May 21, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers wrote that BTCST was
not a Ponzi scheme. Later in the same day, in response to the question from another Bitcoin Forum
participant, “Would you be willing to disclose anything about your actual profit margins over the
7% weekly you pay for use of the funds?,” Shavers wrote: “I net gross 10.65% per week and payout
5
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[sic] 5.98% on average and it really depends on how much I want to work.”
From February 2011 through August 2012, contrary to representations Shavers made to
BTCST investors, Shavers did not earn 10.65% weekly on average from any investment activities
he purportedly undertook for BTCST. From February 2011 through August 2012, contrary to
representations Shavers made to BTCST investors concerning the use of their funds, Shavers used
little, if any, of the bitcoins he raised for BTCST to trade bitcoin against the U.S. dollar; to sell
bitcoins to a group of local people; or to sell bitcoins to individuals who wished to buy them “off
the radar,” quickly, and in large quantities.
From February 2011 through August 2012, contrary to representations Shavers made to
BTCST investors, the risk of the BTCST investments was not “very limited” or “almost 0”; Shavers
did not receive “cash in hand” before moving any BTCST investors’ bitcoins; and Shavers was not,
as he promised investors, in a position to cover any losses personally. From February 2011 through
August 2012, contrary to representations Shavers made to BTCST investors, BTCST was a sham
and a Ponzi scheme, whereby Shavers used new bitcoins received from BTCST investors to make
payments on outstanding BTCST investments and diverted BTCST investors’ bitcoins for his
personal use.
On or about July 2, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers announced that, beginning
August 1, 2012, the rate of return for BTCST investments would be reduced to 3.9% weekly. On
or about July 3, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers clarified that Trust Accounts would
receive 5% returns weekly or higher and all other BTCST investors would receive 3.9% returns
weekly; and he authorized Trust Account operators to take unlimited deposits from the smaller
accounts they managed. Shavers admits he changed the rates of return to encourage smaller BTCST
investors to move to the Trust Accounts so he would not have to manage them himself.
6
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Shavers admits the July 2, 2012 rate-change announcement on the Bitcoin Forum
precipitated a “wave” of withdrawal requests from BTCST investors. Shavers admits that he used
the “reserve fund” in his main operating wallet to honor the withdrawal requests he received
following the July 2, 2012 rate-change announcement; the “reserves” were not enough; and he soon
ran out of “reserves” and bitcoins in his main operating wallet.
On or about July 23, 2012, in a post on the Bitcoin Forum, Shavers announced that he was
eliminating the referral requirement to open a new BTCST account. By August 2012, as he admits,
Shavers shut down BTCST because he could not pay BTCST investors what he owed to them. From
February 2011 through August 2012, Shavers sold BTCST investments, directly or indirectly, to at
least eighty BTCST investors.
Representative Investors
On or about April 14, 2012, James O’Shea (“O’Shea”), a resident of West Grove,
Pennsylvania, purchased a BTCST investment using bitcoins. O’Shea’s initial investment was 500
bitcoins. In deciding to purchase his BTCST investment, O’Shea read the November 3, 2011 general
solicitation for BTCST on the Bitcoin Forum, the discussion thread that followed the November 3,
2011 solicitation, and other statements posted by Shavers on the Bitcoin Forum concerning BTCST.
O’Shea understood from the November 3, 2011 solicitation, as well as from Shavers’ other
statements on the Bitcoin Forum, that BTCST would generate the returns promised to BTCST
investors by using investor funds for bitcoin-market arbitrage, including, among other things, selling
bitcoins to individuals who did not want to buy them on the open market and, thus, were willing to
pay a premium for them. O’Shea understood further that BTCST promised high rates of return, as
much as 7% per week, depending on an investor’s account balance. O’Shea was able to track his
BTCST investment on BTCST’s website, btcst.com. O’Shea continued to invest with BTCST,
7
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including making additional investments of principal, until on or about August 13, 2012, when
BTCST stopped paying the promised returns to him. In total, O’Shea made principal investments
in BTCST totaling approximately 3,000 bitcoins, and received approximately 1,983 bitcoins in what
O’Shea believed, at the time, to be interest payments from BTCST, for a principal loss of 1,017
bitcoins.
On or about June 5, 2012, Nathan Hart (“Hart”), a resident of Chicago, Illinois, purchased an
investment in Hashking Lending (“HKL”) that was offered on the Bitcoin Forum. Hart’s initial
investment was 157 bitcoins. HKL promised a 6.91% weekly return based on its reinvestment of
investors’ bitcoins in BTCST. At the time, HKL was one of many bitcoin-denominated investments
that promised a direct 100% reinvestment in BTCST, commonly referred to in the bitcoin community
as “pirate pass-throughs.” Hart decided to invest in BTCST through HKL because, at the time,
Shavers offered direct investments in BTCST by referral only and Hart did not have a referral from
another BTCST investor.
Prior to his first HKL investment, Hart reviewed Shavers’ statements concerning BTCST on
the Bitcoin Forum from which he understood that BTCST used investor funds for lowrisk bitcoin
arbitrage. Hart read Shavers’ statements, among other things, that: BTCST paid a 1% return daily;
BTCST produced the promised returns by selling bitcoins to individuals who wanted to buy them “off
the radar,” quickly, or in large quantities; the investment’s risk was very limited because of the
volume of BTCST’s order activity and the fact that Shavers rarely let BTCST’s position go
“uncovered” for more than a few hours; BTCST was not engaged in any illegal activity; and BTCST
was not a Ponzi scheme. In or between June and August 2012, Hart made principal investments in
HKL totaling approximately 3,016 bitcoins, and he received approximately 1,124 bitcoins in interest
payments from HKL, for a principal loss of 1,892 bitcoins.
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Defendants’ Misappropriation of Investor Funds
From February 2011 through August 2012, Shavers received at least 732,050 bitcoins in
principal investments from BTCST investors into his main operating wallet for BTCST. From
February 2011 through August 2012, Shavers returned at least 551,231 bitcoins to BTCST investors
in withdrawals and purported interest payments from his main operating wallet for BTCST.
From February 2011 through August 2012, and in the weeks that followed, Shavers
transferred at least 150,649 bitcoins from his main operating wallet for BTCST to his personal
account at Mt. Gox, a bitcoin currency exchange headquartered in Tokyo, Japan that exchanged
bitcoins for U.S. dollars and other conventional currencies. Among other things, Shavers then sold
or used these bitcoins to day-trade (converting bitcoins to U.S. dollars and vice-versa), suffering a
net loss from his day-trading, but realizing net proceeds of $164,758 from his net sales of 86,202
bitcoins.
From February 2011 through August 2012, and in the weeks that followed, Shavers
transferred a combined $147,102 from his personal Mt. Gox account to his personal checking
account, his personal account at the online payment processor Dwolla Incorporated (“Dwolla”), and
a GPUMAX account at Dwolla, which (together with other funds in those accounts) he then used for
personal expenses, including rent, car-related expenses, utilities, retail purchases, visits to casinos,
and meals.
Based on the entire record in this case, on a month-by-month basis, from February 2012
through August 2012, payments to BTCST investors exceeded the amount of bitcoins Shavers
received from sources other than BTCST investors themselves, demonstrating that Shavers was using
new bitcoins received from BTCST investors to make payments on outstanding BTCST investments.
Defendants’ illicit gains obtained as a result of their fraud (bitcoins received from BTCST
9
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investors less bitcoins returned to them) total 180,819 bitcoins, or more than $101 million based on
currently available bitcoin exchange rates. The collective loss to BTCST investors who suffered net
losses (there were also net winners) was 265,678 bitcoins, or more than $149 million at current
exchange rates.
Shavers’ Claims
Shavers claims: (a) he pooled BTCST investors’ bitcoins together with his own bitcoins for
the purpose of investing; (b) over 90% of the investment activity he undertook for BTCST involved
lending bitcoins to others he met online and only 10% involved selling bitcoins locally; and (c)
BTCST came to an end in August 2012 because, in the second week of July 2012, Shavers made an
unsecured loan of 202,000 bitcoins to BTCST’s largest borrower, who promptly absconded with the
funds.
Shavers admits the “vast majority” of BTCST’s supposed lending was to individuals whom
Shavers knew only by internet usernames. He admits further he did not know anything about
BTCST’s largest borrowers, even their internet usernames, because he met them in chat rooms on
the Tor Network, a network designed, in Shavers’ words, to “not be traceable by any form of
government” and “so nobody knows who’s who.”
Shavers admits he has no proof at all of the lending activities he supposedly undertook for
BTCST. Shavers admits he has no proof that he lent 202,000 BTC to an anonymous borrower in July
2012, or even communicated with such a borrower. Rather, Shavers claims that two weeks after the
anonymous borrower absconded with the funds, he deleted the bitcoin addresses he used to send the
202,000 bitcoins to the borrower and, with those addresses, any record of having made the
transaction.
Shavers admits that, contrary to promises he made to BTCST investors that he would cover
10
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any losses himself, he did not have enough bitcoins of his own to make BTCST investors whole after
the anonymous borrower absconded with the 202,000 bitcoins. Shavers admits further that, as of
September 5, 2013 (the date of his deposition in this action), he still owed bitcoins to BTCST
investors.
Shavers’ claims concerning the lending activity he supposedly undertook for BTCST are not
possible based on the record evidence in this action: First, the identified sources of bitcoins obtained
by Shavers do not include such borrowers; second, the amounts of bitcoins received by Shavers from
unidentified sources fall far short of the amounts necessary to support the principal or interest
payments Shavers claimed to be receiving from BTCST’s borrowers, or the rates of return Shavers
otherwise claimed to be earning for BTCST investors; and, third, Shavers did not have nearly enough
bitcoins in July 2012 to make a 202,000 bitcoin loan.
Prejudice to the Commission
On September 21, 2012, the Commission served upon Shavers an investigative subpoena
calling for, among other things, all documents concerning BTCST, and documents sufficient to
identify all bitcoins owned or controlled by him, for the period from May 1, 2011 to the date of the
subpoena. Shavers claims that, as of October 3, 2012, he held 100,000 bitcoins in his possession that
he subsequently returned to BTCST investors. Shavers claims he could find proof of having returned
these 100,000 bitcoins to BTCST investors if he chose to, but he has provided no such proof to the
Commission. Shavers’ claim to have repaid investors on or after October 3, 2012, is not supported
by the record evidence in this action.
Shavers claims that he deleted the data for all BTCST investor accounts that were “closed”
by the time he produced BTCST investor account data to the Commission in response to its
investigative subpoena, though it is unclear whether this deletion occurred before or after Shavers
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was in possession of the subpoena.
Shavers claims the BTCST investor account data he produced to the Commission in response
to its investigative subpoena was not completely accurate. Shavers claims further that he kept more
accurate BTCST investor account data on the server that supported the btcst.com website, but that
such data is no longer available because, when it came time to renew the website in December 2012,
he allowed the website expire and did not preserve the data.
On August 22, 2013, the Clerk of this Court filed an Entry of Default against both Defendants
[Docket No. 25]. To date, each of the Defendants has failed to plead or otherwise defend this action,
and Defendant BTCST has yet to appear in this action.
On March 3, 2014, the Commissioner filed a motion for summary judgment or alternative
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #32). No response was filed.
After a hearing conducted on July 12, 2014, the Court agreed to set aside the default judgment
entered by the Clerk (Dkt. #78), and allow Defendants additional time to respond to discovery,
complete initial disclosures, and file a response to the motion for summary judgment based on
Shavers’ representation that he was engage in the litigation and hired counsel to represent Defendants
in this matter. The Court also entered an order regarding its subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that
the BTCST investments in this case were investment contracts, and, thus, securities (Dkt. #77). To
date, Defendants have not complied with the Court’s order, and have not produced the required
information to the Commission. On September 12, 2014, Defendants’ counsel filed a motion to
withdraw stating that his services were terminated by Defendants (Dkt. #83). The Court granted that
motion (Dkt. #87).
Defendants’ deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment was September 12,
2014 (Dkt. #80). Defendants have not filed a response.
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LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is proper
if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The trial court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment. Casey Enterprises, Inc. v. American Hardware Mut.
Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). The substantive law identifies which
facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 247. If the movant bears
the burden of proof on a claim or defense on which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come
forward with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim
or defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). But if the nonmovant
bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge its burden by showing that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dallas Morning
News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the
nonmovant must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
The nonmovant must adduce affirmative evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts in support of its claim. Lane v.
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Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55657 (2007)). The Court may find a plausible set of facts by considering: “(1) the complaint alone; (2)
the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Lane, 529 F.3d at 557
(quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court will
accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and construe those allegations in a light
most favorable to Plaintiffs. Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). The party
asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”
CleanCOALition v. TXU Power, 536 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Home Builders Ass’n
of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In the Court’s August 8, 2013 Memorandum Opinion (Dkt. #23), the Court determined that
the BTCST investments Defendants sold meet the definition of investment contract and, as such, are
securities, giving the Court jurisdiction over this case. The Court revisited the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction at the request of Defendants, and found again on August 26, 2014, that the BTCST
investment were investment contract, and, as such, are securities (Dkt. #78).
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5] make it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
directly or indirectly, to (a) “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; (b) “make an untrue
statement of a material fact” or a material omission; or (c) “engage in any act, practice, or course of
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business which operates … as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” To establish liability under Section
10(b), the Commission must prove a defendant acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). In the Fifth Circuit, scienter may be established by a showing of “severe
recklessness,” i.e., “highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely
simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,
and that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.” Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981). To establish a violation in the offer or sale of a security under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)], the Commission must prove essentially the same
elements, though scienter is not an element of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3). See SEC v. Seghers, 298 F.
App’x. 319, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 702 (1980)).
The uncontested summary judgment evidence establishes that Shavers knowingly and
intentionally operated BTCST as a sham and a Ponzi scheme, repeatedly making misrepresentations
to BTCST investors and potential investors concerning the use of their bitcoins; how he would
generate the promised returns; and the safety of the investments. During the relevant period, Shavers
falsely represented to BTCST investors on the Bitcoin Forum and in online chat rooms dedicated to
Bitcoin that BTCST traded bitcoin against the U.S. dollar, including selling bitcoins to individuals
who wanted to buy them “off the radar,” quickly, or in large quantities; that the promised returns
would be generated by such bitcoin market arbitrage; and that he earned 10.65% each week on
average for BTCST from these investment activities. In reality, Shavers, on the whole, either used
new bitcoins received from BTCST investors to pay purported returns and withdrawals on
outstanding BTCST investments, or diverted BTCST investors’ bitcoins for his personal use.
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Shavers admits he commingled BTCST investors’ bitcoins with his personal bitcoins and
bitcoins from his GPUMAX activity as a “reserve fund” in his “main operating wallet” for BTCST.
Shavers admits that he used the “reserve fund” – in classic Ponzi scheme fashion – to honor
withdrawal requests from BTCST investors whenever he failed to generate sufficient returns from
BTCST’s purported investment activities to do so. He admits further that, following his July 2, 2012
announcement that the rates of return for BTCST investments would be reduced, he received a
“wave” of withdrawal requests that wiped out the “reserve fund,” even as he still owed bitcoins to
BTCST investors. Based on the entire record in this case, on a month-by-month basis, from March
2012 through August 2012, payments to BTCST investors exceed the amount of bitcoins Shavers
received from sources other than BTCST investors themselves, demonstrating that Shavers was
using new bitcoins received from BTCST investors to make payments on outstanding BTCST
investments.
The record evidence in this action establishes that, during the relevant period, Shavers raised
at least 725,626 bitcoins in principal investments from BTCST investors; he returned at least 538,056
bitcoins to BTCST investors in purported returns and withdrawals; and he diverted at least 150,649
bitcoins to his personal account at the bitcoin currency exchange Mt. Gox, which, among other
things, he then sold or used to day-trade (converting bitcoins to U.S. dollars and vice versa), suffering
a net loss from his day-trading, but realizing net proceeds of $164,758 from his net sales of 86,202
bitcoins. The record evidence establishes further that, during the relevant period, Shavers transferred
$147,102 from his Mt. Gox account to other accounts, which he then used for personal expenses,
including rent, car-related expenses, utilities, retail purchases, visits to casinos, and meals.
The full disclosure of the true nature of Shavers’ activities and use of investors’ bitcoins would
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have been material to BTCST investors. Shavers’ blatant misuse and misappropriation of BTCST
investors’ bitcoins, even as he publicly denied the Ponzi scheme on the Bitcoin Forum, evidences his
intent to deceive, manipulate and defraud.
Shavers claims that over 90% of the investment activity he undertook for BTCST involved
lending to anonymous borrowers he met online and could identify only by internet usernames; that
he could not identify BTCST’s largest borrowers, even by internet usernames, because he
communicated with them over the Tor Network; and that BTCST came to an end in August 2012, not
because it was a Ponzi, but because he made an unsecured loan of 202,000 bitcoins to BTCST’s
biggest borrower, who promptly absconded with the funds. These claims, even if true, does not in any
way save Shavers from summary judgment.
Shavers admits he has no proof of the lending activities he supposedly undertook to generate
returns for BTCST, and no proof that, in July 2012, he lent 202,000 bitcoins to an anonymous
borrower, or even communicated with such a borrower. Rather, Shavers claims to have destroyed all
proof of the transaction. Second, even if Shavers’ claims were true (and the record demonstrates they
are not), they would amount to an admission of liability. Such lending activity to anonymous
borrowers he met over the Tor Network would have contradicted what Shavers told BTCST investors
he would do with their bitcoins and, at a minimum, would have constituted conduct that was “highly
unreasonable” and “an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.” See Broad, 642 F.3d
at 961-62. Moreover, the 202,000 bitcoin loan was not secured in any way and Shavers was in no
position to cover BTCST investor losses when the anonymous borrower absconded with the funds,
despite Shavers’ repeated assurances to BTCST investors that the risk of their investments was “very
limited” or “almost 0”; that he did not “move a single coin” until he had cash in hand or let his
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arbitrage activity go “uncovered” more than “a few hours”; and that he would personally cover any
losses should they occur.
A prima facie case for violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§
77(a) and 77(e)] may be established by showing a defendant: (1) offered or sold a security; (2) there
was no registration statement on file with the Commission or in effect as to the security; and (3) the
defendant used interstate transportation, or communication, or the mails in connection with the offer
or sale. SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1980). Once the prima
facie case is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to show an applicable exemption or safe harbor
from registration. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v Cont’l Tobacco
Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137, 156 (5th Cir. 1972). Section 5 violations are strict liability offenses and do
not require proof of scienter. Swenson v. Engle, 626 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1980). Here, Defendants
violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) because there was no registration statement filed or in effect as to the
BCTST securities offered and sold over the Internet.
Permanent Injunction
Under Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)] and Section 21(d) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)], a permanent injunction against future violations of the federal
securities laws is warranted where a defendant’s past conduct indicates that there is a reasonable
likelihood of further violation in the future. SEC v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 2012); SEC
v. First Fin. Group of Tex., 645 F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1981). In deciding whether to issue an
injunction in light of past violations, a district court should consider the following factors, among
others:
The (1) egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct, (2) isolated or recurrent nature of the
violation, (3) degree of scienter, (4) sincerity of defendant’s recognition of his
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transgression, and (5) likelihood of the defendant’s job providing opportunities for
future violations.
Gann, 565 F.3d at 940 (italics omitted). The commission of past illegal conduct is highly suggestive
of the likelihood of future violations. See SEC v. Cavanagh, No. 98 Civ. 1818DLC, 2004 WL
1594818, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Defendants misrepresented the nature of the BTCST investment
to BTCST investors and, in doing so, violated the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Moreover, Defendants acted with a high degree of scienter. As detailed above, Shavers made blatant
misrepresentations to BTCST investors concerning the use of their bitcoins and the safety of their
investments, while running BTCST as a sham and a Ponzi scheme, and diverting BTCST investors’
funds for his personal use, including rent, car-related expenses, utilities, retail purchases, visits to
casinos, and meals. Defendants’ conduct was not an isolated occurrence. Over the course of
approximately eighteen months, Defendants repeatedly sold BTCST investments, directly and
indirectly, to at least eighty investors over the Internet. A permanent injunction is warranted in this
case.
Disgorgement
The Court enjoys broad equitable power to order securities law violators to disgorge their
ill-gotten gains and thereby maintain the deterrent effect of the federal securities laws. SEC v. First
Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996). The effective enforcement of the federal
securities laws requires that the Commission be able to make violations unprofitable, and the deterrent
effect of Commission enforcement actions would be greatly undermined if violators were not required
to disgorge their illicit gains. Id.
The Commission has established through the evidence in this action that Defendants’ illicit
gains are at least 180,819 bitcoins. A reasonable calculation of disgorgement in U.S. dollars terms
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(particularly in light of Shavers’ willful refusal to produce his verified accounting which has been
ordered three times by the Court) utilizes an average daily price of bitcoin from August 26, 2012,
when Shavers’ scheme collapsed, to today, thus averaging out the effect over this time period of the
large fluctuations in the exchange rate of bitcoin to the U.S. dollars. Applying this methodology, the
Commission requests that the Court order Defendants to disgorge, on a joint and several basis,
$38,638,569, plus prejudgment interest thereon of $1,766,098 (using the IRS underpayment rate, as
detailed below), for a total of $40,404,667. The data the Commission relies upon was produced to the
Commission by Shavers in response to the Commission’s September 21, 2012 investigative subpoena,
which required Shavers to produce, among other things, all documents concerning BTCST and
documents sufficient to identify all bitcoins owned or controlled by him from May 1, 2011 to the date
of the subpoena. Moreover, Shavers has claimed that the data that supported the btcst.com website (if
it ever existed) is not available because Shavers himself permitted the website to expire when it came
up for renewal in December 2012, after he was in possession of the Commission’s investigative
subpoena. In any event, the amount of disgorgement ordered “need only be a reasonable
approximation of profits casually connected to the violation” and “any risk of uncertainty [in
calculating disgorgement] should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created the uncertainty.”
The Commission has made a reasonable approximation of profits based on the evidence in this action
and Shavers should bear the risk of any uncertainty in the Commission’s calculation because he did
not produce accurate or complete records, and he failed to preserve evidence, even after receiving
specific notice that the evidence was relevant to the Commission’s investigation underlying this
action.
As with disgorgement, an award of prejudgment interest (and the rate used) is within the
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discretion of the Court, and is appropriate here. In deciding whether to award prejudgment interest,
the Court should consider the need to fully compensate the wronged investors, the remedial purpose
of the statute involved, and other general principles as are deemed relevant by the Court. In an
enforcement action brought by the Commission, the remedial purpose of the statute takes on a special
importance. The Commission requests the Court impose the IRS underpayment rate (to the U.S. dollar
value of the disgorgement amount), consistent with what the Commission typically applies when it
orders disgorgement as well as with prior precedent. Applying the IRS underpayment rate to the
requested disgorgement amount of $38,638,569, for the period from August 26, 2012, when BTCST
collapsed, to the date of this motion, Defendants should be required to pay $1,766,098 in prejudgment
interest.
Shavers and BTCST should be held liable on a joint and several basis for the entire
disgorgement amount plus prejudgment interest. Shavers is responsible for all of the conduct at issue
here – devising the scheme; making misrepresentations to BTCST investors; accepting investments
from the investors and paying purported returns to them; creating the BTCST website for investors
to track their supposed investments; and misappropriating BTCST investors’ bitcoins. Shavers’
conduct is attributable to BTCST – an unincorporated, online fiction he created – because BTSCT is
essentially his alter ego. See SEC v. Res. Dev. Int’l, LLC, 487 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2007). However,
to the extent BTCST may be considered a separate legal entity, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, it is liable for the acts committed by Shavers, its founder and sole employee. Meek v.
Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 95 F.3d 45, 1996 WL 405436, at *3 (5th Cir. 1996); Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980).
Civil Monetary Penalties
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Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)] permit the Court to impose civil monetary penalties that fall into one of
three tiers, which increase with the seriousness of the violation. Under the third and highest tier, the
Court may award civil penalties for each violation not to exceed the greater of (i) $150,000.00 for a
natural person or $725,000 for any other person, see 17 C.F.R. § 201.1004, or (ii) the gross pecuniary
gain to such defendant as a result of the violation, if the Court determines that the defendant’s
violations involved “fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement” and “resulted in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to
other persons.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(2)(C) and 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii).
“Civil penalties are designed to punish the individual violator and deter future violations of
the securities laws.” SEC v. Offill, No. 3:07-cv-1643-D, 2012 WL 1138622, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
2012) (citation omitted). “Without civil penalties, the only financial risk to violators is the forfeiture
of their ill-gotten gains.” Id. (citation omitted).
For a period of at least eighteen months, Defendants engaged in the fraudulent sale of a Ponzi
scheme to at least eighty investors and misappropriated investor funds. The conduct was egregious,
demonstrated a high degree of scienter, and resulted in illicit gains of 180,819 bitcoins, or more than
$101 million based on currently available exchange rates. The collective loss to investors who lost
bitcoins to the BTCST scheme was even greater at 265,678 bitcoins, or more than $149 million based
on currently available exchange rates. Under such circumstances, maximum, third-tier civil penalties
against each of the Defendants are appropriate and necessary to persuade them not to engage in such
conduct again. See, e.g., SEC v. Becker, No. 09 Civ. 5707(SAS), 2010 WL 2165083, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 28, 2010).

22

Case 4:13-cv-00416-ALM Document 88 Filed 09/18/14 Page 23 of 25 PageID #: 1491

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the alternative, for Default Judgment (Dkt. #32) is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Shavers and BTCST and their agents, servants, employees,
attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this
order and final judgment by personal service or otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined
from violating, directly or indirectly, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], by using any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security: (a) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud; (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading; or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
It is further ORDERED that Shavers and BTCST and their agents, servants, employees,
attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this
order and final judgment by personal service or otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined
from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)] in the offer or sale of
any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud; (b) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
It is further ORDERED that Shavers and BTCST and their agents, servants, employees,
attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this
order and final judgment by personal service or otherwise are permanently restrained and enjoined
from violating Section 5 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e] by, directly or indirectly, in the
absence of any applicable exemption: (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security,
making use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; (b)
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, carrying or causing to be carried through
the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security
for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale; or (c) Making use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement
has been filed with the Commission as to such security, or while the registration statement is the
subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any
public proceeding or examination under Section 8 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77h].
It is further ORDERED that Shavers and BTCST are jointly and severally liable for
disgorgement of $38,638,569, representing profits gained as a result of the conduct alleged in the
Complaint, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,766,098, for a total of
$40,404,667. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d) and 78u(d)(3), Shavers is liable additionally for a civil
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.
penalty in the amount of $ 150,000.00, and BTCST is liable additionally for a civil penalty in the
amount of $ 150,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 18th day of September, 2014.

___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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ARTICLE
IS BITCOIN A SECURITY?
JEFFREY E. ALBERTS & BERTRAND FRY *

INTRODUCTION
Investor interest in the cryptocurrency1 Bitcoin has exploded over the past
two years.2 The market capitalization of Bitcoin rose from less than $150
million at the beginning of 2013 to over $5 billion today,3 and a Bitcoin
exchange-traded fund may soon be listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market.4 Yet,
as the value of Bitcoin has increased, so has concern over how the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) will treat Bitcoin.5 The SEC
* Jeffrey Alberts and Bert Fry are partners in the New York office of Pryor Cashman LLP.
They regularly represent entities in connection with legal issues related to virtual currency
and financial technology. Mr. Alberts is a former federal prosecutor and now leads Pryor
Cashman’s White Collar Defense and Investigations Group. Mr. Fry has extensive
experience with securities law and alternative investment vehicles and is co-head of Pryor
Cashman’s Investment Management Group. The authors would like to thank Satoshi
Nakamoto for making this article possible.
1 The term “cryptocurrency” refers to a digital currency that relies on the principles of
cryptography to process and validate transfers.
2
See, e.g., Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, Bitcoin and the Digital-Currency
Revolution, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/therevolutionary-power-of-digital-currency-1422035061 (archived at http://perma.cc/QN75CF64).
3 Bitcoin - Market Capitalization, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/data/Bitcoinmarket-capitalization/ (archived at http://perma.cc/LKP7-G9E5) (last visited Nov. 28,
2014).
4 Rachel Abrams, Winklevoss Twins to List Bitcoin Fund on Nasdaq, N.Y. TIMES (May
8, 2014, 5:45 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/winklevoss-twins-to-listbitcoin-fund-on-nasdaq/ (archived at http://perma.cc/8CUT-6NXW). See also Winklevoss
Bitcoin Trust, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (July 1, 2013).
5
See, e.g., Todd Zerega and Tom Watterson, Regulating Bitcoins: CFTC vs. SEC?,
SWAP
REPORT
(Dec.
31,
2013),
http://www.theswapreport.com/2013/12/articles/general/regulating-bitcoins-cftc-vs-sec/
(archived at http://perma.cc/536B-ULPB) (“[C]ould or would the SEC attempt to classify a
speculative investment in Bitcoins as a security?”); Dan Stroh, Secure Currency or
Security? The SEC and Bitcoin Regulation, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 18,
2014), http://uclawreview.org/2014/11/18/secure-currency-or-security-the-sec-and-bitcoin-
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has issued an investor alert concerning “Bitcoin and Other Virtual CurrencyRelated Investments,”6 and has brought enforcement actions against virtual
currency-related investments, asserting that these investments were securities.7
However, the SEC has not yet publicly taken a position on whether Bitcoin
is itself a security. The answer to the question of whether Bitcoin is a security
is critical for participants in the Bitcoin market. If Bitcoin were found to be a
security, then sellers of Bitcoin, exchanges for the transfer of Bitcoins, and
special purpose vehicles formed to hold Bitcoin, among others, would be
subject to onerous regulatory requirements and potential penalties for failing to
meet these requirements.8 This article attempts to answer this fundamental
question of whether Bitcoin is a security by applying existing case law to the
sale and mining of Bitcoin.
I.

THE NATURE OF BITCOIN

Bitcoin is a “decentralized peer-to-peer [digital] payment network.”9 It is
decentralized because it is powered by its users rather than any central
authority.10 It is peer-to-peer because payment transactions do not require a
third-party intermediary such as a bank or credit card company to validate the
transaction. Instead, the Bitcoin network relies on the principles of
cryptography to process and validate transfers of Bitcoins.11 Each transaction
on the Bitcoin network is recorded on a decentralized public ledger, called a
“blockchain.”12 The blockchain is visible to all computers on the Bitcoin
network.13 The blockchain does not reveal the identity of the parties involved
in the transaction because each user’s identity is encrypted.14 The public ledger
verifies that a user transferring Bitcoin has in fact transferred the specified
amount of Bitcoin to the user receiving that amount of Bitcoin.15
regulation/ (archived at http://perma.cc/2MZM-SPCG) (“Because bitcoins are securities, the
SEC should continue, and possibly increase, its monitoring of those using bitcoins.”).
6 Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC (May 7,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html
(archived at http://perma.cc/NFB3-QTUN).
7 See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *3-4 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013); In re Voorhees, Securities Act Release No. 9592, 2014 SEC LEXIS
1922 (June 3, 2013).
8 See infra Part II.
9 Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-is-bitcoin
(archived at http://perma.cc/AV97-YZJY) (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
10 Id.
11 See CRAIG K. EWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS,
ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id. at 2.
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The power of Bitcoin’s public ledger is that it solves, through the use of
cryptography, the so-called “double spending” problem.16 The double spending
problem occurs when a participant in a currency market can simultaneously
transfer a single unit of currency to two different recipients.17 Double-spending
problems are greatest when a transferor can easily misrepresent information
about the recipients of a particular currency unit, and can thus transfer the
same unit of currency twice.18 Due to the easy reproducibility of digital
information, the double spending problem is acute for a digital currency.19
Individual Bitcoins are generated through a process called “mining.”20 Users
of the Bitcoin network can mine new Bitcoins by using computing power to
perform complex calculations that process transactions on the Bitcoin network,
secure the network, and keep network users synchronized.21 Once a miner has
proven that it was the first to perform such a calculation, that miner is
compensated with newly generated Bitcoins.22 The process of mining is not
merely a way for participants in the Bitcoin ecosystem to potentially reap
personal rewards. Mining is also critical to the functionality of the Bitcoin
network because it is through the mining process that the blockchain is
continued and verified.23
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BITCOIN BEING A SECURITY

The issuance and transfer of securities are highly regulated by both federal
and state law. Consequently, if Bitcoins were determined to be a “security” for
purposes of federal law and/or state “blue sky” laws, the environment for
mining, exchanging, and publicly providing information about Bitcoin would
be deeply altered, and, depending on how the relevant rules were seen to apply,

16
17

Id.
See generally David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM., Aug. 1992, at

96.
18

Clifton B. Parker, Stanford scholars say Bitcoin offers promise, peril, STAN. REP.
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/february/bitcoin-athey-srinivasan021814.html (archived at http://perma.cc/AQ6M-2S42).
19 With traditional physical currency, the double-spending problem is less significant
because the transferee can see the currency. This is because everyone involved in an
exchange has immediate visual access to the original physical currency involved and it is
not trivially easy to reproduce the currency (this is why the Federal Reserve is constantly
modifying U.S. currency to make it difficult to reproduce). Where the transferor and
transferee of physical currency are not both physically present at the time of transfer, the
risk of double-spending is much greater. Accordingly, third-party financial intermediaries
such as banks and credit card companies are typically used to validate that the currency is
not being double-spent. Id.
20 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
21 Id.
22 EWELL, supra note 11, at 2 n.3.
23 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
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could make the use of the Bitcoin blockchain impossible.24 While this article
does not attempt to canvass all of the laws and regulations that would be
implicated by a determination that Bitcoin is a security, it is worth noting the
more significant laws that would apply.
A.

The Securities Act of 1933

The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) was enacted by the U.S.
Congress in the wake of widely reported fraud and weak disclosures in the
securities markets leading up to the market crash of 1929.25 Consequently, an
essential purpose of the Securities Act is to create a framework of regulations
with the aim of ensuring that issuers and sellers of securities provide investors
with adequate and accurate information upon which to base their investment
decisions.26 The Securities Act prohibits the sale or offer of a security to the
public unless the security is registered with the SEC or an exemption from
registration under Section 4(a) is available.27 An issuer that seeks to register a
security in compliance with the Securities Act is required to file with the SEC
a registration statement (which includes a prospectus to be used in the sale of
such securities) that conforms to the specific requirements of the SEC’s rules
and is made publicly available.28 Registration of securities under the Securities
Act is time-consuming, expensive, and typically necessitates the involvement
of attorneys, accountants, and other professionals.29 Moreover, in the case of
Bitcoin, which was established anonymously by a yet-unidentified person or
persons, it is unclear on whom the registration obligation would fall.30 Indeed,
24

For example, as discussed in Part II.A. below, if Bitcoin miners were found, in
carrying out the function of running the complex calculations required to create new
Bitcoins, to be issuers of Bitcoins, or acting as agents of the issuer of Bitcoin engaged in a
public offering of securities required to be registered under Section 5 of the Securities Act,
they would be unable to provide the most basic information required in the registration
statement to be filed with the SEC on Form S-1, including the issuer’s name and address.
25 See 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN, & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 281
(5th ed. 2014) (“[T]he public in the past has sustained severe losses through practices
neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling securities”
(quoting President Franklin Roosevelt)). With reference to the Securities Act’s sister
legislation, which followed a year later, see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 n.10
(1967) (“The Securities Exchange Act was a product of a lengthy and highly publicized
investigation by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency into stock market practices
and the reasons for the stock market crash of October 1929.”).
26 Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1601 (2012).
27 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a), 77e(a) (2012).
28 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 10
(2014 Ed.).
29 Id. at 263-64.
30 In the case of other cryptocurrencies, the SEC may more easily be able to identify the
persons or entities that sponsored the creation of the blockchain on which the relevant
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the continuous production (through mining) of new Bitcoins is an essential
feature of the architecture of the Bitcoin blockchain, and yet it presents the
possibility that miners themselves are “issuers,” or acting as agents of the
issuer, of Bitcoins.31
Although Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act provides for certain
transactions in securities without a registration statement’s being in effect,
these permitted transactions fall into narrow categories and their requirements
must be strictly adhered to in order for them to apply.32 For example,
transactions in securities by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer do not require registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act.33 If,
however, a person purchases securities from an issuer, or from any person who
controls the issuer, with a view to making a public resale (rather than for
investment purposes), then the person falls within the definition of
“underwriter” and cannot avail himself of this exemption from the registration
requirement.34 The typical Bitcoin transaction is not structured so as to permit
compliance with these requirements: depending on who the issuer of Bitcoin is
cryptocurrency is used. For example, the identity of persons and entities that created the
cryptocurrencies Dogecoin and Litecoin are public. See Danny Bradbury, Litecoin founder
Charles Lee on the origins and potential of the world’s second largest cryptocurrency,
COINDESK (July 23, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/litecoin-founder-charles-leeon-the-origins-and-potential-of-the-worlds-second-largest-cryptocurrency/ (archived at
http://perma.cc/FG3B-YVL5); Asa Bennett, Dogecoin Creator Jackson Palmer on Doge,
Currency And Bitcoin, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2014, 9:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/04/24/dogecoin-creator-doge-jacksonpalmer_n_5199347.html (archived at http://perma.cc/GTM5-TE3C).
31 The Exchange Act defines an “issuer” as “any person who issues or proposes to issue
any security; except that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust
certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares
in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed,
restricted management, or unit type, the term ‘issuer’ means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities, the term
‘issuer’ means the person by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, used.” 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).
32 Id. § 77e.
33 Id.
34 “The term ‘underwriter’ means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates
or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such
term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an
underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors’ or sellers’
commission. As used in this paragraph the term “issuer” shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.” Id. § 77b(e)(11).
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found to be, Bitcoin miners are either acquiring securities directly from the
issuer, or those who purchase Bitcoins from them are acquiring securities
directly from the issuer; transactions on the blockchain are publicly disclosed,
even if the transacting parties are identified only anonymously; and, because
Bitcoins offer no potential for dividends, many purchasers can be expected to
be acquiring Bitcoins for the purpose of reselling them, rather than holding
them indefinitely as an investment. In any event, the Bitcoin blockchain is not
currently configured to permit potential purchasers of Bitcoins to make
representations regarding their investment intent and that they are not
purchasing for resale.
Similarly, if a Bitcoin miner is regarded as the issuer of the Bitcoins she
mines, then Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act would exempt from
registration her transactions in Bitcoin so long as they do not involve a public
offering. Under Regulation D, the widely used safe harbor for private
placements, an issuer must, among other things, either offer its securities
without the use of any form of public advertisement or other general
solicitation and limit its investors largely to persons that it reasonably believes
are “accredited investors”35 or, if it does employ a general solicitation to
market its securities, it must verify that each person that acquires the securities
in the offering is an accredited investor.36 As with determining investment
intent, the Bitcoin blockchain does not offer an opportunity, or facility through
which, to require potential purchasers to make representations as to their status
as accredited investors. Because the transactions are conducted on a public
blockchain, it may not be possible for a miner to claim that she has not offered
the Bitcoin through a form of public advertisement. A failure by an issuer to
comply with the applicable requirements imposed on its offering of securities
can result in the purchaser’s having a rescission right.37
B.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Generally speaking, any person who is in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the accounts of others or for itself is a broker or a
dealer, and thus subject to the requirement to register in such capacity under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).38 Consequently, if
Bitcoins were found to be securities for purposes of the Exchange Act, then
market participants who facilitate the buying and selling of Bitcoins, both for
35

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014).
Id. § 230.506(c).
37
17 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012).
38 The Exchange Act defines a “broker” as “any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others”. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A)
(2012). A “dealer” is defined as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities (not including security-based swaps, other than security-based swaps with or for
persons that are not eligible contract participants) for such person’s own account through a
broker or otherwise”. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
36
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their own account and for the accounts of others, would potentially have to
register with the SEC as broker-dealers, or find an exemption from registration
upon which they could rely.
In addition, the Exchange Act imposes an anti-fraud obligation on any
purchase or sale of a security whether it is registered or not.39 The well-known
Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce . . . to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”40 Were Bitcoins
determined to be securities for purposes of these anti-fraud obligations,
statements that sellers of Bitcoins make in connection with their sales could
subject them to liability under Rule 10b-5.
C.

The Investment Company Act of 1940

The Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act’)
governs entities, such as mutual funds and private investment funds, that hold
securities in a pooled portfolio for their investors.41 If Bitcoin is a security,
then any entity that is established to hold Bitcoins may be subject to the
numerous, specific, and burdensome requirements of the Investment Company
Act. Such requirements would include registering the entity with the SEC as an
“investment company,” conforming the entity’s governance to the narrow set
of permitted structures, and registering the person that has discretion over the
investment decisions of the entity as an investment adviser under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.42 Although the Investment Company Act
provides exclusions from the definition of investment company for certain
pooled investment vehicles (and thus its registration requirements), the
exclusions most commonly relied upon limit the number of investors in the
entity and/or require the investors generally to be ultra-high net worth
“qualified purchasers.”43 If Bitcoin is a security, then entities that are formed to
hold Bitcoins that seek to avoid registration as investment companies would

39

Id. § 78j.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (defining an “investment company” as, among other
things, “any issuer which. . . is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities . . .”).
42
See id. § 80a-8(a) (requiring registration); id. §§ 80a-10(a), 80a-10(c) (setting
parameters on the board of registered investment companies); id. §§ 80b-3(a), 80b3a(a)(1)(B) (requiring the registration of investment advisers and expressly carving out
investment advisers to registered investment companies from the investment adviser
registration exemption available to state-regulated investment advisers).
43 See id. §§ 80a-3(c)(1) (limiting investors to 100 or less), 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (limiting
investors to qualified purchasers).
40
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have to rigorously comply with the requirements of these exclusions, ensuring
that all of the relevant entity’s owners satisfy the applicable criteria and that
the entity does not make or propose to make a public offering of its own equity
interests.44
III. THE DEFINITION OF “SECURITY”
Evaluating whether Bitcoin is a security requires an interpretation of the
Securities Act, a statute enacted over a decade before the construction of the
first fully-functional digital computer.45 The Securities Act was created with
the dual objectives of “requir[ing] that investors receive financial and other
significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale” and
“prohibit[ing] deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of
securities.”46 The legislative intent behind the Securities Act was to create a
legal construct that would not be outpaced by financial innovations.47
In defining the scope of the market that it wished to regulate, Congress
painted with a broad brush. It recognized the virtually limitless scope of human
ingenuity, especially in the creation of ‘countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.’48
The term “security” is intended to be defined in “‘sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a
security.’”49 Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has observed, in passing the
Securities Act “Congress did not . . . intend to provide a broad federal remedy
for all fraud. Accordingly, the task has fallen to the [SEC] . . . and ultimately to
the federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial transactions in our
society come within the coverage of these statutes.”50
“Security” is defined broadly in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act,51

44

Id.
Construction of ENIAC, the first Turing-complete digital computer, was completed in
1946. See Milestones: Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer, 1946, ENGINEERING
&
TECH.
HIST.
WIKI
(Feb.
25,
2015),
http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/Milestones:Electronic_Numerical_Integrator_and_
Computer,_1946 (archived at http://perma.cc/K79R-PL47).
46
The
Laws
That
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (archived at http://perma.cc/9P4N-C6ZV) (last visited
Nov. 22, 2014).
47 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990).
48 Id. at 60-61 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
49 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 85-73, at 11 (1933)).
50 Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
51 The Exchange Act also defines “security.” The Exchange Act definition is largely
identical to the definition in the Securities Act, except that any instrument that is a “currency
or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance, which has a maturity at the time
45
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which provides:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating
to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.52
IV. COMMON TYPES OF SECURITIES
The Supreme Court has observed that the Securities Act’s lengthy litany of
instruments in the definition of “security” includes both “commonly known
documents traded for speculation or investment”53 “whose names alone carry
well-settled meaning”54 – for example, “stock”, “bond”, and “note” – as well
as instruments of “a more variable character, designated by such descriptive
terms as ‘certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,’ ‘investment contract,’ and ‘in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a security.’”55 When an instrument falls within one of the
categories of commonly known instruments, the Supreme Court has relieved
courts from engaging in a “case-by-case analysis of every instrument,” as
“[s]ome instruments are obviously within the class Congress intended to
regulate because they are by their nature investments.”56
Even a passing familiarity with the items listed in the definition allows one
to see that Bitcoin is not among the instruments “commonly known” as
securities. Taking each type in turn, one can easily establish that Bitcoin does
not fall into any of these types of instruments.
In the case of “stock,” the Supreme Court has looked for where “an
of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof
the maturity of which is likewise limited” is expressly carved out from the definition.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012). Because this carve-out
does not bear on the analysis at hand, this article refers to the Securities Act’s definition
throughout.
52 Id. § 77b(a)(1).
53 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
54 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
55 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
56 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990).
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instrument is both called ‘stock’ and bears stock’s usual characteristics,” and
has identified stock’s usual characteristics as “(i) the right to receive dividends
contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability
to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in
proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in
value.”57 Bitcoin does not bear critical indicia of the “stock,” because, although
transferable and able to appreciate (and depreciate) in exchange value, Bitcoins
do not carry a right to a dividend declared by an issuer, a right to vote on an
issuer’s affairs or conduct, or, in fact, any kind of right to participate in the
economic success of a juridical entity.58 Because Bitcoins are not stock, they
cannot be treasury stock, which is simply stock that an issuer has reacquired
from its stockholders.59 For similar reasons, a Bitcoin is not a “transferable
share,” which would require it to represent a fractional “share” of an
enterprise60 or a “preorganization certificate or subscription,” which would
require it to represent an interest in a business entity that was issued prior to,
but in anticipation of, the legal formation of such entity.61
Certain of the instruments listed in the Securities Act’s definition of
“security” have technical meanings and relate to very particular types of
instruments. A “security future” is a “contract of sale for future delivery of a
single security or of a narrow-based security index, including any interest

57 Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 851 (1975)).
58 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (9th ed., 2009) (defining the term “stock,” in
relevant part, as “[t]he capital or principal fund raised by a corporation through subscribers’
contributions or the sale of shares” and “[a] proportional part of a corporation’s capital
represented by the number of equal units (or shares) owned, and granting the holder the
right to participate in the company’s general management and to share in its net profits or
earnings.”
59 See id. (defining the term “treasury stock” as “[s]tock issued by a company but then
reacquired and either canceled or held”).
60 See id. (defining the term “share,” in relevant part, to mean “[o]ne of the definite
number of equal parts into which the capital stock of a corporation or joint-stock company is
divided”).
61 Pre-organization subscriptions and the certificates representing them are rarely used in
sophisticated business transactions, but they are contemplated in the corporations law
statutes of various states. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 165 (West 2015) (providing
that subscriptions for stock of a corporation to be formed shall be irrevocable for six months
after being made, except as provided in the subscription itself or as consented to by all other
subscribers or the corporation); Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F. 2d 253 (9th Cir. 1926).
By including pre-organization certificates and subscriptions in the litany of instruments
included in the definition of “security,” the Securities Act expressly brings into the ambit of
the statute interests that have been purchased but for which the relevant issuer hasn’t been
formed as a juridical entity, thus eliminating the possibility for persons to avoid the statute’s
prohibitions, prescriptions, and penalties simply by taking investors’ money on the promise
of creating an entity that they in fact never form.
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therein or based on the value thereof” other than certain excluded securities.62
A “security-based swap” is any agreement, contract, or transaction, that is a
put, call, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind (other than certain
specified types of agreements, contracts, and transactions that are expressly
excluded) that is based on (a) an index that is a narrow-based security index
(generally a securities index with nine or fewer component securities and
meeting certain other criteria), including any interest in such index or in the
value of such index; (b) a single security or loan, including any interest in such
security or loan, or in the value of such security or loan; or (c) the occurrence,
non-occurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an event (so long as it meets a
specified materiality threshold) relating to a single issuer of a security or the
issuers of securities in a narrow-based security index.63 Critically for these
definitions, Bitcoin does not entitle its holder to require a contract counterparty
to sell such holder any other security or other asset, to buy a security or any
other asset from such holder, or to pay any amount to the holder, or require the
holder to pay any amount to its counterparty, in each case upon the payment of
an amount or the occurrence of any economic or other event. The presence of
these features is not only key to security-based swaps, but also to puts, calls,
straddles, options, and privileges on securities, securities indices, non-U.S.
currencies,64 and other assets.65 Lacking these features means that Bitcoin does
62

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(A) (2012). The Securities Act adopts the Exchange Act’s
definition of “security future” by cross-reference. Id. § 77b(a)(16).
63 An understanding of the term “security-based swap” requires reference to three
separate statutes and tracking through nested cross-references. The Securities Act, id. §
77b(a)(17), defines “security-based swap” by referring to the Commodity Exchange Act of
1974. 7 U.S.C. §1a(42) (2012). The Commodity Exchange Act, in turn, defines “securitybased swap” by reference to the Exchange Act’s definition of the term. Id. The Exchange
Act’s definition, however, refers, in significant part, back to the Commodity Exchange Act’s
definition of “swap.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(68). The Commodity Exchange Act’s definition of
“swap” is a lengthy definition that, along with tying the definition to the functional
characteristics typical of “swaps,” sets out a list of twenty-two specifically named types of
swaps, and ten categories of transactions excluded from the definition. The term “narrowbased security index” is defined in the Exchange Act and in the Commodity Exchange Act.
Id. § 78c(a)55(B); 7 U.S.C. § 1a(35). Unsurprisingly, neither Bitcoin nor any other
cryptocurrency is named in any of these explicit and technical definitions.
64 It is worth noting in this context that, although the definition of “security” includes
“any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency,” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1), there is no need to determine whether
Bitcoins are a “currency” for this purpose, because the Securities Act covers only these
specified rights to acquire or sell non-U.S. currencies, not the sale and purchase of such
currencies themselves. Retail transactions in currencies are governed by the Commodity
Exchange Act and are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(B). An analysis of the treatment of Bitcoin under the
Commodity Exchange Act is outside the scope of this article.
65 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1203-04 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “option,” in relevant
part, as “[t]he right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell a given quantity of securities,
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not fall into any of the enumerated types of instruments that relate to options,
swaps, futures, or warrants or rights to subscribe or purchase.
The Securities Act’s definition of “security” also lists several types of
certificates. A “collateral-trust certificate” is a certificate representing a debt
secured by the deposit of another security with a trustee.66 A “voting-trust
certificate” is a certificate that the trustee of a trust, itself organized to hold
shares of voting stock in a closely held corporation and to empower such
trustee to exercise the stock’s rights to vote, issues to the beneficial holders of
such stock.67 A “certificate of deposit for a security” is a bank-issued
certificate evidencing the bank’s receipt of a security and agreeing to provide
such security to the depositor.68 A “certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement,” on the other hand, has a less established definition,
and (as noted above) is one of the “more variable”69 categories of security that
the courts have been called upon to examine. To the extent courts have
evaluated this term in the definition of “security,” they have applied it only if
the relevant instrument was also “commonly known as a security.”70 Where
courts have focused on sharing in profits, it has instead been in the context of
interpreting the term “investment contract,” as discussed below.71 Most
importantly, however, in terms of the characterization of Bitcoin under these
elements of the definition of “security,” each of them requires the existence of
a certificate.72 Bitcoins are not evidenced by certificates or instantiated in

commodities, or other assets at a fixed price within a specified time”; “call option” as [a]n
option to buy something (esp. securities) at a fixed price even if the market rises; the right to
require another to sell. Often shortened to ‘call’”; and “put option” as “[a]n option to sell
something (esp. securities) at a fixed price even if the market declines; the right to require
another to buy. Often shortened to ‘put’”). A “privilege” in this context is a right similar to
that afforded by a call option, but which inures to a current holder of a security. See, e.g., id.
at 1297-98 (noting, in the definition of “preemptive right” that it is a “shareholder’s
privilege to purchase newly issued stock – before the shares are offered to the public – in an
amount proportionate to the shareholder’s current holdings in order to prevent dilution of
the shareholder’s ownership interest. . . . Also termed ‘subscription privilege’”).
66 See id. at 203 (noting, in the definition of “bond,” that a “collateral trust bond” is also
termed a “collateral trust certificate”).
67 See id. at 1655, 1714 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “voting trust certificate,” and, under the
definition of “trust,” defining “voting trust”).
68 See id. at 256 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “certificate of deposit” with respect to cash
deposits).
69 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
70 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that
the “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement” term was
“colorably relevant” to a partnership interest, but concluding that “‘[a profit-sharing]
provision alone is not sufficient to make that agreement a security’”) (quoting Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982)).
71 See infra Part V.
72
See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967) (noting that the
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certificated form, and thus cannot be “securities” under these elements.
Similarly, Bitcoin clearly conveys no right to a fractional undivided interest
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has noted
that oil and gas rights “were notorious subjects of speculation and fraud,”73 and
so a court may be warranted in taking as broad an interpretation as possible
when evaluating instruments that might constitute interests in such rights, and,
thus, securities subject to the Securities Act and Exchange Act.74 Even a broad
construction of these terms, however, cannot convert a wholly virtual resource
like Bitcoin into an interest in any of those most tangible of terrestrial
resources: oil, gas, and minerals.
Purchasers may borrow money to acquire Bitcoins, but transactions for or in
Bitcoins do not themselves result in any continuing obligation of one party to
pay another. Consequently Bitcoins do not represent evidences of
indebtedness, debentures, or bonds.75 The term “note” similarly conveys a
sense of an obligation of the maker of the note to the holder.76 The Supreme
Court and the U.S. courts of appeals, however, have given particular attention
to “notes” when conducting analyses under the Securities Act’s definition of
“security”, because this category of instruments has proven to be relatively
broad.77 The Supreme Court has adopted a “family resemblance” test to
determine when an instrument that is called a note also constitutes a “note” that
is a “security” for purposes of the Securities Act.78 This test, however, applies
only to instruments that are called or referred to by the term “notes.”79 Besides

“withdrawable capital shares” being analyzed are “investment contracts,” but could also be
‘viewed as ‘certificate[s] of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement’”
because they “must be evidenced by a certificate” as required by the relevant Illinois law
under which they were issued).
73 SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943).
74 See id. (conceding that leasehold subdivisions of parcels of land on the basis of
promises to drill for oil on the land are not fractional undivided interests in oil, but finding
that the interests were nonetheless securities because they were “investment contracts”).
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 200, 460 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “bond,” in its broadest
and simplest meaning, as “[a]n obligation; a promise”; defining “debenture” as “[a] debt
secured only by the debtor’s earning power, not by a lien on a particular asset” and as “[a]n
instrument acknowledging such a debt”).
76 Id. (defining “note,” in the relevant respect, as “[a] written promise by one party (the
maker) to pay money to another party (the payee) or to bearer.”).
77 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1990).
78 See id. at 64-65.
79
Id. at 62-63 (Explaining that the term ”‘note’ may now be viewed as a relatively broad
term that encompasses instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on
whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment
context . . . . A majority of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue have
adopted, in varying forms, ‘investment versus commercial’ approaches that distinguish, on
the basis of all of the circumstances surrounding the transactions, notes issued in an
investment context (which are ‘securities’) from notes issued in a commercial or consumer
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not representing a payment obligation of any kind, Bitcoin is not identified as a
“note,” and consequently a court would not be expected to apply this test.
Consequently, Bitcoins are not bonds, debentures, evidences of indebtedness,
or notes for purposes of the Securities Act’s definition of “security.”
V.

INVESTMENT CONTRACTS

A financial investment that does not fall within any other category of
“security” may nonetheless fall within the very broad category of “investment
contract.” Indeed, in SEC v. Shavers, the defendant argued that the Bitcoin
investments that he sold were not “securities,” but the court rejected that
argument, finding that shares of digital hedge fund Bitcoin Savings and Trust
were “investment contracts” and therefore securities.80 This decision has been
interpreted by some commentators as holding that Bitcoin itself is a security
subject to regulation by the SEC.81 This is incorrect. The court limited its
holding to whether shares of the hedge fund were investment contracts and did
not consider whether Bitcoin itself is an investment contract.82 However, the
fact remains that analyzing whether Bitcoin is an investment contract is the key
to determining whether it is a security.
“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party.”83 This definition, which the Supreme Court
articulated in SEC v. Howey, has been interpreted as creating a three-prong
test, requiring proof of (a) an investment of money, (b) a common enterprise,
and (c) the expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others.84
While it might seem intuitively appealing to shortcut this analysis for
transactions that do not involve speculation on future investment returns or
purchases of goods with a value independent of any potential investment
return, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that “an investment contract
is necessarily missing where the enterprise is not speculative or promotional in
character and where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value
context (which are not)”).
80 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *4-6 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013).
81
See, e.g., Michael Bobelian, Serious Money, CAL. LAW. (May 2014),
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=934788&wteid=934788_Serious_Money
(archived at http://perma.cc/8KRL-32MJ) (“[A]s of 2014, a federal court had found that
Bitcoin is a security.”); Stroh, supra note 5 (“As the court determined in Shavers, bitcoins
are a security”).
82 Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *14 (noting that “the Court determined
that the BCTCST [Bitcoin Savings and Trust] investments Defendants sold meet the
definition of investment contract and, as such, are securities”).
83 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
84 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99).
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independent of the success of the enterprise as a whole.”85
A.

Investment of Money

“The first component of the Howey test focuses on the investment of money.
The determining factor is whether an investor ‘chose to give up a specific
consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the characteristics
of a security.’”86 Under this broad definition, most purchases of Bitcoin will
qualify as an investment of money, because the specific consideration given up
in exchange for Bitcoin is either fiat currency backed by a government, such as
U.S. dollars, or another virtual currency that constitutes a specific
consideration. In fact, at least one federal court has already explicitly
concluded that payment of Bitcoin constitutes an investment of money under
this prong of the Howey test.87
B.

Common Enterprise

In determining whether or not a scheme satisfies the common enterprise
requirement of the Howey test, federal courts have applied one or more of the
following criteria: (i) horizontal commonality; (ii) broad vertical commonality;
and (iii) strict vertical commonality.88 The law concerning the application of
these criteria is inconsistent between different Courts of Appeals, and is still
developing within certain circuits.89 It therefore is important to consider all
three of these criteria for whether a common enterprise exists.
1. Horizontal Commonality
The horizontal commonality approach to evaluating the existence of a
common enterprise provides that a common enterprise exists if there is a

85

Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 48 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559
(1979)).
87 Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *6. See also In re Voorhees, Securities
Act Release No. 9592, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1922 (June 3, 2013) (SEC cease-and-desist order
asserting that sales of hedge fund shares in exchange for Bitcoin were unregistered
offerings).
88 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49 (“Courts are in some disarray as to the legal rules associated
with the ascertainment of a common enterprise . . . . Many courts require a showing of
horizontal commonality . . . . Other courts have modeled the concept of a common
enterprise around fact patterns in which an investor’s fortunes are tied to the promoter’s
success rather than to the fortunes of his or her fellow investors. This doctrine, known as
vertical commonality, has two variants[:] . . . [b]road vertical commonality . . . [and] . . .
narrow vertical commonality.”) (internal citations omitted).
89 Id. (“Courts also differ in their steadfastness of their allegiance to a single standard of
commonality. . . . To complicate matters further, four courts of appeals have accepted
horizontal commonality, but have not yet ruled on whether they will also accept some form
of vertical commonality.”).
86
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“pooling of assets from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and
risks of the enterprise.”90 Thus, the horizontal commonality approach focuses
on the relationship among investors in an economic venture. The Courts of
Appeals taking this approach place great weight on whether the scheme
involves a “pooling” of assets.91 For the common enterprise prong to be
satisfied, horizontal commonality requires that an investor’s assets be joined
with another investor’s assets into a joint enterprise in which each investor
shares the risk of profit and loss according to his or her individual
investment.92
There is certainly a sense in which purchasers of Bitcoin can be seen as
participating in a broadly defined joint endeavor. There is a strong feeling of
community among proponents and longtime users of Bitcoin. Many, if not
most, holders of Bitcoin own or work for enterprises that somehow make use
of cryptocurrencies. The value of Bitcoin is likely related to the collective
success of those enterprises. If the holders and miners of Bitcoin are successful
in convincing others to purchase Bitcoins and in increasing the use of Bitcoin,
the value of Bitcoin will generally increase.93
However, purchasers of Bitcoin will not be pooling their assets in a single,
common enterprise to which they are making payments. Due to the
decentralized nature of Bitcoin, there is no common entity that generates, sells,
or controls Bitcoins.94 Purchasers’ payments for Bitcoin will go to the miner
who generates the Bitcoin or to someone who obtains Bitcoin from a previous
holder of the Bitcoin through a market exchange.95 Both mining and
subsequent market transactions are decentralized processes.96 While a single
miner or holder of Bitcoin may sell different Bitcoins to different purchasers,
the resulting aggregation of payments with the seller is an unintended
byproduct of the decentralized purchases, not an intentional “pooling” of the
purchasers’ assets with the seller to further a common enterprise in which the
purchasers all are investing.
In addition, purchasers of Bitcoin are not investing in the profits and risks of
90

Id. (citing SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212 F.3d 180, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2000)).
See generally Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1994).
92 Id. at 1018 (finding no investment contract where a condominium’s sharing program
creating “a pooling of weeks, in a sense . . . [b]ut . . . not a pooling of profits, which is
essential to horizontal commonality”).
93 While it is intuitive that increasing the use of Bitcoin will cause an increase in its
value, in some cases increasing transactions in Bitcoin may have a contrary effect. For
example, many retail businesses that accept payment in Bitcoin immediately sell the Bitcoin
that they receive for fiat currency. To the extent that they are selling goods to individuals
who previously were holders of Bitcoin and these individuals do not acquire new Bitcoin to
replace the Bitcoin that they used to make their purchase, these transactions may have the
effect of decreasing the value of Bitcoin by increasing the available supply.
94 See supra Part I.
95 See supra Part I.
96 See supra Part I.
91
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the person or entity selling the Bitcoin. While these sellers of Bitcoin may use
the payments that they receive to take actions that would increase the value of
Bitcoin, they have absolutely no obligation to do so, and purchasers generally
have no reason to expect the sellers to do so. The future value of Bitcoin is
based primarily on factors other than how the sellers use the payments that
they receive. These factors include, for example, retailers’ willingness to
accept payment in Bitcoin, actions taken by various regulators both in the
United States and internationally, the willingness of banks and other financial
institutions to open accounts for Bitcoin businesses, the quality of competing
decentralized virtual currencies, and the rate at which miners create new
Bitcoins by performing the work of processing transactions.97 Accordingly, to
the extent that certain purchasers of Bitcoin view their purchase as an
investment, it is an investment based on these market factors, not an
investment based on anticipated actions by the seller from whom they are
purchasing the Bitcoin.
Several federal courts have held that when a seller has no ongoing
obligation to act for the benefit of a common group of purchasers, the
instrument sold does not satisfy the horizontal commonality test.98 For
example, purchasers of plots of land in a common development have attempted
to assert that these purchases constitute an investment contract because the
value of their interests was tied to the common development of the land and
community in which the plots were located.99 However, courts evaluating such
assertions “have held that the developer must make a commitment to manage,
develop or otherwise service the plaintiff’s property in a common
enterprise.”100 In the absence of such an ongoing commitment, the venture to
which the purchasers pay the purchase price is not a venture in which the
purchasers share with each other a common risk of profit and loss.101 Rather,
they are paying a seller that is engaged in its own distinct venture and that will
not directly generate profits and losses for the group of purchasers.102 The
same logic applies to sellers of Bitcoin, who have no obligation to act for
purchasers of Bitcoin after the sale of that Bitcoin.

97

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F. Supp. 182, 236 (D.N.J.
1993).
99 Id. at 236.
100 Id. at 236. See also Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the expectations of land purchasers that land would rise in
value if seller “built roads and other improvements” did not make purchase an investment in
a common venture because “this is not the type of managerial service contemplated in
Howey,” and noting that there was no management contract or management obligation and
“defendants did not promise to run the development and distribute profits” to the purchasers
“as did the operators of orange groves in Howey”).
101 Rolo, 845 F. Supp. at 236.
102 Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
98
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2. Broad Vertical Commonality
The broad vertical commonality approach to evaluating the existence of a
common enterprise focuses on the expertise of the promoter of the alleged
security.103 “Broad vertical commonality requires that the well-being of all
investors be dependent upon the promoter’s expertise.”104
In the case of sales of Bitcoin, the only potential “promoter” would be the
seller of the Bitcoin. As noted in the discussion of horizontal commonality,
there is no common seller of Bitcoin, because the creation and transfer of
Bitcoin is decentralized. In addition, the future value of Bitcoin is not
dependent on the expertise of the decentralized sellers of Bitcoin.105 The
absence of any obligation on the part of the sellers to use their expertise to
further the value of the sold Bitcoins again ensures that Bitcoin is not a
security under the broad vertical commonality criteria for “common
enterprise.”
Courts have repeatedly adopted similar logic in instances where a developer
sells plots of land based on representations that the developer will finish a land
development, but will not continue to manage it after initial development is
complete.106 Where a seller is “attempting to transfer its entire interest and
upon sale [removes itself] from the enterprise, this is not a situation where the
seller and buyer [enter] into a common venture dependent for success upon the
providing of capital by the buyer and management by the seller.”107 Thus,
when Bitcoin sellers do not undertake to act to increase the value of Bitcoin
103

SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001)
Id. See also SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“Broad vertical commonality . . . only requires a movant to show that the investors are
dependent upon the expertise or efforts of the investment promoter for their returns.”).
105 See supra Part V.B.1.
106 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that purchasers of lots of undeveloped real estate were not part of common venture with the
promoter who sold the land, despite “strong and repeated suggestions that the surrounding
area would develop into a thriving residential community,” because “apart from the promise
of an existing lodge or a new country club, the evidence did not show that the promoter or
any other obligated person or entity was promising the buyers to build or provide
anything”); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that
purchasers of lots from a developer were not part of “any common venture or common
enterprise” with the developer because the developer “was under no contractual obligation
to the plaintiffs other than deliver title once the purchase terms were met” and had no
“collateral management contract with the purchasers”).
107
Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that purchaser of partial interest in oil and gas lease is not
part of common venture with the seller). See also Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that developer that had no ongoing management
obligation after the transfer of title and whose “interest was in recouping their investment,
making a profit and moving on” was not part of a common enterprise with the purchaser,
regardless of the purchasers’ expectation of profit).
104

21.1_ALBERTS_F
THIS
INAL_MVERSION
ACROD (DO NOTDOES
DELETE) NOT

CONTAIN PAGE NUMBERS
1/11/2016 1:11 PM
PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION

2015]

IS BITCOIN A SECURITY?

after the sale, they are not participating in a common vertical enterprise with
the purchasers.
3. Strict Vertical Commonality
This strict vertical commonality approach to evaluating the existence of a
common enterprise requires that the investors’ fortunes be “interwoven with
and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or
of third parties.”108 “It is not necessary that the funds of investors are pooled;
what must be shown is that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those
of the promoters, thereby establishing the requisite element of vertical
commonality.” 109 “Thus, a common enterprise exists if a direct correlation has
been established between success or failure of [the promoter’s] efforts and
success or failure of the investment.”110
While eliminating the pooling requirement might initially appear to address
the primary reason decentralized transfers of Bitcoin cannot be an investment
contract, it remains clear that sales of Bitcoin fail the test for strict vertical
commonality. Sellers of Bitcoin receive their only compensation at the moment
that the Bitcoin is sold; they do not receive additional compensation based on
future increases in the value of Bitcoin. Accordingly, the connection between
the financial interests of buyers and sellers does not create a vertical
commonality of interest.
The importance of the connection between the fortunes of the promoter and
the investor was evident in Brodt v. Bache & Co., where the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a discretionary commodities
brokerage account was not an investment contract “because the success or
failure of . . . [the brokerage house did] not correlate with the individual
investor’s profit or loss.”111 Rather, the brokerage house was compensated
through commissions and “could reap large commissions for itself and be
characterized as successful, while the individual accounts could be wiped
out.”112 There was no direct correlation between the success or failure of the
brokerage house, on the one hand, and the individual brokerage account
holder, on the other hand; therefore, the court held that the investor’s account
with the brokerage house did not satisfy the “vertical commonality” test for
determining whether such an arrangement constitutes a common enterprise so
as to constitute an investment contract.113 By analogy, because there is no
correlation between the future value of Bitcoin and the payment that a seller
receives in the sale of Bitcoin, this sale does not satisfy the “vertical
108 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
n.7 (9th Cir. 1973)).
109 SEC v. Eurobond Exch. Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994).
110 Id.
111 Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
112 Id.
113 Id.
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commonality” test.
C.

Expectation of Profits Solely From Efforts of the Promoter

The final prong of the Howey test requires that a person “is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”114 In Forman,
the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others.”115 “The courts of appeals have been unanimous in declining to give
literal meaning to the word “solely” in this context, instead holding the
requirement satisfied as long as ‘the efforts made by those other than the
investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.’”116
Bitcoin fails this test because even purchasers of Bitcoin who make their
purchase in anticipation of profits do not expect these profits to result from the
action of the promoter. If the expectation of economic return from an
instrument is based solely on market forces, and not on the efforts of the
sponsor, then the instrument does not satisfy this prong of the Howey test.117
Thus, in Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a contract to
purchase silver bars was not an investment contract because, “once the
purchase of silver bars was made, the profits to the investor depended upon the
fluctuations of the silver market” and not on the managerial efforts of a third
person, and “the decision to buy or sell was made by the owner of the
silver.“118 Purchasers of Bitcoin acquire a commodity like silver, the value of
which may fluctuate, but based solely on market forces and not on the efforts
of a sponsor or promoter.
VI. CONCLUSION
While no court or government agency has yet opined on whether Bitcoin is a
security, based on an analysis of case law applying the definition of “security”
under the Securities Act, it appears that Bitcoin is not a security. Bitcoin does
not fall within the definition of any common type of security. In addition,
Bitcoin does not appear to fall within the broad definition of “investment

114

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (2d Cir. 1975).
116 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 55 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973). See also Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d. 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973)
(holding that “an investment contract can exist where the investor is required to perform
some duties, as long as they are nominal or limited and would have little direct effect upon
receipt by the participants of the benefits promised by the promoters” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
117 Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d. 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
118 Id. at 79.
115
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contract” that the Supreme Court articulated in Howey.119 A sale of Bitcoin is
not an investment contract because a purchase of Bitcoin is not an investment
in a common enterprise and because purchasers should not expect to receive
profits from their purchase based on the efforts of the seller. As the SEC has
made clear, however, securities law is not irrelevant to virtual currency
investments.120 The SEC has already successfully applied securities law to
private investment funds that invest in Bitcoin companies.121 In addition, the
rapidly developing virtual currency ecosystem involves a wide variety of
transactions that could involve the sale of securities depending on how these
transactions are structured, including fundraising for Bitcoin businesses and for
alternative virtual currencies. As a result, we can expect the virtual currency
industry to continue to generate novel securities law questions for years to
come.

119

Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *3-4 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013)
121 Id.
120
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INTRODUCTION: TROUBLE IN THE KINGDOM
Approximately five years ago, just as the Bull Market returned, a
bold e-currency named Bitcoin emerged in cyberspace. 1 Attending its
launch was the promise that online vendors and anonymous consumers
could transact commerce without the restrictions of nations or
institutions.2 Indeed, the innovation was initially targeted for customers
nobly resisting often inscrutable bank and other intermediary fees.3 But
such attribution proved little more than reductive logic, as the
cryptocurrency4 soon paved a redolent playground for those engaging in
Ponzi schemes and shocking criminal activities. 5 The investment allure
1. For a brief, objective history of the phenomena, see generally CRAIG K. ELWELL ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, U.S. CRS ANALYZES VIRTUAL CURRENCY‘S LEGAL
AND REGULATORY ISSUES (2014) [hereinafter CRS Summary]. For a more pointed view, see
EOG Bitcoins and Sports Wagering – Birth of Bitcoins, EYE ON GAMING (Mar. 4, 2014),
www.eog.com/eog-bitcoins-sports-wagering-birth-bitcoins/.
2. See generally Frank J. Diekmann, Diekmann: The Risk In Currency & The
Currency Of Risk, CREDIT UNION JOURNAL (Apr. 25, 2014, 10:02AM),
http://www.cujournal.com/news/diekmann-the-risk-in-the-currency-and-the-currency-ofrisk-1022509-1.html; Freddy Gray, Welcome to crypto-currency land, THESPECTATOR(Apr.
26,
2014),
http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/the-speculator/9189611/are-cryptocurrencies-the-future-of-money/ (identifying the largest holders of virtual currencies only as
―???‖).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Treasury, Remarks From Under Sec‘y of
Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence David S. Cohen on ‗Addressing the Illicit Fin. Risks of
Virtual Currency,‘ (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl236.aspx (noting the ―intense enthusiasm‖ for virtual currencies because of
the belief ―shared by consumers, businesses, and investors alike‖ that such alternatives
―lower transaction costs, increase access to capital, and bring financial services to many
unbanked individuals‖).
4. Cryptocurrency
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp(last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
―Cryptocurrency‖ is most aptly described by what it is not: a currency tied to a nation,
manifested in paper form.A working definition calls it a ―digital or virtual currency that uses
cryptography for security.‖ Id.See alsoSEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV00416, 2013 WL
3810441, ¶ 2 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013), in which the SEC defines Bitcoin as ―a virtual
currency that may be traded on online exchanges for conventional currencies, including the
U.S. dollar, or used to purchase goods and services online. [Bitcoin] has no single
administrator, or central authority or repository.‖
5. Takashi Mochizuki, Japanese Regulators Take Closer Look at Bitcoin,THE WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(May
5,
2014,
8:00
AM),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579406331583977114;
Mridhula Raghavan, U.S. authorities probe bitcoin exchanges over illegal transactions:
WSJ, REUTERS (May 19, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/ususa-crime-bitcoin-idUSBREA4J01P20140520(disclosing subpoenas issued to the leading
Bitcoin exchange seeking information on ―ties between the exchanges and the online drug
market Silk Road‖);Peter J. Henning, For Bitcoin, Square Peg Meets Round Hole Under the
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:43 AM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/forbitcoin-square-peg-meets-round-hole-under-the-law/(―The government seized nearly
175,000 Bitcoins, so clearly virtual currency can be used to buy drugs as if it were cash on a
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has garnered less regulatory attention, despite a vault in single Bitcoin
price from thirteen dollars in January 2013 to over $1,100 in December
of the same year.6 Not surprisingly, notorious entrepreneurs resurfaced,
spearheading companies poised to capitalize on the Bitcoin craze.7
Consequentially, as regulators were forced to select the most
alarming examples of cyber-fraud to cabin this new threat,8 criminal
prosecution has often been the most ready fit. 9 Civil agencies have
adopted less certain—and diametrically opposed—stances (i.e., the
Internal Revenue Service10 and the Department of Treasury11).
street corner.‖); Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (HBO comedy series May 11, 2014)
(viewing the phenomena as much more intertwined with fraud, calling Bitcoin the currency
of ―heroin dealers and pornographers‖).
6. Stephen Bell, Blog, ―Bitcoin Entrepreneur Readies Australia Listing for New
Venture,‖THE
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Mar.
11,
2014
8:09
PM)
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/11/bitcoin-entrepreneur-readies-australia-listingfor-new-venture/.
7. See Brad Stone, Halsey Minor Returns, Bearing Bitcoins, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-15/halseyminor-returns-bearing-bitcoins-via-bitreserve (describing the plans of Bitreserve, a Cayman
Islands company that has filed for an IPO, and its CEO, a noted ―Internet entrepreneur‖
whose has seen his $400 million fortune subject to ―calamity‖).
8. See generally Kim Zetter, FBI Fears Bitcoin‘s Popularity with Criminals, WIRED
(May 9, 2012, 10:51PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/05/fbi-fears-bitcoin/; see also Cyrus
Sanati, Bitcoin looks primed for money laundering, FORTUNE (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:49 PM),
http://fortune.com/2012/12/18/bitcoin-looks-primed-for-money-laundering/.
9. How
Bitcoin
Works,
FORBES
ONLINE
(Aug.
1,
2013,
12:25
PM),http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/08/01/how-bitcoin-works/. The most
colorful Bitcoin prosecution to date involves the case against the Bitcoin pioneer who called
himself ―Dread Pirate Roberts.‖See United States v. Ross William Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93093 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014) (denying defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss in its
entirety). Even free market publications have noted as a ―disadvantage‖ to Bitcoin the
specific evils it opportunes: ―The relative anonymity of Bitcoin may encourage its use for
illegal and illicit activities such as tax evasion, weapons procurement, gambling and
circumvention of currency controls.‖ How Bitcoin Works.
10. See Michael Cooney, IRS: Bitcoin is property not money; IRS says virtual
currency has no legal tender status in any jurisdiction, NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 25, 2014,
5:21 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2175530/security/irs-bitcoin-is-propertynot-money.html. The IRS has, for now, sidestepped the controversy by deeming Bitcoin
gains and losses as ―property transactions.‖ Id. .
11. SeeApplication of FinCEN‘s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging
or Using Virtual Currencies, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK
(Mar.
18,
2013),
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2013-G001.html. FinCEN‘s guidance
declares that parties ―mining‖ Bitcoins for others or exchanging Bitcoins for cash must
comply with the registration requirements of the money laundering regulations promulgated
under the Bank Secrecy Act. To date, FinCEN has stopped short of subjecting Bitcoin
transactions exceeding a monetary threshold in value to reporting requirements. Id. See also
Press Release, supra note 3 for the proposition that ―we will need to consider whether to
apply ‗cash-like‘ reporting requirements to the virtual currency space‖, and Jenna Greene,
Playing Hot Potato: Regulators may be interested in overseeing bitcoin, but it‘s not clear
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Securities regulators have been quick to caution—the North American
Securities Administrators Association (―NASAA‖)12 lists digital
currencies as one of two new threats to investors on its eponymous
annual list.13 But, in the main, the newness of these e-currencies has
proven a challenge for tangible regulatory response by even sufficiently
alarmed watchdogs.14 And the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (―SEC‖ or ―Commission‖) has stepped slowly in its
inevitable march towards regulation, no doubt in part because of the
wide variety of Bitcoin arrangements.

A.
Bitcoin: Multiple Sources and Uses
In its present state, the Bitcoin market is populated by three

which
can
or
will,
CORPORATE
COUNSEL
(June
1,
2014),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202655860491/Playing-Hot-Potato; Kashmir Hill, Every
Important Person in Bitcoin Just Got Subpoenaed by New York‘s Financial Regulator,
FORBES
(Aug.
12,
2013,
1:43
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/12/every-important-person-in-bitcoin-justgot-subpoenaed-by-new-yorks-financial-regulator/.
12. See Regulatory & Legal Activity, N. AM. SEC. ADM‘RS ASSOC.(last visited August
3, 2014),www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/. NASAA is an organization that predates the
federalization of securities laws, and serves as the voice of state securities regulators. Id.
The organization issues many investor alerts and actively testifies before Congress, but it
has no rulemaking or enforcement apparatus and must rely on its members to bring
disciplinary action.Id.
13. The full warning on NASAA‘s website is as pointed as it is colorful:
Virtual reality may exist only in science fiction, but consumers now are able
topurchase goods and services with virtual money such as Bitcoin, PP Coin and
other digital currencies. Unlike traditional coinage, these alternatives typically are
not backed by tangible assets, are not issued by a governmental authority andare
subject to little or no regulation. The value of Bitcoins and other digital currencies
is highly volatile and the concept behind the currency is difficult to understand even
for sophisticated financial experts given the complicated mathematical algorithms
that determine when new blocks of coins will be released. This environment has
provided fertile ground for scam artists to capitalize on the increasing popularity and
acceptance of digital currencies. Investors should be aware that investments that
incorporate abstract money systems present very real risks, including the possibility
of virtual reality leaving an investor virtually broke.
Top Investor Threats, N. AM. SEC. ADM‘RS ASSOC. (last visited August 3, 2014),
http://www.nasaa.org/3752/top-investor-threats/.
14. See Henning, supra note 5 (―Currency, even the virtual types, is usually not
understood to be a security or commodity subject to regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.‖).
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categories of issuers.15 ―Mining‖ websites assist Bitcoin purchasers with
efforts to create new Bitcoins.16 It has been aptly noted that idyllic use
of the free source computer code is well beyond the capability of
individuals armed only with a mobile device, laptop, or personal
computer;17 regardless, any attempt by the SEC to universally apply a
reading of ―security‖ to all Bitcoins would be felled by the purchaser‘s
significant efforts in mining.18
A second categorical source of Bitcoins is the secondary market
(i.e., merchants and Miners re-selling Bitcoins to third parties).19 Such
market is nearly unidentifiable, and such actions appear more true to
Bitcoin‘s original purpose (i.e., as currency) rather than speculative
investment.20
But a third, vast market for Bitcoins is populated by selfproclaimed ―exchanges,‖ an appreciable number of which misrepresent
exchange status or disappear under questionable circumstances. 21
Offering a quick entrance to the highly volatile Bitcoin market, these
highly publicized cyber-entities pose a real and potentially catastrophic
threat to the American investing public.22 Further, these entities are
openly availing themselves of the goodwill attending policed
exchanges.23
Accordingly, this Article posits that the SEC can and must address
these common and commonly misconstrued conduits.24 To state it
15. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id. (declaring the ―probability of an individual discovering Bitcoins through
mining‖ to be ―very small‖).
18. See infra Part III (discussing the application of securities law to various Bitcoin
websites).
19. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 5.
20. See Complaint¶ 2,SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV00416, 2013 WL 3810441 (E.D.
Tex. July 23, 2013) (alleging only that Bitcoin satisfies the prerequisite of ―money‖ in
determining the presence of an investment).
21. See Crayton Harrison & Jesse Hamilton, Bitcoin Exchange Tradehill Pauses for
Regulatory Reasons, BLOOMBERG Aug. 30, 2013 (noting the exchange‘s halt for
―unspecified banking and regulatory reasons‖); see also Vitalik Buterin, Bitfloor Hacked,
$250,000
Missing,
BITCOIN
MAGAZINE
(Sept.
4,
2012),
http://bitcoinmagazine.com/2139/bitflooor-hacked-250000-missing/ (indeed, the stories of
disasters harming Bitcoin exchanges nearly defies tally).
22. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 7.
23. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1); see also Exchange
Act Release No. 55631, 2006 WL 6324802 (Apr. 12, 2006) (detailing the strict requirements
attending exchange registration).
24. For a broader, more generalized call for regulatory action, see Ruoke Yang, When
Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S. Securities Laws?, 18 J. TECH L. & POL‘Y 99, 114-15 (2013)
(concluding that Bitcoin—however generated or used—satisfies all of the Howey Test
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bluntly, in the five years of its formal existence, Bitcoin‘s use as an
alternative to ―PayPal‖ or Western Union has likely been overridden by
its utility as an aggressive mutual fund. Loosely-based tales of an
individual Bitcoin‘s worth have prospered, even in the face of a
spectacular crash in late 2013.25 SEC regulation is not as farfetched as
once feared. Once Bitcoin ―exchanges‖ 26 are sheared of their cover, they
too often more closely resemble old-fashioned offers for quick gains by
promoters (―Promoters‖) for speculative investments to unsophisticated
investors (―Investors‖).
To wit, to enable effective SEC regulation, all Bitcoin Exchange
Sites offering Bitcoins as a speculative investment to buyers expending
only cash need to be considered Promoters; likewise, all purchasers of
Bitcoin under circumstances clearly evidencing said passive investment
need to be considered Investors. As a Promoter of an offering of
securities, such Sites need to register with the Commission, even if
prompted by SEC enforcement action.27
B.Obstacles to SEC Jurisdiction
To be sure, the grounds for such SEC regulation are vulnerable. 28
First, in determining the presence of a security, the Bitcoin purchase
arrangement—albeit varied—is still largely unprecedented. Paperwork
is nearly non-existent, eliminating comfortable comparisons to a
statutory ―investment contract.‖29 Apart from the difficulty in applying
that statutory definition to a Bitcoin transaction, parties mining Bitcoins
do not make an investment in a ―bond,‖ or ―note.‖ 30 Moreover,
Bitcoin—when defined—is most often labeled as a form of currency,
factors described later herein).
25. See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV00416, 2013 WL 3810441, at ¶ 2 (E.D. Tex. July
23, 2013)(stating the online ―Bitcoin Forum‖ provides regular valuations, as well as
―[Bitcoin]-denominated investment opportunities‖); see also CRS Summary, supra note 1,
at 5; see generallyKevin Maney, The Other Side of Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (March 28, 2014,
1:58 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/28/other-side-bitcoin-248009.html.
26. For purposes of this Article, Internet entities offering to buy, sell, trade, or house
Bitcoins will be referred to ―Bitcoins Exchange Sites,‖ or simply ―Sites.‖
27. See supra note 25.
28. See Henning, supra note 5.
29. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (interpreting the meaning of
―investment contract‖ under the Securities Act of 1933).
30. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (holding that the notion that
―note[s]‖ are presumed securities—subject to myriad factors evidencing commercial
paper—this ―family resemblance test‖); see alsoSEC v. Thompson, 732 F.3d 1151, 1170
(10th Cir. 2013) (finding unsecured promissory notes to be securities under federal law. The
―family resemblance test‖ utilized by the Reves Court—as a means of distinguishing
commercial paper from securities—is still followed.).
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which, by definition, normally evades application of the securities
laws.31 As such, the Bitcoin arrangement does not readily satisfy even
the generous definitions afforded by the Securities Act of 193332 nor the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33
Second, the myriad pressures in 2014 on SEC attention make
Bitcoin a likely back-burner issue. The vexing issues of Dodd-Frank
Act rulemaking, increased criminalization of the fraud provisions of the
securities laws, and tangles with activist courts 34 all augur poorly for
expansion of Commission jurisdiction in a targeted, highly
technological area. Moreover, the question of whether to regulate or not
regulate has, perhaps predictably, taken foot on Capitol Hill. 35 Not
surprisingly, sporadic SEC enforcement action to date has trumpeted the

31. See Henning, supra note 5 (stating that, to date, the formal positions espoused by
federal securities regulators define Bitcoin as a currency); see also Investor Alert: Ponzi
Schemes Using Virtual Currencies, SEC Office of Investor Educ. and Advocacy (July
2013), www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf. (―Virtual currencies, such as
Bitcoin, have recently become popular and are intended to serve as a type of money.‖);
Investors Protect Yourself, Bitcoin: More than a Bit Risky, FINRA (Updated May 7, 2014),
www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P456458
(in
terms of policy established via litigation, the SEC has brought a handful of cases targeting
companies using Bitcoin‘s appeal to gain investors in speculative enterprises); see also SEC
v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2013); Newcomb, infra note 95.
32. Securities Act of 1933 (―1933 Act‖), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2012); see also
Nat‘l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 37538, 1996 WL 447193 (Aug. 8,
1996); N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 41574, 1999 WL 430863 (June 29,
1999); N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51524, 2005 WL 840452 (Apr. 12,
2005); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67857, 2012 WL 4044880 (Sept.
14, 2012); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 72065, 2014 WL 1712113
(May 1, 2014).
33. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (―1934 Act‖), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77lll (2012).
The 1933 Act and 1934 Act shall be collectively referred to in this Article as ―the Securities
Acts.‖In addition, seeGreat Rivers Coop. v. Farmlands Indus., 198 F.3d 685, 699 (8th Cir.
1999), which found no security in farm cooperative notes, notwithstanding the issuer‘s
registration with both the SEC and State authorities. It thus bears noting that even
registration with the SEC does not always establish the presence of a ―security‖ for purposes
of applying the Securities Acts.
34. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Panel Upsets Rakoff Ruling in Citigroup/SEC
Settlement,
N.Y.L.J.
(June
5,
2014),
available
at
http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202658021852/Panel-Upsets-Rakoff-Ruling-inCitigroupSEC-Settlement(discussing the tussle between the Commission and U.S. District
Judge Jed Rakoff over the standard of review attending hearings on SEC settlements),.
35. Rebecca Robbins, Bitcoin is barely regulated—and these congressmen want to
keep
it
that
way,
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
30,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/30/bitcoin-is-barelyregulated-and-these-congressmen-want-to-keep-it-that-way/
(picturing
industry
representatives fielding questions in the foyer of the Rayburn Office Building during
―Bitcoin Demo Day‖).
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word ―Bitcoin,‖36 but has done little to assuage the fears that swindled
investors will someday demand remedy.
However, the public‘s thirst for faddish investments in Bitcoins is
undeniable37—and strikingly familiar of the Tulip Bulb Craze of the
seventeenth century.38 The Internet is presently besieged by scores of
Bitcoin Exchange Sites. State regulators are arriving at varying means
of shielding their citizens.39 While a handful of Bitcoin-related
investment companies have registered with the Commission, 40 the
cryptocurrency as an investment unto itself remains wholly distant from
the government‘s radar.
The unchecked and growing use of Bitcoin as an investment shouts
for regulation. In the past forty years, the Commission has chilled
quixotic offers by expanding its reach to, among other areas, real estate
deals, purely synthetic investments, ―death bonds,‖ and internetgaming.41 Likewise, the storied federal agency needs to immediately
regulate self-proclaimed Bitcoin ―exchanges‖ where such entities are
advertising Bitcoin as an investment and concurrently offering to assist
its purchasers desirous of passive profits.42
Accordingly, this Article explores the application of the
definitional and registration sections of the securities laws to Bitcoin
arrangements representing secondary sales of Bitcoin (i.e., from Sites to
customers, for cash) under circumstances evidencing speculative intent.

36. See Nat‘l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 37538, 1996 WL
447193 (Aug. 8, 1996); N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 41574, 1999 WL
430863 (June 29, 1999); N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51524, 2005 WL
840452 (Apr. 12, 2005); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67857, 2012
WL 4044880 (Sept. 14, 2012); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 72065,
2014 WL 171213 (May 1, 2014).
37. See, e.g.,A.H. SMITHERS, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BUYING, SELLING
AND INVESTING IN BITCOIN (2013); RICHARD FORBES, BITCOIN GUIDE FOR BEGINNERS: THE
ESSENTIAL BEGINNER‘S GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING, AND INVESTING IN BITCOIN (2014);
DEVON WILCOX, BITCOIN BEGINNER‘S GUIDE: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO
BECOME RICH WITH BITCOINS (2014);SAM PATTERSON, BITCOIN BEGINNER: A STEP BY STEP
GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING AND INVESTING IN BITCOINS (2013).
38. See J. Scott Colesanti, ―Circuit Breakers‖ and the Mission of Stock Market
Stability, 15 NEXUS 43, 43-44 (2009/2010) (describing the storied European Tulip Bulb
craze of the seventeenth Century).
39. See Weinberger, infra note 330; Jackson, infra note 331.
40. See Bitreserve Ltd. (Form D) (Feb. 26, 2014), available athttp://formd.findthebest.com/1/153913/Bitreserve-Ltd (disclosing revenues of $1.65 million in three
months and a minimum investment size of $50,000); see also Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1)
(July
1,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1579346/000119312513279830/d562329ds1.htm .
41. See infra Part III.E. [pp. 1043-44]..
42. See, e.g., CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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Concomitantly, the Article urges the SEC to solidify and prioritize its
heretofore random policing of such poorly understood investments.
Part I of this Article provides detailed background on the Bitcoin
phenomena, a notion at once curiously ubiquitous and dangerously
nascent in development. Part II describes the state of the statutory
definition of ―stock exchange‖ and concludes that Bitcoin Exchange
Sites, for many reasons, are a poor fit. Part III similarly addresses the
state of the statutory definition of ―security.‖ Part III also suggests SEC
registration as a security as the solution to the particularized investment
problem posed by Bitcoin, a device laudably conceived which has
succumbed to the pragmatic lure of yet another ―get rich quick scheme‖
for U.S. investors. Further, based upon a review of numerous websites
designed to buy, sell, or hold Bitcoins, Part III offers a three-part
disjunctive analysis by which regulators could discern whether a Bitcoin
―exchange‖ is acting foremost to promote Bitcoin as an investment.
Finally, Part IV highlights the practical efforts by State regulators
to cabin this investment threat while reminding of the open-ended
mission of the preeminent agency charged with protecting American
investors of every ilk.
I. BITCOIN MECHANICS: PURGATORY IN THE DETAILS
A. The New Currency?
The details of Bitcoin are simplistic in theory, yet surreal in effect.
On one level, an anonymous party uses an ―open source‖ (i.e., free and
public)43 computer code to generate a personal address while
establishing the capability of calculating pending Bitcoin transactions (a
mathematical contest/computational process known as ―Mining‖). 44
This process creates personal Bitcoins in modest amounts (presently set
at twenty-five).45 These new coins are held by the successful ―Miner‖ in
virtual ―wallets‖ and disbursed to pay online debts for goods and
services.46 There is no central overseeing authority. 47 Once ―Mined,‖ the
coins reside in cyberspace, retrievable only by the respective wallet‘s
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. How Bitcoin Works, supra note 9.
46. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 4-5.
47. Id.; see also Monami Yui & Takahiko Hyuga, Japan Says Bitcoin Not Currency
Amid
Calls
for
Regulation,
BLOOMBERG,
2
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-07/japan-says-bitcoin-is-not-a-currency-amidcall-for-regulation.html (noting that Bitcoin exchanges had been subjects to hacking thefts
and that Bitcoin ―has no central issuing authority‖).
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creator, who is identified by an alias.48 Wallets (utilized by both Miners
and others) can be kept on a personal computer (also known as a
―standalone‖ wallet) or may be maintained by various websites offering
to buy, sell, convert, and/or store Bitcoins.49
On a larger scale, a clear picture of the notorious monetary
alternative is absolutely ephemeral—and terrifying. An individual (or
individuals) cyber-named ―Satoshi Nakamoto‖ started the entire craze
with a highly technical 2008 research paper that portended a
commercial e-payment system without middlemen.50 ―Satoshi
Nakamoto‖ subsequently left the network; earlier this year, a California
engineer with the name ―Dorian Satoshi Nakamoto‖ disputed an article
in Newsweek identifying him as Bitcoin‘s legendary founder.51
More importantly, even for those comprehending underlying
―encryption techniques,‖ there are seemingly random individual choices
ranging from residence for the digital wallet (e.g., a website or a mobile
device) to the choice of a sole wallet or unlimited wallets.52 Also, there
are arbitrary network decisions being made by unknown operators. For
example, only twenty-one million Bitcoins shall ultimately be
generated, less than 50% away from the present volume.53
The points of contact of Bitcoins may vary with the jurisdiction‘s
degree of safeguarding. In some locales, Bitcoins are virtually dispensed
from ―kiosks‖ and ATMs.54 More likely, the majority of Bitcoins are
purchased online from a Bitcoin Exchange Site as an alternative to the
computations required of the Mining process. 55 Such ―exchanges‖ have
proven to be transient and dubious.56 Moreover, a great amount of
48. See generally Diekmann, supra note 2. While physical Bitcoins exist, these are
novelty items.
49. Princess Clark-Wendel, How Safe is Your Bitcoin Wallet From a Cyber-Attack?,
FORBES
ONLINE
(July
28,
2014,
11:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sungardas/2014/07/28/how-safe-is-your-bitcoin-wallet-from-a cyber-attack/.
50. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Bitcoin,
available at http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
51. Roger Yu, Nakamoto hires lawyer, ‗unconditionally‘ denies Bitcoin role, USA
TODAY
(Mar.
17,
2014,
1:03
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/17/nakamoto-hireslawyer/6520011/.
52. See Clark-Wendel, supra note 49.
53. How Bitcoin Works, supra note 9.
54. U.S. Gov‘t Accountability Office, GAO-14-496, Virtual Currencies 4 (May 29,
2014) [hereinafter GAO Report].
55. How Bitcoin Works, supra note 9.
56. See, e.g., In re Virtual Mining Corp. (The Missouri Complaint), 2014 Mo. Sec.
LEXIS 12, 3 (2014) (―Due to regulatory concerns, several Bitcoin exchanges have ceased
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braggadocio has surfaced.57 Even when maintaining standards and
solvency, Bitcoin ―exchanges‖ can confound observers with their
dichotic transparency: while individual users remain unknown, all
Bitcoin transactions (and pseudonyms attached to the corresponding
encrypted addresses) are ultimately visible to anyone via a public site
called ―Blockchain‖58
Despite their points of origin, Bitcoin transactions are largely
paperless, irreversible, uninsured, and relatively slow (a confirmation
takes at least ten minutes).59 Of course, the most vexing variable is
ultimate user-friendliness, for it is not yet certain how many websites
can help one Mine coins, nor how many vendors and counterparties will
ultimately accept the currency (although there have been some
significant additions to the latter roster). 60 Noteworthy is the
unfathomable proliferation of unrelated websites offering to facilitate its
market and growth.61Mishaps are well- documented.62 Embarrassingly,
operations.‖).
57. See, e.g., What is Bitcoin?,Bitstamp, https://bitstamp.net/help/what-is-bitcoin?
(last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (―BITCOIN IS BETTER THAN GOLD‖).
58. BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info (last visited Oct. 20, 2014); see also
Gray, supra note 2.
59. How Bitcoin Works, supra note 9.
60. For example, in late July, the online research resource Wikipedia announced that
it would accept donations in Bitcoin form. Sydney Ember, Wikipedia Begins Taking
Donations
in
Bitcoin,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
30,
2014,
6:48
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/wikipedia-begins-taking-donations-in-bitcoin.
Earlier in the year, the U.S. Federal Election Commission agreed to accept Bitcoin political
contributions under existing law defining ―money or anything of value.‖Nick Corasaniti,
Election Commission Votes to Allow Bitcoin Donations, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/us/politics/election-commission-votes-to-allowbitcoin-donations.html; Fed. Election Comm‘n, Advisory Op., RE: Advisory Opinion
Request of Conservative Action Fund PAC (No. 2013-15) (Aug. 15, 2013), available at
http://saos.fec.gov/saos/searchao;jsessionid=4BA5267C9F87EA52161CD82BFB116617?S
UBMIT=year&YEAR=2013 (noting the elastic definitions of ―contribution,‖―money,‖ and
―anything of value‖ within the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) or
attendant regulations, 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a-d) (2012)).Likewise, Overstock.com and Dish
Network both accept Bitcoin as payment for their products.Michael J. Casey, Dish Network
to Accept Bitcoin Payments,Satellite TV Company Will Accept Virtual Currency Beginning
in
July,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(May
29,
2014,
9:19
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/dish-network-to-accept-bitcoin-payments-1401363621; Kevin
Maney, The Other Side of Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (March 28, 2014, 1:58 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/28/other-side-bitcoin-248009.html. It is estimated that
approximately 20,000 merchants now accept Bitcoin, the incentive generally believed to be
an avoidance of a credit card processing fee of 3%. Not everyone is following this trend,
however.See, e.g., James Ching, Hysteria Grips Bitcoin Market as Apple Removes Bitcoin
Wallet App from Its Store, 30 E-COMMERCE LAW AND STRATEGY 1 (March 1, 2014),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_ecommerce/30_11/news/hysteria_grips_bi
tcoin_market_as_apple_removes_bitcoin_wallet_app_from_its159285-1.html.
61. Id.; see also Complete List of Bitcoin Exchanges, 70+ Sites, Bourses, and
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the CEO of a Bitcoin exchange (and a leader on the Board that promotes
Bitcoin‘s growth) was recently charged with money laundering, 63
casting further and grave speculation about the e-currency‘s potential
for legitimate use.64
B. The Investment Potential
Nonetheless, consumers/customers have eagerly progressed to
investors.65 It is estimated that in excess of twelve million Bitcoins exist
in cyberspace.66 Meanwhile, the popular press is flush with hardcover
guides on making easy profit from this virtual treasury, 67 and individual
coins (even after a spectacular free market fall) have been recently
valued as high as $600 each.68 Bitcoin‘s widely disseminated price
Platforms From Around the World, PLANET BITCOIN, www.planetbtc.com/complete-list-ofbitcoin-exchanges (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Complete List of Bitcoin
Exchanges, 70+ Sites]. The site was apparently suspended in November 2014.
62. See Bitcoin: More than a Bit Risky, infra note 163; Mark Thompson, Bitcoin
market Mt. Gox files for bankruptcy, CNN Money (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:24 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/28/investing/mt-gox-bankruptcy; Greene, supra note 11; see
also Monamiyui Yui & Takahiko Hyuga, Japan Says Bitcoin Not Currency Amid Calls for
Regulation,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
7,
2014,
12:13
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-07/japan-says-bitcoin-is-not-a-currency-amidcalls-for-regulation.html (noting the loss of 896 Bitcoins by an Alberta, Canada bank to
hackers in March 2013, which forced the bank to close).
63. Donna L. Leger, Bitcoin pioneer facing federal charges quits foundation, USA
TODAY (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:05 PM) (describing charges against Charlie Shrem, CEO of
BitInstant
and
attendant
scandal
at
the
Bitcoin
Foundation),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/01/28/shrem-resigns-from-bitcoinfoundation/4961903/.
64. Cf. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 11-12 (noting Bitcoin exchange failures in the
United States, Australia, and Japan). But see Hugh Starr, Harvard Economics Professor
Makes the Case For Bitcoin, THE CRYPTO CRIMSON (May 21, 2014),
http://cryptocrimson.com/2014/05/harvard-economics-professor-makes-case-bitcoin
(blessing Bitcoin as an alternative to the large amount of debt taken on by governments in
recent years).
65. Kevin Maney, The Other Side of Bitcoin,NEWSWEEK (Mar. 19, 2014, 1:58 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/28/other-side-bitcoin-248009.html (―As more people
bought [B]itcoin, the value rose, which in turn drew in more investors.‖).
66. Jenna Greene, SEC Warns Investors About Bitcoin, LEGAL TIMES (May 7, 2014,
12:53 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202654353187/SEC-WarnsInvestors-About-Bitcoin (quoting a public SEC Investor alert: ―As a recent invention,
[B]itcoin does not have an established track record of credibility and trust.‖).
67. See, e.g., A.H. SMITHERS, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BUYING,
SELLING AND INVESTING IN BITCOIN (2013); RICHARD FORBES, BITCOIN GUIDE FOR
BEGINNERS: THE ESSENTIAL BEGINNER‘S GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING, AND INVESTING IN
BITCOIN (2014); DEVON WILCOX, BITCOIN BEGINNER‘S GUIDE: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO
KNOW TO BECOME RICH WITH BITCOINS (2014); SAM PATTERSON, BITCOIN BEGINNER: A STEP
BY STEP GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING AND INVESTING IN BITCOINS (2013).
68. CRS Summary, supra note 1 (concluding that interested parties can readily
discern the market for Bitcoins via numerous Internet sources); see, e.g., BLOCKCHAIN,
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ranged from a high of $1100 in December 2013 to a dramatic low of
$400 in April 2014 (a 63.6% swing). 69 Hedge funds and professional
traders actively comment on the upside potential.70 Not surprisingly,
putative exchanges conjuring images of traditional stock exchanges
have emerged, often promising to swell wallets or convert their holdings
to tangible profits.71 As a result, the enormity of the e-currency, the
related mystical events, and the list of serious crimes it enables make for
voluminous headlines72—and interesting, piecemeal regulatory efforts.
For example, in June, the Missouri Securities Commission formally
incorporated some common sense Bitcoin disclosure standards into a
charging instrument.73 The next month, New York sought to compel
registration of, among other enterprises, all Bitcoin exchangers (but not
Miners).74 Regardless of individualized approaches, it is universally
clear that the demise of each Bitcoin ―exchange‖ leaves a finite amount
of Bitcoins unrecoverable, and a new limitless class of victimized
investors.75 It is highly doubtful that such investors appreciated the risks
http://blockchain.info/charts/market-price (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); see 17 C.F.R. §§
242.301(b)(5)(i)-(iii), (b)(6) (2014); see also Google Search for ―Bitcoin price‖, GOOGLE,
http://google.com.On August 14, 2014, one Bitcoin was valued at $516. On October 18, the
value had dropped to $381.
69. CRS Summary, supra note 1, at 5.
70. See, e.g., Stephen Foley, Bitcoin endorsed by top hedge fund manager,FINANCIAL
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e972afe-3cce-11e3-a8c400144feab7de.html#axzz3DDC12wvT.
71. See, e.g., BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net (last visited July 25, 2014); see
alsoComplete List of Bitcoin Exchanges, 70+ Sites, supra note 61.
72. See Thompson, supra note 62 (detailing the demise of the world‘s largest Bitcoin
exchanges amidst $64 million in debts, halted investor withdrawals, and fear of hackers).
Later that day, it was reported that the CEO of a separate Bitcoin exchange had apparently
committed suicide. Michael Gray, Bitcoin firm CEO found dead after ‗suicide,‘ N.Y. POST
(Mar. 5, 2014, 9:34 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/05/bitcoin-firm-ceo-found-dead-insuspected-suicide/.
73. See, e.g., The Missouri Complaint, 2014 Mo. Sec. LEXIS 12, *3 (2014). In the
Complaint, the Missouri Securities Commission expressly faulted the defendants (―Virtual
Miners‖) for not disclosing, among others, the following facts:
Virtual currencies are not backed by a central bank and are not insured;
Virtual currencies can be hacked or stolen with little or no recourse;
There is no way to reverse a virtual currency transaction;
Virtual currencies are highly volatile; and
The liquidity of virtual currencies may be highly dependent upon the growth and
acceptance of thevirtual currency market.
Id. at *8-10 n.64.
74. See Weinberger, infra note 330; Jackson, infra note 331.
75. Abel Avram, BitCoins Lost, MongoDB and Eventual Consistency, INFO QUEUE
(Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.infoq.com/news/2014/04/bitcoin-banking-mongodb (describing
the loss of half-of-a-million dollars of Bitcoins to a hacker/hackers of an exchange named
―Flexcoin‖ on March 2, 2014). Days later, an exchange named ―Poloniex‖ lost 12.3% of its
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they were undertaking.
C. The Language of Bitcoin Exchange Sites
Despite the SEC‘s strict enforcement of relevant requirements, a
review of the marketing employed by those touting Bitcoin Exchange
Sites reveals their questionable, unedited use of the concept of
registered stock exchanges:
If you‘re looking to buy or trade Bitcoin, for either the sovereign
currency of your country or for other digital currencies, the place to do
it is at a Bitcoin exchange. An exchange, for centuries known as a
bourse, is in its basic form a market organized for the purpose of
buying and selling investments, currencies and other financial
instruments. In days gone by, the buying and selling on an exchange
was done on the floor of the exchange via an open outcry system with
agents for buyers and sellers shouting and using hand signals to
convey information about buy and sell orders. Nowadays, open outcry
is virtually extinct . . . .76

Individual Sites may be much more indirect in their reference to
stock exchanges but impressively blunt in their solicitations:
How to Buy Bitcoins?
First thing you need to do is transfer some money into your …
account. In order to do this you must be logged in to your … account,
go [sic] to your deposit section and select preferred method of
transferring funds. You will be given a unique 11 digit reference code
and our account information where your funds must go. Once we
receive your deposit we will credit your account and then you can start
purchasing [B]itcoins right away.77

Elsewhere on the same Site appears the explanation of its limited
matching role appears:
Are you selling [B]itcoins?
No. We are providing a service. You are always buying [B]itcoins
from another individual who is selling them. All we do is provide a
safe and simple environment to trade. We guarantee that buyers get
their bitcoins and sellers get their money at agreed (sic) price.78

Furthermore, some exchanges provide a half-market, offering only
to sell Bitcoins:
Bitcoins to the same crime.Id.
76. See Complete List of Bitcoin Exchanges, 70+ Sites, supra note 61.
77. BITSTAMP: HOW TO BUY BITCOINS http://www.bitstamp.net/help/how-to-buy (last
visited July 25, 2014).
78. BITSTAMP: FAQ, http://www.bitstamp.net/faq (last visited July 25, 2014).
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We are sorry, but . . . [w]e do not offer any refunds on coins
purchased, even if we have not sent them out yet. We may be in a
position to buy back your coins at the current market prices. We can
also direct you to some great alternative ways to spend your coins.79

Particularly noteworthy are the steps some exchanges will take to
assist with the first-time purchase of Bitcoin. Some Sites selling Bitcoin
require the user to have his own digital wallet, 80 but others highlight
their creation of a digital wallet for customers (while also highlighting a
buy/sell feature).81 Often, the buy and sell transactions take time,
necessitating the holding of Bitcoins pending purchase; 82 further, some
Exchange Sites offer to act indefinitely as repository for the purchaser. 83
Certain Exchange Sites live up to the name and offer the visitor a look
at a pending ―order book‖ displaying bids to buy and offers to sell. 84
The Sites offering a look at the pending order book normally include a
visual tool (i.e., a graph covering the period of the last few months).
Often, there is no meaningful information explaining which or how
many merchants accept Bitcoin.
Significantly, because these websites are not serving member
organizations (like traditional stock exchanges), 85 customers must create
accounts with the sponsoring entity.86
D. Where the SEC Has/Has Not Addressed Bitcoin
To be sure, there have been calls for the SEC to simply define
Bitcoin as a security.87 However, the Commission is presently playing it
79. EXPRESSCOIN: FAQ, http://www.expresscoin.com/faq. The site offers a photo
gallery of its nine employees—identified by first name only—and a contest awarding a
percentage of a Bitcoin based upon a contestant‘s ability to predict the future market price
of Bitcoin SeeEXPRESSCOIN: PRICES, http://www.expresscoin.com/prices (last visited Aug.
9, 2014).
80. EXPRESSCOIN, http://www.expresscoin.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
81. E.g., COINBASE, https://coinbase.com (last visited Oct. 20, 104). Among other
services, Coinbase offers digital wallets linked to the user‘s bank account.
82. SeeFrequently Asked Questions, BITSTAMP, http://www.bitstamp.net/faq/ (last
visited July 25, 2014) (noting that receipt of wire transfers and conversion of funds to U.S.
dollars can take two to five business days).
83. See, e.g., UNOCOIN, http://www.unocoin.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2014) (greeting
the user with the message its self-description of a ―Simple, Secure and Seamless Way to
Store, Buy, and Sell Bitcoins in India‖).
84. See, e.g., Order Book, BITSTAMP, www.bitstamp.net/market/order_book (last
visited July 25, 2014).
85. The modern stock exchange is typically a member organization requiring ―trading
licenses‖ or other attributes of membership See generally N.Y.Stock Exch. Rule 300,
available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/chp_1_4/default.asp.
86. See, e.g., BITSTAMP: FAQ, supra note 78.
87. See Yang, supra note 24, at 109.
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coy with its efforts to match the threat. While it has been noted that the
e-phenomena does not neatly fit within SEC jurisdiction,88 the agency
has concomitantly warned American investors of extreme volatility in
the Bitcoin market.89 Commission Chair Mary Jo White has stopped
short of committing resources to investigating Bitcoin‘s role as a
―security‖ but promised a case-by-case review of circumstances in
which promoters tout companies investing in Bitcoins.90 Meanwhile,
journalists—either directly or indirectly—have consistently sounded the
trumpet heralding Bitcoin imitators91 and, ironically, new middlemen to
commerce.92
On occasion, the Commission has asserted jurisdiction over
promotions centering on Bitcoin. The Shavers93 case from 2013 (which
resulted in a settlement) merely focused on a Ponzi scheme accepting
Bitcoin as an investment.94 Later in 2013, a federal judge sustained a
Commission complaint against alleged Ponzi schemers utilizing
Bitcoin.95 Months ago, an SEC press release touted charges against the
co-owner of ―two Bitcoin-related websites for publicly offering shares
in the two ventures without registering them.‖ 96 But that recent action
represents another pooling arrangement, rather than a swipe at Bitcoin
itself (or any entity serving as ―exchange‖ therefor).97
88. See generally Henning, supra note 5.
89. See generally Greene, supra note 66.
90. Dimitri Nemirovsky & Bryan I. Reyhani,Why Financial Services Firms Should
Prepare For Bitcoin, LAW360, (Dec. 11, 2013, 1:31 PM ET) [hereinafter Why Financial
Services
Firms
Should
Prepare
For
Bitcoin],
available
at
www.rnlawfirm.com/2013/12/11/why-financial-services-firms-should-prepare-for-bitcoin.
91. See Gray, supra note 2 (―Following Bitcoin, all sorts of junior crypto-currencies
have popped up, mushroom-like, across the web. There‘s litecoin, namecoin, novacoin,
worldcoin, quarkcoin, feathercoin, alphacoin to name only several out of thousands.‖).
92. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, The Two Sides Of Bitcoin, WIRED (Apr. 2014),
available at ProQuest 1514439150 (describing the effort to create a ―PayPal for [B]itcoin,‖
gathering a ―0.5 percent charge anytime anyone converted dollars to [B]itcoins or vice
versa‖).
93. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-6, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
94. Id. at *1.
95. Alyssa Newcomb, SEC Can Pursue Case Against Alleged Bitcoin Ponzi Schemer,
Federal Judge Says, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 8, 2013 6:00 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2013/08/sec-can-pursue-case-against-alleged-bitcoinponzi-schemer-federal-judge-says/.
96. Press Release 2014-111, SEC, SEC Charges Bitcoin Entrepreneur With Offering
Unregistered
Securities
(June
3,
2014),
available
athttp://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541972520#.VGF9Qvn
F83k.
97. See Co-owner of bitcoin-linked sites settles SEC case, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE
(June 3, 2014), available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/58022860-79/bitcoin-secowner-securities.html.csp (noting a Commission settlement with ―a prominent bitcoin
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Interestingly, the latest SEC disclosure of its broad priorities is
bold. In early summer 2014, the Commission prioritized its role in
overseeing ―intermediation,‖ or where parties stand between buyer and
seller of securities.98 In forceful language, the SEC Chair confirmed the
Commission‘s willingness to combat a burgeoning class of middlemen,
reminding that new situations require some creative thinking:
To complicate things further, the neat lines that Congress drew in
1934 have not resulted in models of intermediation that are clear-cut
or uniform across securities markets. Most obviously, the functions of
broker and dealer often have been combined – there is a reason we call
them ―broker-dealers.‖ The conflict between investors‘ interests and
the intermediary‘s interests that can be created by this dual role has
been a source of serious concern since the SEC was created.99

The Chair likewise committed the SEC‘s tools to protecting
investors against the ―powerful forces‖ of technology and competition
―in every securities market.‖100 Yet, the SEC‘s planned response to
Bitcoin remains amorphous.
Thus, by late summer 2014, amidst the exchange closings and lost
Bitcoins and lawsuits, there nonetheless existed certain truths about the
Bitcoin market. First, Bitcoin‘s presence is widespread and resilient.
Second, Bitcoin‘s varied uses and users have expanded exponentially,
beyond expectations. Third, Bitcoin ―exchanges‖ are making some
highly visible yet sometimes unsupportable claims (and, at times, acting
much more like stock promoters than market centers). Finally, no
regulator is effectively addressing the investment potential.

proponent‖ for over $50,000 based upon alleged sales of unregistered shares paid for with
Bitcoin).
98. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC, Intermediation in the Modern Securities
Markets: Putting Technology and Competition to Work for Investors (June 20, 2014),
available
athttp://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542122012#.VGEDSvnF83k
(elaborating on the prior promise to study and address the threat posed by ―high-frequency
trading‖ and clarifying that the ―securities‖ market includes the ―fixed income‖ market).
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 13.
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II. EXISTING REGULATION OF ―EXCHANGES‖—ALLOWING NO RAIDS ON
THE CASTLE
A study of the legal definition of a ―stock exchange‖ confirms that
great discretion resides with the Commission as an expertise agency,
and that the agency‘s relevant interpretations have been loudly sounded.
A.What is an ―exchange‖?101
The effect of stock exchanges on a national economy is well
documented. A famous litigation from the 1960s provided this salutary
summary of the interplay between centralized market centers and their
regulation:
To the public exchanges are an investment channel which promises
ready convertibility of stock holdings into cash. The importance of
these functions in dollar terms is vast . . . . [B]ecause such transactions
are often regarded as an indicator of our national economic health, the
significance of the exchanges in our economy cannot be measured
only in terms of the dollar value of trading. . . . It was, therefore, the
combination of the enormous growth in the power and impact of
exchanges in our economy, and their inability and unwillingness to
curb abuses which had increasingly grave implications because of this
growth, that moved Congress to enact the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.102

The referenced statutory definition of ―exchange‖ is thus
dauntingly broad:
The term ―exchange‖ means any organization, association, or group of
persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together
purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with
respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market
place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.103

That definition in the 1934 Act has stood for decades. To be sure,
wholesale reform of the stock exchange has been rare, even in times of
near-demise.104 While § 19 of the 1934 Act, which governs the SEC‘s
101. For purposes of clarity, entities formally recognized by the SEC as registered
stock exchanges are connoted herein with a capital ―E.‖
102. Silver v. N. Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349-52 (1963) (upholding selfregulatory efforts challenged by an NYSE member).
103. Section 3(a)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(1) (2012).
104. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 589-604 (3d
ed. 2003). Professor Seligman was quite pointed in his summary of SEC compromise on
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supervisory role, did not initially integrate the Commission into
exchange rulemaking or internal discipline,105 since the storied 1975
amendments to the federal securities laws, 106 the agency has been vastly
empowered. Specifically, the Commission is authorized to, among other
things, approve exchange rules in advance, review disciplinary actions,
regulate commission rates and ―eliminate any other exchange rules
which impose[] unwarranted restraints on competition.‖107
The related SEC releases interpreting the scope of the definition of
―exchange‖ are brief but evidence certainty. Much of this existing
guidance stems from a series of cases initiated by the Chicago Board of
Trade (―BOT‖). Approximately two decades ago, that entity asked the
SEC to determine that a new proprietary trading system that traded
options on government securities and was utilized by a broker-dealer
(the ―Delta System‖) was required to register with the SEC. The BOT
request had been prompted by the Commission‘s decision to take ―No
Action‖ against the operator of the Delta System on the grounds that
proprietary systems (i.e., non-exchanges) that ―offer to participants the
capacity to execute automatically transactions based on derivative
pricing‖ had not yet evolved into ―interdealer quotation or transaction
mechanisms‖ fielding quotations on a consistent basis.‖108 In the view
of the SEC in 1989, these systems need not register as exchanges. 109
Upon judicial review, the Seventh Circuit called the Delta System
comprehensive exchange reform:
The Commission might have been wiser to use the occasion of the October 1987
crash as the means to galvanize congressional support for a new special study ofthe
securities markets . . . . Instead, during [Chairman] Breeden‘s chairmanship, the
SEC initiated a staff report ultimately entitled [sic] Market 2000: An Examinationof
Current Equity Market Developments. When published in early 1994, it offered a
series of incremental proposals to refine securities trading, but little of the
broadcontext and general examination of securities market structural issues that had
characterized the Commission‘s earlier effort.
Id. at 604; see also J. Scott Colesanti, Other People‘s Volatility: A Call for Rules that More
Equitably Stabilize the Stock Market, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2013).
105. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION328-29 (2d ed.
2006).
106. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 542 (5th ed. 1998) (describing how the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 propelled the notion of a national market, thus focusing on, among other things,
codified rules governing securities transfer and settlement, and the formal prohibition of
fixed commission rates for securities purchases and sales).
107. Id. at 329.
108. Propriety Trading Sys., Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, 54 Fed. Reg. 15429
(Apr. 11, 1989); see DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 106, at 395 (an SEC ―No Action
Letter‖ is a letter requested of the SEC wherein the Commission agrees to not take
disciplinary action in response to specific activity).
109. Propriety Trading Systems, supranote 108.
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―neither fish nor fowl‖ and could not (or simply would not) declare the
Delta System an ―exchange.‖110 The Seventh Circuit panel noted that it
―could not find a single case under [1934 Act] §3(a)(1)‖ detailing
factors for ―sorting a trading apparatus into the ‗exchange‘ bin.‖111 The
case was thus remanded for a formal ruling by the SEC on the question
of exchange status.112
On remand, the SEC fleshed out its position that the Delta System
was not an exchange:
In conducting [the § 3(a)(1)] analysis, the central focus of the
Commission‘s inquiry should be whether the system is designed,
whether through trading rules, operational procedures or
businessincentives, to centralize trading and provide buy and sell
quotations on a regular or continuous basis so that purchasers and
sellers have a reasonable expectation that they can regularly execute
their orders at those price quotations . . . .113

Finding no standard quotations or continuous trading, the SEC
again refused to declare the Delta System an exchange. The SEC‘s final
determination was challenged by the BOT, leading to a second Seventh
Circuit decision on the matter.114 Calling the system ―[a]n ingenious
device for facilitating the purchase and sale of securities,‖ 115 the Second
BOT Decision noted that the Delta System lacked, among other things,
members, a trading floor, and overseers (i.e., specialists or marketmakers).116 Noteworthy was the court‘s emphasis on the Commission‘s
broad discretion in interpreting the elastic § 3 definition.117 Finally, the
court reminded that the primary focus of the SEC inquiry is ―a threat to
the safety of investors;‖118 also paramount is the consideration of
whether exemption from registration creates ―regulatory gaps.‖ 119
Overall, while the Board of Trade cases ultimately held that the novel
trading system need not be registered, the case resonated loudest in
clarifying the Commission‘s unilateral discretion as an expertise agency
110. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC (First BOT Decision), 883 F.2d 525, 535 (7th Cir.
1989).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 536.
113. Proprietary Trading Sys., Exchange Act Release No. 27,611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890
(Jan. 12, 1990).
114. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC (Second BOT Decision), 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir.
1991).
115. Id. at 1271.
116. Id. at 1272.
117. Id. at 1272-73 (noting ―there is enough play in the statutory joints‖).
118. Id. at 1273.
119. Second BOT Decision, 923 F.2d at 1273.
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in defining stock exchanges.120
The demands of registration placed on such entities help us further
understand what makes an ―exchange.‖ Specifically, the relevant SEC
―Form 1‖ requests specific information in the following areas:
•Corporate structure,121
•Affiliated trading partners,122
•Manner of operation of the trading system (including the fees and
hours of operation),123
• Audited financial statements,124 prepared by an independent
consultant in conformance with GAAP,125
•Shareholders with a 5% or more126 interest,127
•Members, as well as criteria for membership,128 and

120. SeeJOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
ANDMATERIALS 588-89 (12th ed. 2009) [hereinafter COFFEE & SALE]

REGULATION CASES
(explaining that the
SEC ―stuck to its guns‖ on remand of the first Delta case—i.e., again found no exchange
present—as evidenced by the language of 1934 Act Release No. 27611 from January 12,
1990).
121. See
generallySECForm
1
Exhibits
―A‖-‖C,‖available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1.pdf [hereinafter Form 1]; Comm‘n Notice: Nasdaq
Stock Market, Inc., Files Application for Registration as a Nat‘l Sec. Exch., Exchange Act
Release No. 44,396, 2001 WL 629346 (June 7, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-44396.htm [hereinafter Nasdaq Application].
122. Form 1, supra note 121, at Exhibit ―D.‖
123. Id. at Exhibit ―E.‖
124. Id. at Exhibits ―G‖ and ―I.‖
125. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 106, at 234-35 (the United States‘ Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (―GAAP‖) are ―conventions, rules and procedures that
define accepted accounting practice, including broad guidelines as well as detailed
procedures.‖ GAAP principles are prepared by the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
an independent organization); see Gretchen Morgenson, What? They Never Heard of
WorldCom?,N.Y.
TIMES,Mar.
20,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html?_r=0 (quoting a
chief strategist at a major Wall Street firm, ―The reason you have G.A.A.P. is so investors
have consistent clear information. The U.S. has always prided itself on having the most
transparent financial markets.‖ GAAP principles are generally regarded as the most
stringent accounting standards in the world); Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S.
87, 101 (1995) (―conventions, rules, and procedures that define accepted accounting
practice . . . .‖).
126. Form 1, supra note 121, at Exhibit ―K‖ (the 5% requirement is requested by
Exhibit ―K‖).
127.In response to pernicious tender offers in the 1960s, in 1968 Congress passed the
Williams Act amendments to the 1934 Act. Since that time, 1934 Act § 13 requires owners
of 5% or more of the securities of certain public companies to file Schedule 13D
(―beneficial ownership report‖) with the Commission. See Schedule 13D, SEC,
www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm.(last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
128. Form 1, supra note 121, at Exhibits ―L‖ and ―M.‖
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•Securities trading on the Exchange.129

Overall, the mandatory disclosure attending formal exchange status
requires that the Commission and the investing public learn of ―detailed
information‖ about an Exchange and ―how it proposes to satisfy the
requirements of the [1934] Act.‖ 130 Consequentially, statutory stock
exchanges are finite in number,131 reasonably well understood by the
industry, and policed by the SEC on many levels.
B.Regulation ATS—An Accommodation with Strings Attached
Subsequently,
the
technologically-enabled
marketplace
necessitated new regulation; in 1997, the SEC chose a familiar route
(i.e., compelling new trading systems to register as broker-dealers).132
More specifically, the rise of proprietary trading systems and Electronic
Crossing Networks (―ECNs‖)133 prompted the Commission‘s adoption
of Regulation ATS (i.e., ―Alternative Trading Systems‖) of 1997.134
While Regulation ATS did allow rivals to traditional stock exchanges,
the 1934 Act definition of ―exchange‖ remained concrete, 135 and its
129. Id. at Exhibit ―N.‖
130. Nasdaq Application, supra note 121. Nasdaq existed as a unique electronic
trading platform—nonetheless squarely on the government‘s radar—until its formal
conversion to a duly registered exchange last decade in order to complete its public offering.
Id.
131. There are presently sixteen stock exchanges registered with the SEC, pursuant to
§ 6(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78l(a). STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW
AND POLICY 214 (2d ed. 2014) (―Only listed securities may be traded on the exchange in
question.‖); Exchanges, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml,
(last visited July 21, 2014) In addition, the SEC recognizes six exchanges registered under §
6(g) of the 1934 Act ―for the purpose of trading security futures.‖ Id.
132. Ironically, the SEC‘s familiar response of a prior generation—laudable as an
attack on the monopolies enjoyed by traditional exchanges—is nonetheless now decried as
enabling the unchecked proliferation of dark pools, which have been linked to high
frequency trading. CompareJOHN G. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION 603 (12th ed. 2006)(―The SEC‘s historic attitude of benign neglect toward
alternative trading systems was largely a product of their low volume plus the fear that close
regulation would retard their evolution as competitive alternatives to the traditional
markets.‖) withMICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 112 (Starling Lawrence ed., W. W. Norton &
Co. 2014)(―Since the mid-2000s, the average trade size in the U.S. stock market had
plummeted, the markets had fragmented, and the gap in time between the public view of the
markets and the view of the high-frequency traders had widened.‖).
133. Dana Stiffler & Deborah Williams, ECNs Close In on NASDAQ, 3 No. 6
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: Sec. Elec. Age 1 (1999) (―ECNs are fully automated systems
that match orders and set prices for trades. In a certain sense, an ECN functions like an
electronic stock exchange.‖). By 1999, the number of formal ECNs tallied nine and posed a
volume threat to, among others the NASDAQ.Id.
134. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301 (2014).
135. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2012) (defining ―exchange‖ to include any
entity that ―provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers
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strict application, consistently interpreted—indeed, the failure to
comply with Regulation ATS is itself a violation disciplinable by the
Commission.136
Further, the industry is guided on the question of whether or not to
register a trading system as an exchange by the numerous requirements
within Regulation ATS, which mandates maintenance of ―security of
automated systems,‖137 fair access by customers,138 registration with the
SEC as a broker-dealer,139 display of all subscriber orders,140 capacity
estimates,141 fees commensurate with industry practice,142 customer
confidentiality,143 and record-keeping.144
Additionally, more granular regulations similarly liberally define
―exchange,‖ thus ensuring compliance with the Form 1 or Regulation
ATS protocols. For example, SEC Rule 3b-16 has been used to support
a very basic understanding of a stock exchange—a market center that
matches buyers and sellers.145 Private players at home and abroad
understand that the consistency of this interpretation warrants a ruling
from the SEC whenever the call becomes close. To that end, in recent
years, exchanges dabbling in currency speculation146 and trades among

of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly
performed by a stock exchange‖).
136. See, e.g., In re INET ATS, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 53631, 2006 WL
6324802, *1-2 (Apr. 12, 2006) (instituting and settling disciplinary proceedings against a
New Jersey broker-dealer that allegedly failed to comply with ―fair access‖ requirements
triggered by attainment of 20% trading volume in stocks between 2002 and 2003).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(6) (2014).
138. Id. § 242.301(b)(5)(i)-(iii).
139. Id. § 242.301(b)(1).
140. Id. § 242.301(b)(3)(i)-(iii).
141. Id. § 242.301(b)(6)(D)(ii)(A).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(4).
143. Id. § 242.301(b)(5)(iii)(B).
144. Id. § 242.301(b)(5)(ii)(C); id. § 242.301(b)(8).
145. See, e.g., In re INET ATS, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 53631, 2006 WL
938783 (Apr. 12, 2006):
An ATS is any organization, association, person, group of persons, or system: (a)
that constitutes, maintains or provides a market place or facilities for bringing
together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect
to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange . . . and (b)
that does not: (i) set rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than the
conduct of such subscribers‘ trading on such organization . . . ; or (ii) discipline
subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.
146. See Channel Islands Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, No Action, 2002
WL 31101733, at *2 (Sept. 6, 2002) (permitting ―services with respect to transactions in,
investments of all kinds, whether direct or derivative, including financial instruments and
currencies‖).
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their shareholders147 have conservatively requested a ―No Action
Letter‖ from the Commission. Of note as of late, entities operating
trading systems functioning as dark pools148 or other quasi-exchanges
have been required to register either as a broker-dealer or exchange with
the Commission.149
Significantly, a review of SEC discipline of exchanges yields
numerous instances of traditional exchanges failing in regards to their
listing of traditional securities,150 but no such discipline of an alternative
exchange (i.e., one matching investors in nontraditional securities).
C.Application of ―Exchange‖ Law to Bitcoin Exchange Sites
In sum, the scant case law on the scope of SEC discretion reflects
suits initiated by traditional stock exchanges fearful of upstart
competition (i.e., plaintiffs with a true financial interest in the outcome).
That case law, while admitting some statutory ambiguity, 151 confirms
unilateral SEC discretion in labeling ―exchanges‖ based upon
evaluation of the following factors:
1. Whether the nontraditional exchange matched customer orders in
securities;
2. Whether the nontraditional exchange poses a threat to investors;
147. See Letter from Ross Kaufman to Paul Dudek, SEC, in 3 (July 14, 2014),
available
atwww.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2014/klabin-071414-3a9incoming.pdf (interpreting § 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act as exempting transactions with
existing security holders ―where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given
directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange‖).
148. ―Dark pools‖ are private stock exchanges operated by registered broker-dealers
to provide anonymity for institutional investors. They are notorious for their lack of
transparency. Elvis Picardo, CFA An Introduction to Dark Pools, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/050614/introduction-dark-pools.asp (last visited
Oct. 18, 2014).
149. Regulation of Exchs., Exchange Act Release No. 38672, 1997 WL 276278, at
*35 (May 23, 1997).
150. See, e.g., In re Nat‘l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 37538,
1996 WL 447193, at *1 (Aug. 8, 1996) (censuring and imposing remedial measures on the
Nasdaq market for failing to investigate unlawful trading); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 41574, 1999 WL 430863, at *1 (June 29, 1999) (censuring the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (―NYSE‖) for failing to detect unlawful proprietary trading
by certain of its member firms); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51524,
2005 WL 840452, at *1 (Apr. 12, 2005) (censuring the NYSE for failing to
detect/investigate unlawful member trading); N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 67857, 2012 WL 4044880, at *3 (Sept. 14, 2012) (censuring the NYSE for faulty
distribution of market data); and N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 72065,
2014 WL 1712113, at *2 (May 1, 2014) (censuring and fining the NYSE $4.5 million for
failing to establish/enforce rules governing error account trading).
151. Second BOT Decision,923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (―Of course, if the statute [i.e., the
1934 Act] were unambiguous, the Commission would have to bow.‖) (citations omitted).
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3. Whether the decision not to require registration as an exchange
would result in regulatory gaps; and
4. Whether the entity exhibits traditional exchange activities such as
rules of membership and continuous quoting and trading.152

The wide variety of Bitcoin Exchange Sites precludes a meaningful
statutory analysis: some Sites only sell Bitcoin,153 some match customer
orders,154 some continuously display an order book, 155 and some hold
the Bitcoins of customers indefinitely.156 Moreover, most entities
currently attempting to serve as Bitcoin ―exchanges‖ exhibit none of the
capacities for delivering all of the information called for by Form 1 or
the protocol established by related exemptive measures such as
Regulation ATS or SEC Rule 3b-16 (i.e.,fair access, uniform fees,
audited financials, or display of all customer orders 157). The press may
have done all a tremendous disservice in labeling all entities offering
some form of entrance into the Bitcoin market as ―exchanges;‖
regardless, the threat posed by this hodgepodge is no less real.
Specifically, the threat is delivered (often from abroad, via the
Internet) through advertisements and communications revealing a
bastardization of the notion of the modern stock exchange. These
advertisements often lack in accompanying transparent quote display, a
lack of depth to quotes, and information on entity membership.158 The
newness of the enterprises and ease of entry into the field renders
considerations of recordkeeping and capacity estimates irrelevant. In
sum, entities that either are or are not serving as a permanent market are
offering Bitcoins to the unsophisticated in return for a transfer of
money, repeatedly highlighting the investment potential of a Bitcoin
purchase.159 Often, the individual so solicited is not first offered basic
facts about Bitcoin or the entity sponsoring the website; however, the
daily consensus price for a sole Bitcoin is referenced (and freely
available elsewhere on the Internet).160 Moreover, that well-publicized
152. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
153. SeeEXPRESSCOIN, supra note 80.
154. See BITSTAMP: FAQ, supra note 78.
155. See Order Book, supra note 84.
156. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
158. See generally supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., What is Bitcoin?, BITSTAMP, https://bitstamp.net/help/what-is-bitcoin
(last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (―If you have some Bitcoins saved, you can make them more
valuable by using Bitcoins. Using Bitcoins increases their demand which in turn increases
the value of your saved Bitcoins.‖).
160. Google Search for ―Bitcoin price‖, GOOGLE, http://google.com; BITSTAMP,
http://www.bitstamp.net (last visited July 25, 2014) (for example, the conversion rate for
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daily conversion rate—as is apparent after only moments searching on
the Internet—has risen over 50% this year alone.161
Clearly, the status quo is in need of regulation. 162 Investigating
Bitcoin Exchange Sites for their possible violation of provisions of the
Securities Acts would work to quell fears that Bitcoin is growing
unabated while reminding the industry that compliance dollars are wellspent. Any second-guessing of this goal is readily met by the tales of
woe that have already befallen Bitcoin ―investors.‖ In early 2014, Mt.
Gox, the largest Bitcoin exchange, fell prey to the theft of Bitcoins
valued at $400 million and filed for bankruptcy in two nations;163 days
later, the world learned from headlines of the suicide of the head of a
separate Bitcoin exchange.164 Smaller exchanges have met similar
terminal fates. In March 2014, a Canadian exchange announced it was
closing after Bitcoins valued at $600 thousand were electronically
pilfered. The same month, a Chinese exchange named Vircurex
announced account freezes after it was victimized by cyber-attacks.165
To be sure, Bitcoin Exchange Sites pose a threat to investors that
currently flourishes in a regulatory vacuum. But those entities often
exhibit so few of the characteristics of statutory stock exchanges as to
render the comparison absurd—indeed, one website even offers to help
enthusiastic entrepreneurs start their own Bitcoin ―exchange.‖166
The more rational analysis of Bitcoin exchange sites would thus

July 25, 2014 was $602.03 per Bitcoin).
161. See,
e.g.,
Bitcoin
Market
Price
(USD),
BLOCKCHAIN.INFO,
http://www.blockchain.info/charts/market-price (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (daily pricing
data) andDouble-Digit Yield, CROWDABILITY, http://landing.crowdability.com/the-nextbitcoin (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (stressing Bitcoin‘s meteoric 1,946% rise in price during
2013).
162. See Andrew Ramonas, CFPB Gets Real About Bitcoin Risks, LEGAL TIMES (Aug.
11,
2014
2:43
PM),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202666454383/CFPB-Gets-Real-AboutBitcoin-Risks?slreturn=20140810104117 (summarizing the announcement by the young
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that consumers should be wary of Bitcoin—which
―can cost more to use than cash or credit cards‖—and utilize the federal agency‘s dedicated
link to report complaints).
163. Bitcoin: More than a Bit Risky, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (May 7, 2014),
www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P456458.
The
Tokyo-based Bitcoin exchange ceased operations on February 24, 2014. Id. It then filed for
bankruptcy in Japan days later, and in the U.S. on March 10). Id. See also, for example,
Greene, supra note 11.
164. See Thompson, supra note 62.
165. Greene, supra note 11.
166. LOCALBITCOINS.COM, https://localbitcoins.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2014)
(offering to help site visitors ―[f]ind local bitcoin exchangers in your country or start your
own bitcoin exchange . . . for profit‖).
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appear to be as an offering of a security as defined by the Securities
Acts. The relevant case law is voluminous and decidedly in support of
an expansive definition; the accompanying policy justifications comport
with the threat presently posed. Under either a legal or policy approach,
the key determination would appear to be whether the Bitcoin exchange
serves as originator of a money-making scheme (―Promoter‖) and its
customer as passive contributor of funds thereto (―Investor‖). In short,
evidence of a passive, interdependent relationship would remove any
jurisdictional hurdle to the SEC‘s assertion of jurisdiction. As trends in
the governing case law indicate, that fact-specific inquiry often boils
down to considerations of relative expertise.
III. ARMING THE WHITE KNIGHT
A.What is a ―Security‖?—The Howey Case and Its Progeny
The SEC‘s activism in finding novel financial arrangements to be
securities is legendary; moreover, with an eighty-year head start, the
agency is aptly experienced at litigation aimed at expanding the
definitional or registration sections of the securities laws, even in the
absence of a complainant.167 Specifically, the Howey decision of 1946
began a ceaseless period of brashly applying the Securities Acts to
nonconventional securities—an ever-growing list of investments the
First Circuit has coined ―a kaleidoscopic assortment of pecuniary
arrangements that defy categorization.‖168 This expansive reading of the
statute is buttressed by court decisions noting the lack of other
regulatory remedies—the Supreme Court has even expressly tilted the
scales in favor of finding a security when the instruments in question
―would escape federal regulation entirely if the [Securities] Acts were
held not to apply.‖169 Most importantly for present purposes, the
application of the securities laws to purely private transactions is

167. See, e.g.,SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 382 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); and SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters. Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (these three famed cases were brought without evidence
of a customer complainant); see alsoThe Investor‘s Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VBBmi_ldWNg (last visited Sept. 10, 2014)
(describing the individual investor as ―[o]ne of the major sources of information on which
the SEC relies to bring enforcement action.‖).
168. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) (denying defendants‘ motion
to dismiss).
169. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67-69 (1990) (finding farm cooperative
demand notes to be securities after analysis under the Second Circuit‘s ―family
resemblance‖ test, used to identify commercial paper).
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unquestioned,170 absent a statutory exemption, when the arrangement in
question satisfies the time-honored test set forth by the Court in
Howey.171
In Howey, tourists bought slices of land within an orange grove,
presumably for investment purposes.172 In addition to a warranty deed
to the fractional interest, the tourists were offered an installment
payment plan and a land service contract; the SEC successfully argued
that the three documents in tandem were tantamount to an investment
contract as included in section 2 of the 1933 Act.173 The Supreme Court
agreed, and the operators of the grove were forced to register their
collective offer as a security.174 The case demonstrated the SEC‘s will to
tackle, among other things, nonconventional investments in a part of the
country that had been widely criticized for real estate speculation. 175
170. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697 (1985) (finding an
investment contract—and thus a security—within a written agreement to purchase a lumber
mill).
171. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 301 (―The test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.‖).
172. Id. at 296 (―The purchasers for the most part are non-residents of Florida. . . .
Many . . . are patrons of a resort hotel owned and operated by the Howey Company in a
scenic section adjacent to the [citrus] groves.‖).
173. To wit, § 2(a) of the 1933 Act reads in relevant part as follows:
The term ‗‗security‘‘ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, securitybased swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‗‗security‘‘, or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). The same definition in appears in the 1934 Act, with very
limited variance. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); see also Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 556 n.7 (1979) (citing, inter alia, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342
(1967) for the proposition that it has long been held in federal courts that ―the coverage of
the two Acts may be regarded as the same‖).
174. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 301. Separately, the Howey decision, while noting
that the term ―investment contract‖ was undefined by the 1933 Act, concurrently noted that
it was ―common in many state ‗blue sky‘ laws‖ and had been ―broadly construed by state
courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection.‖Id. at 298.
175. See Jesse Colombo, The 1920s Florida Real Estate Bubble,
THEBUBBLEBUBBLE.COM (June 26, 2012), http://www.thebubblebubble.com/floridaproperty-bubble.
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The famed Supreme Court decision explained that operative section 5 of
the 1933 Act, which requires SEC registration of all ―securities,‖ 176 is
violated absent any showing of intent (i.e., it can be violated even as a
result of ―bona fide mistake‖).177 Further, the concluding words of the
majority opinion declared, ―[t]he statutory policy of affording broad
protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae.‖178 Additionally, the Howey test ensured that substance would
triumph over form;179 consequentially, the name assigned to an
investment180 and even the act of registering a deal as a security with
regulators181 became ancillary to a determination of coverage by the
Acts.
Collaterally, Howey (along with the preceding Joiner Leasing182
high court case) evidenced the desire to apply the relatively new
securities laws to instruments ―that were not susceptible to trading on
exchanges or in other securities markets.‖183 Finally, Howey reminded
that the courts would actively further the remedial mood of the congress
of 1933/1934: Justice Frankfurter had been one of the drafters of the
1933 Act,184 and yet the Court majority relegated his fears of an overexpansive reading of ―security‖ to the decision‘s dissent.185
176. 1933 Act Section 5 is a difficult read, at best. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID
L. RATNER, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION/CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (2003) (―Section 5
has a dual thrust . . . . Unfortunately, the structure of 1933 Act § 5 does not clearly reflect
this division; nor does it clearly reflect the distinctions between the three different periods
defined by the filing date and effective date of the registration statement.‖). Nonetheless,
the provision is steadfastly interpreted as creating dual obligations for those who would sell
securities in the United States (or to U.S. investors), to wit, (1) the requirement that the
security be registered with the SEC prior to its issuance, and (2) that the delivery of the
related prospectus precede or accompany the sale of the security. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
177. W.J. Howey Co.,328 U.S. at 300.
178. Id. at 301.
179. See, e.g., J. Scott Colesanti, Will the Howey Test Prize Substance Over Form?,
LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARY (Sept. 2008).
180. See, e.g.,Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (―[T]he fact
that instruments bear the label ‗stock‘ is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the
Acts.‖).
181. See Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmlands Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 698 (8th Cir.
1999).
182. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (applying the
statute to the sale of oil and gas leases in conjunction with the promoter‘s promise to drill oil
test wells; holding that the reach of the 1933 Act ―does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace.‖).
183. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 120, at 258-59.
184. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 228-29 (1997) (―Felix
Frankfurter, of the Harvard Law School, and two assistants helped draft the final version [of
the 1933 Act].‖)
185. To wit, Justice Frankfurter—thirteen years after helping to draft the 1933 Act—
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B.State of the Law on Howey Elements
Thus, despite the detailed, comprehensive list of covered
arrangements populating the statutory definition, the ―Howey Test‖
became the standard by which private arrangements did or did not come
within reach of the securities laws. A universally utilized barometer, the
test is frequently summarized into four conjunctive factors: 186
1.―An investment of money. . .‖
The seminal case to interpret the required monetary investment
centered on John Daniel, the unfortunate teamster who inventively
attempted to bring a compulsory (but non-contributory) employee
pension plan within the reach of the securities laws. 187 Daniel had
sought unsuccessfully to access a pension plan that (unbeknownst to
him) had been vitiated years earlier by a layoff from work; upon
learning the disappointing news at retirement, he invoked the securities
laws as a means of redress.188
The lower courts rewarded Daniel‘s creativity, but the Supreme
Court ultimately ruled for his employer, finding that the employer‘s
pension contributions on Daniel‘s behalf did not constitute the
―investment of money‖ required by the first Howey element.189 While
the Supreme Court decision noted an intervening act of Congress
(namely, ERISA190), the majority opinion is most often cited for
expressly objected to an elastic reading of the statutory definition of ‗security‘ in his
dissenting opinion. See id.; SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (―I find nothing in the Securities Act to indicate that Congress meant to bring
every innocent transaction within the scope of the Act simply because a perversion of them
is covered by the Act.‖).
186. Although some courts occasionally phrase the Howey Test in three factors, the
totality of required elements is consistently the same. Compare Searsy v. Commercial
Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. 1977) andTHOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6[2] (2014), available at Westlaw (stating the Test via
four factors) with SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.,87 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (offering the
identical elements—investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits
derived from the efforts of others—in three factors).
187. Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 552 (1979) (finding a
compulsory but noncontributory pension plan to not constitute a security under either the
1933 Act or the 1934 Act); see also Employee Benefit Plans, Exchange Act Release, No.
33, 6188, 1980 WL 29482, at *2 (Feb. 1, 1980). The SEC later clarified that it would deem
voluntary pension plans securities, even in the presence of express Congressional intent to
regulate pension plans through the 1974 adoption of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.Id.at *9.
188. See generallyDaniel, 439 U.S. at 553-56.
189. Id. at 559-61.
190. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)).
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relaying a concrete standard that asks whether the value parted with by
the investor equates to a ―tangible and definable consideration.‖ 191
Taking the cue from this broad standard, subsequent courts have
far more often than not located sufficient Investor contribution in the
fact pattern. Moreover, Daniel‘s analysis of ―investment of cash‖ gained
repute and grew to lead courts to conclude that it was ―well established
that cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will
create an investment contract.‖192 And thus some less than intuitive
―money investments‖ have been found for purposes of the Howey Test,
including promissory notes,193 bartered-for goods and services,194 and
even an employee‘s promise to work. 195 Moreover, in the presence of
outright sham or fraud, some courts have largely ignored legal
distinctions and focused solely on whether ―the investor must commit
his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject himself to
financial loss.‖196 More globally, the Supreme Court, when evaluating
Investor contributions and returns, has actively supported the timehonored expansionist reading of the statutory definition, refusing to
parse granular distinctions between present/future consideration 197 and
fixed/variable returns on investment.198
Further, even when subdivided into ―investment‖ and ―money,‖ the
191. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
192. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th
Cir. 1991).
193. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976).
194. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560 n.12. But see United States v. Jones, 450 F.2d 523, 525
(5th Cir. 1971) (finding airline ticket vouchers not to be securities for purposes the
prohibition against carriage of forged instruments set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2311, even where
such provision—which largely echoed the 1933 Act and 1934 definitional sections—
specifically included ―evidence of indebtedness‖).
195. Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding investment where the plaintiff ―commit[ted] herself to employment‖ in return for
the promise of employer‘s stock).
196. SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (quoting Hector v.
Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976)); see also Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982)).
197. See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir.
1989) (finding passbook savings certificates to constitute a security), remanded by 494 U.S.
1014 (1990) (ordering consideration of investment contract as a ―note‖ in light of
intervening decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)).
198. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391, 397 (2004) (finding that a payphone
sale-and-leaseback agreement satisfied the Howey test, and that a fixed rate of return—as
opposed to a variable rate—did not negate the presence of a security); but see Fishoff v.
Coty Inc., No. 09 Civ. 628 (SAS), 2009 WL 1585769, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009)
(finding a corporation‘s long term incentive plan, which provided performance incentives
for some employees, to not constitute a security).
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element remains easily established, as noted by scholars 199 and
judges.200 It appears that any nuanced reading of the first element is
subsumed in subsequent Test factors. For this and other reasons, these
other Howey elements provide a more traversed battleground.
2.―. . . in a common enterprise. . .‖
―Commonality‖ is an occasionally thorny determination for courts
and regulators alike. The Howey case indirectly provided an initial
description of the element through its fact pattern, which summarized an
arrangement whereby numerous investors contribute to a promoter‘s
plan, with the expectation of a pro rata distribution of any resulting
profits.201 But the Howey case did not actually define this ―common
enterprise‖ element.202 Accordingly, subsequent federal courts searched
for numerous investors pursuing common dreams as the means of
satisfying the second element of the Howey Test, coined (in hindsight)
―Horizontal Commonality.‖203
Such a construction, among other things, potentially leaves the
solitary investor without recourse under federal securities law,
prompting a considerable amount of post-Howey courts to view
commonality in a different fashion (i.e., as referring to the vertical
relationship between Promoter and Investor).204 Thus was cemented the
199. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 14041 (7th ed. 2006) (―The ‗of money‘ element is easily disposed of, since it is clear that
‗money‘ in this context is simply shorthand for ‗something of value.‘‖).
200. See supra notes 195-97
201. See, e.g., SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 993 F.Supp. 321, 322 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(defining horizontal commonality while noting that only the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits require it).
202. Jonathan E. Shook, Note, The Common Enterprise Test: Getting Horizontal or
Going Verticle in Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp., 30 TULSA L.J. 727, 730 (1995)
(citing Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and
Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 325
(1989)) (―Unfortunately, because neither the Court in Howey nor any subsequent Supreme
Court decision has defined the ‗common enterprise‘ prong of the Howey test, the federal
courts have been left to disagree. . .‖) (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Infinity Grp. Co., 993 F. Supp.at 322(finding horizontal commonality
―ampl[y]‖―satisfied‖ where over 10,000 investors contributed over $26 million to a
purported stick investment trust); see also Steinhardt Grp., Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144,
151 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that horizontal commonality ―requires a pooling of investors‘
contributions and distributions of profits and losses on a pro-rata basis among investors.‖)
(quoting Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise
Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152-53 (1995)).
204. See generally, Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts
Grading This Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L.J. 1, 17-19 (2011); see also SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (concluding that a multimarketing scheme, when viewed as an investment by an individual availing himself of a
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notion of vertical commonality, allowing a sole investor to bring a claim
passing element two of the test.205 This interpretation of Howey
permitted the SEC to twice successfully charge a notorious Ponzischeme artist of the early 1970s.206
In turn, vertical commonality was juridically divided into strict and
broad varieties, enthusiastically embraced by litigants and
opportunistically utilized by the SEC. ―Strict‖ vertical commonality
requires that the economic fates of the Promoter and Investor be tied
and that their fortunes rise and fall together; 207 the focus rests upon a
closely-aligned ―one-to-one relationship between the investor and
investment manager.‖208 Conversely, ―broad‖ vertical commonality
requires only that the ―efforts‖ of Promoter and Investor be ―linked.‖209
The Supreme Court has not determined which, if any, of the versions is
universally required.
The result is a universal understanding that there exists a number
of options by which to satisfy Howey‘s commonality requirement,210
and a sole consumer/Investor need not be rigidly excluded from
invoking the Securities Acts.
3.―. . . with the expectation of profits . . .‖
The third element of the test is largely synonymous with the
marketing of the financial arrangement. In Howey, the element was
satisfied by the incontrovertible evidence that the purchasers of units of
a partitioned orange grove were promised a slice of the profits. 211
recruitment scheme designed and promoted by others, constituted an investment contract).
The simplified approach to commonality announced by Turner has been followed by
subsequent federal courts. See, e.g.,Webster v. Omnitrition Int‘l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776 (9th Cir.
1996); SEC v. Novus Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-235-TC, 2010 WL 4180550, at *8 (D.
Utah Oct. 20, 2010) (―Indeed, investors were told that [the defendant company] could pay
such a high interest rate because it ‗earns more than it pays out.‖).
205. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
Marini v. Adamo, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that vertical
commonality does not focus on a ―pooling of funds‖).
206. See generally Koscot, 497 F.2d at 477; see alsoMarini, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
207. Marini, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
208. Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Shapiro, 655 F. Supp. 336, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
209. Marini, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 255-56. But see Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d
81 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting broad vertical commonality).
210. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Defining A Common Enterprise in Investment
Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 68-69 (2011) (noting that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
utilize broad commonality, and that three other Circuits have not expressly ruled on it); see
also id. at 69 (―The Tenth Circuit has rejected a requirement of horizontal commonality in
favor of an ‗economic reality‘ approach.‖). Thus, on the whole, broad vertical commonality
is a pleading possibility in half of the federal circuits.See id.at 69-70.
211. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-96, 300 (1946).
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Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the Promoter‘s statements of
a higher than average return on investment significantly influenced the
Investor‘s decision.212
Emblematic of the judiciary‘s eagerness to find the present of a
profit expectation is Teague v. Bakker, 213 a famed Fourth Circuit
decision declaring a resort time share (titled ―Life Time Partnership‖) to
be a security:
We conclude, then, that the promotional materials used to market the
LTPs can be seen as emphasizing the profit potential of the LTPs. The
materials not only speak of the LTPs as ―investment[s],‖ but also offer
specific calculations of the true value of the LTPs as compared to their
purchase price. The materials also allow the reader to infer that the
value of the LTPs was enhanced by virtue of the commercial activities
of the [Promoter] in catering to patrons paying full price. Moreover, it
is clear . . . that this benefit arises from the managerial efforts of
others.214

In short, the ―expectation of profits‖ element is often readily
proven by the Promoter‘s wistful statements or advertising of successful
commercial activities.
4.―. . . derived solely from the efforts of others . . .‖
The most problematic of Howey‘s elements may be the final
consideration, which speaks to the gist of the test: whether the Investor
is truly passive, or he expends enough effort to assume the role of
Promoter himself.215
In this analysis, the significant efforts may be supplied by ―others‖
(i.e., third parties). Howey had arguably emphasized the ―sole‖ efforts
of the Promoter.216 But subsequent cases explored varying verbiage to
loosen this standard, and thus a finding of a security will stand despite
the defense that the Promoter did not supply the lone efforts. 217 Also, in
evaluating whether the requisite ―efforts‖ come from others, the stated

212. Id. at 296, 300 (―[The investors] are attracted by the expectation of substantial
profits. It was represented, for example, that profits during the 1943-44 season amounted to
20% and that even greater profits might be expected during the 1944-45 season . . . .‖).
213. 35 F.3d 978, 987 (4th Cir. 1994).
214. Id. at 989.
215. See generally Albert, supra note 204, at 12.
216. See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 382 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
217. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973) (requiring only that ―the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or
success of the enterprise‖).
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intentions of the Promoter (as opposed to his actions) suffice.218
Perhaps the most insightful court decision (as well as one of the
most noted SEC defeats) in this line of rulings came from the Life
Partners case,219 in which controversial ―viatical settlements‖220 were
deemed beyond the reach of the Acts by the D.C. Court of Appeals. In
finding the fractionalized interests in the life insurance proceeds of
dying individuals outside the definition of security, the court noted,
among other things, that the significant efforts were (1) arguably
contributed by a third party (i.e., the insured person)221 and (2) when
undeniably contributed by the Promoter, merely ministerial in nature. 222
After Life Partners, there ensued a line of cases debating whether
those securitizing the death benefits of the dying contributed significant
efforts under the law. The significance of Life Partners was ultimately
attenuated on the second ground (i.e., that such efforts were much more
important to the enterprise than originally construed). For example, an
Ohio district court found in 2005 that the defendant‘s choice of
insurance agent was crucial to the success of the investment scheme; 223
earlier this year, to the same end, the Texas high court found a security
in a case against Life Partners itself.224 With intentions counting as
much as actions in a formula that eschews a zero-sum game, the result
is a fourth element that (1) discounts Investor efforts in favor of
Promoter expertise, and (2) can readily be met with ample proof of the
prior three elements.225
218. SEC v. The Infinity Grp. Co., 993 F.Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing SEC
v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967)).
219. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
220. SEC,
Viatical
Settlements
(last
visited
Sept.
22,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/viaticalsettle.htm (―A viatical settlement allows you to invest in
another person‘s life insurance policy. With a viatical settlement, you purchase the policy
(or part of it) at a price that is less than the death benefit of the policy. When the seller dies,
you collect the death benefit.‖).
221. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 548 (―In this case it is the length of the insured‘s
life that is of overwhelming importance to the value of the viatical settlements marketed by
[the defendant].‖).
222. Id. at 546 (noting that the defendant ―provide[d] no post-purchase services‖).
223. Wuliger v. Mann, No. 3:03 CV 1531, 2005 WL 1566751, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July
1, 2005) (quotingLife Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 551) (Wald, J., dissenting) (noting that
―form should not be elevated over substance and economic reality‖).
224. Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 577, 592-93 (Tex. App. 2014).
225. See, e.g.,United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (―Following
the Ninth Circuit‘s lead, we have held that the word ‗solely‘ should not be construed as a
literal limitation; rather, we ‗consider whether, under all the circumstances, the scheme was
being promoted primarily as an investment or as a means whereby participants could pool
their own activities, their money and the promoter‘s contribution in a meaningful way.‘‖)
(internal citations omitted).

J. SCOTT COLESANTI

1034

2/6/201511:37 AM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 65:nnn

Overall, despite some hiccups, Howey transformed the 1933 Act
and 1934 Act into dynamic statutes that would forever value the dual
promises of section 5 (i.e., registration and prospectus delivery). 226
Moreover, the federal bench has continued to uphold Howey‘s promise
of protection for Investors in securities traditional or otherwise; such
continued protection is laudable for, among other reasons, the
vulnerability and political nature of agency-made law in general.227
C. Raising the Drawbridge: Limitations on the Expansive Definition
At varied times, courts have expressly exempted categories of
putative ―investments‖ from the SEC‘s reach. Cases citing Howey have
carved out distinctions for investments met with tangible goods for
consumption.228 Additionally, courts have actively intervened to halt
expansion of the definition of the term ―security‖ in the presence of an
alternative regulatory scheme. For example, certificates of deposit—in
plain vanilla form—were exempted from SEC reach in the Marine Bank
case of 1982.229 Likewise, commodity contracts are not normally found
to be securities.230 And gambling ventures—which often grow money
on efforts other than those of the investor—are characteristically left to
State lottery laws.231 Alternatively, the quest for expansive jurisdiction
has been halted where the investors were presumed sophisticated, as in

226. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 22-27.
227. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54-57 (6th ed. 2012)
(noting that the federal agencies‘ ―administrator[s are] totally subject to Presidential
control‖).
228. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851, 858 (1975) (finding
―shares‖ of a cooperative apartment to not constitute a security because of, inter alia, their
correspondence to a tangible living space).
229. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556, 559 (1982) (stating that Congress, in
adopting the 1933 Act, did not ―intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud‖).
230. See, e.g., Point Landing v. Omni Capital Int‘l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir.
1986).
231. See, e.g.,Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966);State v.
ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1966).But see SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d
42, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss an SEC Complaint alleging an online
gaming venture to be a security). The case attracted much attention for the Commission‘s
foray into the virtual gaming world, and included language buttressing the SEC‘s
expansionist vision:
As long as the three-pronged Howey test is satisfied, the instrument must be
classified as an investment contract. Once that has occurred, ―it is immaterial
whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of
property with or without intrinsic value.‖ It is equally immaterial whether the
promoter depicts the enterprise as a serious commercial venture or dubs it a game.
Id. at 48 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 382 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)).
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the Steinhardt case of 1997.232
Thus, in 2014, the common denominators of cases applying Howey
in expansive fashion appear to be (1) the presence of a manifest
intention of an expert to assist the truly passive, unsophisticated investor
who (2) is otherwise without recourse under the law. 233 As any law
student studying securities regulation is told, SEC over-reaching in
defining securities is tempered by the modest remedy sought (i.e.,
registration with the Commission). Accordingly, armed with a broad
definition, incalculable judicial support, and a mandate from the
investing public, the SEC has used section 5 of the 1933 Act to exercise
jurisdiction over arrangements far removed from those securities traded
on stock exchanges,234 and to counter faddish investment frenzies
centering on, among others, farm cooperative notes, 235
condominiums,236 and collateralized debt obligations (including those of
the synthetic genre).237 Even when a jurisdiction has seemingly closed
the door on SEC jurisdiction, facts often surface permitting the case to
proceed.238
232. Steinhardt Grp. Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding a
―highly structured securitization transaction‖ involving non-performing assets to fail the
―efforts of others‖ element of the Howey test).
233. See generallyHowey, 328 U.S. 293.
234. See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Jones, 450 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1971); Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751
F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1984); see Bailey v. J.W.K. Props., Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 923 (4th Cir.
1990); Newmyer v Philatelic Leasing Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1989); SEC v. SG
Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 2001); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 130 (5th
Cir. 1989); Marini v. Adamo, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); seeSEC. REG. & L.
REP., infra note 291; Bamert v. Pulte Home Corp., 445 F. App‘x 256, 258-59 (11th Cir.
2011); Wolf v. Banco Nacional De Mex., 549 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Warfield
v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009); Sheets v. Dziabis, 738 F. Supp. 307, 312
(N.D. Ind. 1990).
235. See Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 699
(8th Cir. 1999).
236. See SEC, Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to
Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act of
1933 Release No. 33-5347, 1973 WL 158443 at *2 (Jan. 4, 1973) (―The Howey case
involved the sale and operation of orange groves. The reasoning, however, is applicable to
condominiums.‖).
237. See Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147
(S.D.N.Y
2010)
(No.
10
Civ.
3229
(BSJ)(MHD)),
available
atwww.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm. Perhaps surprisingly, the question of
whether the SEC possessed jurisdiction over a synthetic investment—i.e., one that
references a portfolio of securities rather than owns the securities—was readily resolved in
the Commission‘s favor.See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d. 147, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
238. See, e.g.,Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1475-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a
general partnership, normally exempt from securities laws, to be a security where one
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The SEC has exhibited this expansive spirit (and historical
bravado) where Bitcoins pay for the purchase of corporate shares; 239 it
is high time to take the application one step further.
D. Application of the Howey Test to Bitcoin Exchange Sites
It is axiomatic that the SEC has successfully brought
unprecedented action against new fashions of investments—indeed,
some might argue that the Howey Test can be used to reach any
conceivably passive investor arrangement. The Howey progeny (now
exceeding 1400 formal case citations240) employs various means of
specific analysis, several of which are possible mechanisms of asserting
SEC jurisdiction over Bitcoins.
1.Under a Strict Howey Analysis
Applying the first element of the Howey Test, it is readily apparent
that customers utilizing Bitcoin Exchange Sites invest money (in cash
or credit card form). Specifically, customers utilizing Bitcoin exchanges
are universally informed of the percentage price of the process; 241
further, the promised return is always financial (i.e., listed in Euros or
U.S. dollars).242 Frequently, the practicalities dictate the creation of an
account and the transfer of money thereto. The instructions are as
straightforward as they are bold.243 In short, a ―definable consideration‖
as explained by Daniel244is not only sought but often a prerequisite to
any transactional progress continuing.245 The application of the first of
Howey‘s elements to Bitcoin Exchange Sites is thus non-controversial.
Concerning the second element of the Howey Test (i.e., a common
general partner possessed a unique expertise upon which the investors relied); United States
v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding a limited liability company to constitute
a security despite New York‘s LLC shield statute);SEC v. Aqua-Sonics Products Corp., 687
F.2d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding a franchise agreement to be a security where the
franchisor retained significant commission rights in a dental equipment sales arrangement).
239. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text..
240. Westlaw Keycite search for authorities cases citing Howey. WESTLAW,
https://a.next.westlaw.com/(last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
241. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 77--78, 80--83 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 77--78, 80--83 and accompanying text.
244. See Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979). Interestingly, while the purchase of Bitcoins by itself has
not yet been held to constitute the purchase of a security, Bitcoin itself has been equated
with cash for purposes of the first element of the Howey analysis. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013)(―It is clear that Bitcoin can be
used as money.‖).
245. See supra notes 77-78, 81-83 and accompanying text.
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enterprise), Investors evidence—at the very least—broad vertical
commonality with their Promoters. Without people converting cash into
Bitcoin (or vice versa), the Sites have no business model. This totality
of enterprise approach often suffices to establish the linked efforts
delineated by cases such as Turner246 and Koscot.247
One could argue that strict vertical commonality cannot be
established by the SEC with regard to most Sites. The leading case for
this restrictive approach is Brodt v. Bache,248 a suit by a customer
against the broker-dealer that employed an allegedly dishonest
stockbroker.249 In finding for the broker-dealer, the court noted that the
failure of the entity would not necessarily mean that the customer would
―suffer serious losses‖ because such accounts are insured; the inability
to establish that both Promoter broker-dealer and Investor customer
would rise and fall together was thus fatal in a strict vertical
jurisdiction.250
But the fates of Bitcoin Exchange Sites are much more linked to
their customers. When Mt. Gox was pilfered and bankrupted, its
customers suffered.251 Likewise, no regulator stands ready to make
whole those chancing their investments with Bitcoin exchanges, thus
making the independent relationship touted in Brodt v. Bache252 a
highly unlikely possibility at this time.
Regarding the third element of the test (i.e., expectation of profits),
Investors undeniably answer a call for higher return. The language of
Bitcoin Exchange Sites consistently infers (if not states) that Bitcoins
are lucrative investments through a combination of charts, graphs,
and/or historical prices.253 Further, these Sites benefit from the
pervasive publicity for Bitcoin that floods the Internet. 254 In sum,
visitors to Bitcoin Sites believe that their virtual wallets shall be
―enhanced by virtue of the commercial activities of the [Promoter].‖ 255
Addressing the fourth and final element (i.e., efforts of others),

246. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
247. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
248. 592 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
249. Id. at 462.
250. Id. at 461.
251. See Thompson, supra note 62.
252. 595 F.2d 459.
253. See, e.g., BITSTAMP: FAQ, supra note 78.
254. See Leger, supra note 63 (taking note of the publicity-seeking Bitcoin
Foundation); Complete List of Bitcoin Exchanges, supra note 61 (providing the link to
PlanetBitcoin.com).
255. See Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 989 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Investors expend truly minimal efforts—namely, converting currencies
at the original or other Site as prices rise. While a Site serving solely as
a portal to the world of Bitcoin might be able to assert its lack of
managerial efforts, significant efforts are being offered by certain
exchanges. Some Sites offer to set a virtual wallet for visitors; others
agree to act as repository for purchased Bitcoins.256 In such
arrangements, significantly enabling actions are expended by the
Promoter, bringing the arrangement within the court‘s interpretation of
requisite ―managerial efforts.‖257
Thus, supple precedent exists for the SEC to confidently proceed
with the demand for registration by some Bitcoin exchange Sites. Such
action is justified where Sites are requesting money while promising
high returns for passive, uninformed Investors. Such regulatory result is
naturally expected, as the landmark Howey decision sought (and
consistently continues to seek) the regulation of those entities
evidencing ―all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture.‖258
If the concern be that some courts may stringently apply each
variety of the Howey Test elements, there nonetheless exists a more
flexible (and judicially created) approach.
2.Under a Risk of Loss Analysis
A slightly distinct risk of loss analysis, followed at times by the
Second and Ninth Circuits, perhaps poses fewer obstacles for a
Commission action. This variation on the Howey analysis emphasizes
the practical ramifications of the financial arrangement, thus
discounting such factors as proof of pro rata distribution of profits in
favor of the presence of an undeniable group of passive Investors.
The landmark case for this alternative analysis is Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski,259 in which a country club membership was
deemed a security because of the Promoter‘s planned use of the
members‘ fees.260 The Silver Hills court noted that the membership fees
at issue were crucial to the initial development of the business. 261

256. See supra notes 83 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g.,SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973) (defining the required efforts as ―those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise‖);United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852 (1975) (defining as the ―touch[]stone‖ a premise of a ―reasonable expectation of profits
to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others‖).
258. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
259. 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
260. Id. at 907.
261. Id. at 908.
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Noteworthy is that Bitcoin Exchange Sites are often discussed in the
press as start-up enterprises,262 thus making them a good fit for
Promoter under a risk of loss application of the Securities Acts.
A subsequent case more expressly advancing this totality view is
United States v. Carman, involving insured student loan packages sold
by a trade school.263 The Carman court noted that the sale agreement
included both a repurchase clause and the guarantee that the trade
school would cover any refund liability (i.e., damage to the investment
occasioned by students‘ failure to stick to the original payment
schedule).264 In Brodt, the court summed up the Carman court‘s
satisfaction of the most troublesome Howey factor: ―[t]hus, a substantial
risk of loss for the investor on the school‘s failure was sufficient to
create a common enterprise, even though there was no common
enterprise between the school and the credit union.‖265 If in fact the lack
of horizontal or strict vertical commonality is troublesome to any
potential SEC case, this language—which substitutes the degree of
potential investor hardship for considerations of similarity of
Promoter/Investor plight—might be crucial.
Apart from doctrines and their monikers, in recent years, this focus
on Promoter expertise has expanded the definition of security when the
arrangement fueled criminal activity—even in the face of the
protections of New York‘s Limited Liability Company Act.
Specifically, in the 2008 case of United States v. Leonard, the Second
Circuit affirmed all convictions flowing from facially protected
investments in an independent film project, stating that ―courts can (and
should) look beyond the formal terms of a relationship to the reality of
the parties‘ positions to evaluate whether ‗the reasonable expectation
was one of significant investor control.‘‖266
Indeed, many court holdings subordinate tests and their elements to
the protective mission of the securities laws. For example, in Reves v.
Ernst & Young, the high bench noted that a decision for the defendant
would place the subject financial arrangement completely outside the

262. See, e.g., Pete Rizzo, Expresscoin Launches to Become Coinbase,
COINDESK.COM (June 11, 2014), www.coindesk.com/expresscoin-launches-becomecoinbase-unbanked (discussing the 2014 conversion of the young company).
263. 577 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1978).
264. Id. at 560, 564.
265. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
266. 529 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687
F.2d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding a security in a franchise agreement where the
franchisor retained too much control in the form of commissions).
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reach of the law;267 more pointedly, in Aqua-Sonic, the court found a
security even in the face of a written franchise agreement, reasoning that
―it would circumvent the purposes of the securities laws to exonerate
defendants who had the guile to insert the requirement that the buyer
contribute a modicum of effort.‖268
Once identifying a security, the SEC would then be permitted to
charge famed SEC Rule 10b-5 (itself quite an elastic provision) to cover
any Site misstatements.269Finally, the fact that Bitcoin exchanges are
foreign entities270 is a nullity, as the Commission has enjoyed a great
many successes in exporting American securities law271 to foreign
companies victimizing U.S. Investors.272
3.As a Response to These Troubled Times . . .
Aside from potentially technical application of elements and
precedents, there exists a cogent rationale for the expansion of SEC
efforts to rein in Bitcoin. Since 1946, the Howey test has often
267. 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (stands as authority for use of the Second Circuit‘s
―family resemblance test‖ to determine whether the Acts reach an investment as a note). The
present Article does not posit that Bitcoin can be equated with a statutory note;
consequentially, the Article also does not evaluate an investment in Bitcoin under the Acts‘
definitions of ―evidence of indebtedness.‖See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
925 F. Supp. 1270, 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (citations omitted) (―The test whether an
instrument is within the category of ‗evidence of indebtedness‘ is essentially the same as
whether an instrument is a note‖).
268. Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 584.
269. Promulgated pursuant to 1934 Act § 10b, 15 U.S.C. §78(j)(b) (2012). Rule 10b-5
provides in relevant part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, . . .
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2014).
270. See Why Financial Services Firms Should Prepare For Bitcoin, supra note 90
(―There exist several Bitcoin ―exchanges,‖ the majority of which are in Asia and Europe.‖).
271. Congress and the federal judiciary have, respectively, provided for and
consistently upheld the right of the Commission to investigate and discipline foreign entities
engaging in securities transactions with American citizens. See, e.g., Section 22(c) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c)(2) (granting SEC authority over violations of section 77(q)(a)
where the foreign conduct has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.); see
also Section 30b of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(1) (clarifying SEC authority to
promulgate rules reaching foreign conduct).
272. See, e.g., Robert Moore D/B/A The Kingdom of Enenkio Consents to a
Permanent Injunction and Contempt Order, SEC NEWS DIGEST/ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS, (Oct. 27, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/10-27.txt (detailing the
Commission‘s action against a foreign, transient defendant for his sale of unregistered
―Gold War Bonds‖ to American investors via the Internet).
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emphasized public perception of the financial arrangement in issue, and
Bitcoin is increasingly seen as an investment. 273 As such, it poses the
traditional dangers to the uninformed. The test‘s chief progenitor, the
SEC, for the past decade has been actively pursuing all schemes that
tarnish the American market.
For example, the 2001 SG Ltd.274 case exemplifies the willingness
of the Commission to foreclose online gaming as a sub rosa investment
scheme.275 In that case, the First Circuit rejected the district court‘s
―dichotomy between business dealings‖ and virtual games. 276 The
decision not only sustained the Commission‘s aggressive Complaint
(depicting ―virtual shares‖ purchased by 800 American domiciliaries as
securities) but did so in language hauntingly familiar of the threat posed
by Bitcoin:
In defining the scope of the market that it wished to regulate, Congress
painted with a broad brush. It recognized the virtually limitless scope
of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of ―countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits,‖ and determined that the best way to
achieve its goal of protecting investors was ―to define the term
‗security‘ in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within that definition the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.‖277

While an online game soliciting $4.7 million from Investors 278
might be novel, the holding of the case was impressively steadfast:
under American securities law, on the question of whether a security
has been created, names matter little.
More recently, the SEC made clear that those laws would play a
meaningful role in establishing accountability for the financial crisis,
providing little room for any debate that a ―synthetic CDO‖ 279 is not a

273. See supra notes 13 (describing NASAA‘s alarm), 39 (describing the registered
Winklevoss investment scheme).
274. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
275. Id. at 48.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citations omitted).
278. Id.¶ 7.
279. Unlike a plain CDO, which invests in tangible debts and loans, a
―synthetic collateralised [sic] debt obligation is a derivative created from
the securitization of a portfolio of credit default swaps. A synthetic CDO does not own
actual fixed income assets such as bonds or loans. It gains exposure to the assets through the
credit
default
swaps.‖Financial
Glossary:
Synthetic
CDO,http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Synthetic_CDO (last visited Sept. 22,
2014).
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security.280 And thus, the Commission obtained one of its largest civil
judgments against an investment banking concern 281 and an impressive
jury verdict against one of its traders, 282 both actions premised on the
novel theory that a ―shadow‖ investment (i.e., a CDO with no actual
holdings) animated by an insurance vehicle (i.e., a credit default swap)
is a security.283
Thus, there are a number of means of effectuating SEC activism,
and the combination of law, policy, and public sentiment augurs well
for Commission efforts at this task. Such a new stance would, at the
very least, implement rules governing communication by Bitcoin
exchange sites while, at the most, reaffirm the Commission‘s roles as
ultimate securities regulator. To the extent critics would parse the
applications described herein, such counterarguments are easily met.
E. Counter-Analyses
In eighteen months, Bitcoin market value skyrocketed and
plummeted close to 2000%.284 While some might scoff at regulation of
a promotion so fanciful as to be unbelievable, it was aptly noted by
Judge Posner years ago that securities law must not yield to schemes
simply because they are too good to be true.285
Separately, generic opposition to SEC activism regarding Bitcoin
Exchange Sites could also point to the imbalance among the agency‘s
stated objectives, to wit, capital formation and market regulation. As far
back as 1980, informed critics charged the Commission with stifling

280. Id.
281. See Jennifer O‘Hare, Synthetic CDOs, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities
Fraud, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 707-10 (2014) Professor O‘Hare aptly sums up the
respective positions of Goldman Sachs and the SEC leading up to the firm‘s landmark
settlement of $550 million for ―mistake[nly]‖ touting a doomed CDO to a customer. Id.
Notably, battle lines were drawn regarding whether the synthetic CDO even came within the
securities laws, a point the SEC admirably advanced in its original Complaint. Id. See also
Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (No.
10
Civ.
3229
(BSJ)(MHD)),
available
atwww.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm.
282. O‘Hare, supra note 281, at 710. In 2013, former Goldman Sachs trader Fabrice
―Fabulous Fab‖ Tourre was found liable for 6 counts of fraud by a Manhattan jury. Id.See
alsoJoshua Brustein, True Believers Cheer the Fall of Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox, BUS. WK.
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-25/bitcoin-exchange-mtdot-gox-falls-true-believers-cheer.
283. Complaint ¶ 13, Goldman Sachs, 790 F. Supp. 2d 147.
284. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
285. See SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (―It would be a considerable
paradox if the worse the securities fraud, the less applicable the securities laws.‖).
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innovation and hindering markets through a rush to ―prosecute.‖ 286 But
such ideology is rendered inapplicable by its own definitions. Bitcoin,
as an innovation, seeks primarily to place commerce completely beyond
regulatory reach; even a reputable critic such as Professor Karmel
would be hard pressed to defend no regulation of such substantial
business activity.287 Additionally, lacking shareholders, quotes, annual
reports, dividends, and universality, Bitcoin lacks both a formal market
and rivals, making increased market productivity via light regulation an
illusion at best.288
Additionally, critics might (justifiably) note the Commission‘s
crowded agenda, highlighting the extreme delay attending derivative
reforms. Specifically, while the Dodd-Frank Act289 expressly called for,
among other things, mandatory clearing of securities an commodity
based derivatives ―through regulated central clearing organizations,‖ 290
the details of key, related definitions have been extended seemingly
indefinitely.291 But the SEC has long boasted of its overwhelming lists
of obligations, and is fully capable of effectively highlighting that list
for purposes of budgetary and staffing increases.
Further buttressing the case for expanded SEC targeting of Bitcoin
are the agency‘s past inclinations and related track record. The
Commission‘s applications of the securities laws to unconventional
arrangements are as whimsical as they are legion: a short list might
amplify recent cases involving cattle embryos, 292 postage stamps for
mail on privately owned islands,293 online investment games,294 a
286. See, e.g., ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION, THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 298-99 (1982). Presaging an
array of future election year polemics, Professor Karmel, a former SEC Commissioner,
wrote:―I believe there is a need today to change the direction of federal regulatory agencies
generally, and the SEC in particular, so that regulation will work in favor of, rather than, as
is often now the case, against capital formation and improved business productivity.‖ Id.
287. See generally id.
288. Id.
289. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
290. SeeSummary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010, DAVIS POLK CLIENT NEWSLETTER, July 2010 at 5263,
available
at
http://www.davispolk.com/resources/all?nid=56797&field_pb_publication_type_tid_1=589
8; see also id. at 44-46. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act also required the registration of
dealers in subject derivatives, and that banks ―pushout‖ subject ―swaps‖ to their affiliates.Id.
291. See, e.g., SEC Exempts Security-Based Swaps From Coverage as ‗Securities‘
Until 2017, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) NO. 255 (Feb. 10, 2014).
292. Bailey v. J.W.K Props., Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 923 (4th Cir. 1990).
293. Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1989).
294. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 2001).
AND
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livestock-feeding consulting agreement,295 rare coins,296 credit default
swaps,297 condominium subletting agreements,298 deposits in a Mexican
bank,299charitable gifts,300 and even a ―stallion syndication‖ contract.301
Juxtaposed with such a history of stretching Howey in the name of
Investor protection, a short list of actions against the most dangerous of
Sites seems only natural.
To be sure, more pointed criticism might highlight application of
the last and arguably most critical Howey test elements. Bitcoin
Investors, at times, are technologically savvy. In turn, a number of Site
visitors no doubt have created their own wallets and otherwise
independently researched the Bitcoin market. Such efforts could make
classification of such consumers as ―passive‖ belabored.302
But the Koscot decision—in which Investors of the Ponzi scheme
ranged from those simply selling retail cosmetics to those who actively
participated in the recruitment aspects of the enterprise 303—has long
clarified that a scheme is no less violative because some of its Investors
provide meaningful efforts.304 Further, such a modicum of efforts
defense ignores the capabilities of the Promoter, who possesses far more
insight and skill regarding Bitcoin than does the first-time Investor.305
Interestingly, even the universal acceptance among federal regulators of
Bitcoin as a new currency would lighten the Commission‘s load, as
investments of money in currencies have themselves been found to
satisfy the Howey test.306
In sum, the agency charged with protecting Investors is best poised
for the inevitable clashes between Investor hopes and issuer shields,
battles from which the Commission has never shied in the past. In this

295. Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1989).
296. Marini v. Adamo, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
297. SeeSwaps in [Fabrice] Tourre Case ‗Based‘ on Securities, SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA), July 22, 2013.
298. Bamert v. Pulte Home Corp., 445 F. App‘x 256, 258-59 (11th Cir. 2011).
299. Wolf v. Banco Nacional De Mex., 549 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
300. Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009).
301. Sheets v. Dziabis, 738 F. Supp. 307, 312 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
302. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (refusing to find a security
where the putative Investors exerted only ―ministerial‖ efforts).
303. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974).
304. See generally id.
305. See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 2008).
306. See generallyComplaint, SEC v. Boston Trading and Research, LLC, No. 1:10CV-11841,
(D.
Mass.
Oct.
28,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21712.pdf (alleging a security in the
agreement to invest contributions in forex (i.e., foreign currency) ―trading venture‖).
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instance, popular commentary may be presciently informed, advocating
recognition of the cryptocurrency but suggesting some level of
regulation thereof.307
In the end, the most valid argument against forced registration
traces back to perennial debates on SEC funding and resources. Thus,
the true issue appears to be one of political will. Overall, forced
registration of some Bitcoin Exchange Sites would weed out the false
―exchanges‖ and hold the valid ones to a common standard.
IV. CONCLUSION: WEAPONS WITHIN REACH
In the 1970s, a Ponzi scheme artist named Glenn Turner 308 traveled
from state to state peddling schemes ostensibly centering on wholesale
sales of cosmetics and self-help audio tapes.309 His storied journey was
cut short by two SEC actions in separate circuits finding securities fraud
among his misdealings.310
In the 1990s, the SEC targeted complex, three-party, fractionalized
life insurance assignments. After a notorious setback in the D.C.
Circuit‘s Life Partners case,311 the SEC regrouped and successfully
targeted viatical settlements and related ―death bonds.‖ 312
More recently, the SEC has policed public companies for
discriminatory hiring practices and investments in illegal foreign
regimes.313
307. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Regulators See Value in Bitcoin, and Investors
Hasten to Agree, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at B1, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/18/regulators-see-value-in-bitcoin-and-investorshasten-to-agree/?_r=0.
308. See SEC v. G.W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
309. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 n.4, 480 (5th Cir. 1974)
(noting seventeen separate actions in ten federal districts against Turner-controlled entities).
310. SeeTurner Enters., 474 F.2d 476; and Koscot, 497 F.2d 473.
311. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
312. See, e.g., SEC v. Tyler, No. Civ.A.3:02 CV 0282 P, 2002 WL 32538418, at *7-8
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction against promoter of
investments securities backed by viatical settlements based upon findings of misleading
statements);SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding the
promoter of viatical policies to contribute the managerial efforts necessary to satisfy the
Howey Test). See also Moreover, in 2014, the Texas high court declared viatical settlements
to be securities for purposes of the Texas Securities Act. See Arnold v. Life Partners, Inc.,
416 S.W.3d 577, 592 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).
313. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Seeking Guidance on Dodd-Frank‘s Diversity Clause,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/seekingguidance-on-dodd-franks-diversity-clause (describing the thinking behind section 342 of the
Act, ―that putting diversity regulators in the agencies would help to correct racial and gender
imbalances at Wall Street firms‖);Press Release 2012-163, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for
Disclosing
Use
of
Conflict
Minerals,(Aug.
22,
2012),
available
at
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It may be time again for the agency with the billion-dollar
budget314 to trot out its White Horse. On one level, Bitcoin represents
some creative thinking in a global market increasingly dominated by a
condensed list of major banks (and their audacious retail fees). 315 But on
a far more dangerous level, Bitcoin has created an inscrutable platform
for fraud that is presently outpacing regulators and private attorneys
alike.316 More active SEC regulation of Bitcoin is not only warranted
but commensurate with existing case law and destined to instill
confidence in the investing populace. More pointedly, the SEC action
advocated herein would have legitimacy, provide a federal standard, and
please the public.
A. On the SEC‘s Legitimacy
Alexander Hamilton wrote that ―[t]he propriety of a law, in a
constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the
powers upon which it is founded.‖317 The federal securities laws were
indubitably founded on the premise that American Investors were
blindly parting with their monies in hopes of greater returns.318 It is
undisputed that these initial legislative responses to the horrors of the
Great Depression sought foremost to bring markets and products into
the light.319 In turn, hundreds of federal cases attest to the SEC‘s
www.sec.goc/NEWS/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484002.
314. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fiscal Year 2013 Agency Financial
Report, available atwww.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2013.pdf, at 37 (noting ―budgetary
resources‖ of $1.4 billion).
315. See, e.g., View All Bank of America Fees, BANK OF AMERICA, (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/bank-account-fees.go (listing, among others, a $12
per month maintenance fee for the bank‘s ―Core Checking‖ account).
316. While private lawsuits have yet to impact Bitcoin regulation, the trend may
ultimately reverse. SeeBitcoin Case Survives, NAT‘L L. J. (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202652779053/Verdicts-ampSettlements?slreturn=20140819090004 (describing a local San Francisco court‘s refusal to
dismiss the breach of contract suit by a Bitcoin purchaser against a private seller for $2,500
in Bitcoins; the article noted a similar suit against a Bitcoin exchange in a San Francisco
court in 2012).
317. THE FEDERALIST NO.33 (Alexander Hamilton).
318. See, e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929 6-7 (7th ed. 1997)
(describing the notoriously American faith in ―quick, effortless enrichment in the stock
market‖).
319. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi, The Competitor, TIME, Apr. 14, 2014, at 34, 36
(detailing the ascent of former prosecutor Mary Jo White to the position of SEC Chair:―The
SEC was created 80 years ago in the wake of the 1929 stock-market crash to fix a key cause
of Wall Street‘s Depression-era dysfunction: the corporate secrecy that gave financial titans
an unfair advantage over average investors.‖); see alsoMICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND
OF WALL STREET, 235 (2010) (―People have a remarkable capacity for self-delusion,
particularly when those delusions are congruent with their own financial interest.‖).
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authority to look beyond traditional ―stocks‖ listed on rooted exchanges
when seeking to serve as the Investor‘s advocate.320
It is thus clear that the SEC acts truest to its purpose when it
elevates reality over semantics, and, by so doing, renders transparent the
most confusing of trendy investment vehicles. Concurrently, even the
champions of the free market have been humbled by the recent financial
crisis into recognition of the need for regulation of exotic products.321
B. On the Practical Need for Uniformity
Perhaps more noteworthy, in the interest of legal consistency, the
growing suspicion and intolerance of Bitcoin by the states needs to be
harmonized. Many regulators have—quite justifiably—refused to
dignify Bitcoin, no doubt mindful of the old adage that once sharing a
canoe with a bear, ―it is hard to get him out without obtaining his
agreement or getting wet.‖322 But a growing number at the local level
have taken aim. As varied regulators attempt to limit the destructive
potential of a new, nearly incomprehensible investment,323 the SEC
needs to remind all regulators that the federal watchdog is again
federalizing the standards by which investors are shielded, a laudable
goal that the agency has readily embraced throughout its storied history
(and troubled recent past).324
It bears noting that the remedy proposed herein is truly a measured
Professor Perino details the influence of the famed ―[Ferdinand] Pecora Hearings‖ upon
immediately ensuing Congressional reform. Id.
320. See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Interview with Alan Greenspan, Former Chair of the United States
Federal Reserve, 10 Questions, TIME,Nov. 4, 2013, at 72 (―I was wrong. You have to
regulate the system. My concern about regulation is that it‘s more vindictive than
curative.‖); Joel Cohen, An Interview with Judge Richard A. Posner, A.B.A. J., 58 (July
2014) (―I‘ve become much more concerned with . . . consumer protection . . . less trustful of
purely economic analysis—the last partly because of the crash of 2008 and the ensuing
economic downturn. That shook some of my faith in economic analysis.‖).
322. VIRAL V. ACHARYA, GUARANTEED TO FAIL/FANNIE MAE. FREDDIE MAC AND THE
DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 61 (2011) (quoting a 1996 Congressional Budget Office
report on the two foundering government-sponsored enterprises).
323. See, e.g., Dustin Volz, Ohio Won‘t Let You Buy Beer With Bitcoin, NAT‘L L. J.
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/ohio-won-t-let-you-buy-beer-withbitcoin-20140428; Sarah Todd, Texas Issues Guidelines on Virtual Currency, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 3, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_65/texas-issuesguidelines-on-virtual-currency-1066677-1.html
(describing
the
Texas
Banking
Commissioner‘s ruling that ATM providers of Bitcoin might be subject to Texas licensing
requirements).
324. See, e.g., Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskopf, Inside the Breakdown at the
SEC, TIME, Feb. 9, 2009, at 34 (detailing ―less than aggressive‖ regulatory efforts by the
agency during the stewardship of Republican Chair Christopher Cox).
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response. China has already banned the use of Bitcoin by banks and
merchants;325 SEC registration would seek foremost to ensure informed
use. Moreover, slimming the investment potential of Bitcoin (as well as
the field of exchanges) would surely increase its stability. In a historical
sense, placing Bitcoin conversion arrangements more squarely on the
Commission radar screen would serve as the alternative currency‘s
greatest victory: Bitcoin has arrived, and is part of the system. 326 To be
part of that system, and, in the interest of protecting American
Investors, the product now needs to be rationally confined and honestly,
publicly and fully described, just like countless nouveau financial
arrangements that preceded it.
C. On the Public‘s Perception of the Crusade
Main Street and Wall Street have both come to fear Bitcoin, 327 the
cyber-currency at once so esoteric and so often linked to drug deals and
irretrievable wealth. While the most flagrant examples thereof provide
headlines for aggressive prosecutors, the commonplace opportunities
for investor fraud grow daily and exponentially. The free market has
incentivized Bitcoin but done little to provide rational boundaries
therefore. And some regulators remain unconvinced that Bitcoin is
simply a currency.328
But regulators, even if temporarily as bewildered by
cryptocurrency as the public, need not be impotent. Putting aside the
possibility of Bitcoin serving tantamount to American dollars (as the
IRS has), it readily fits the definition of security when purchased solely
by the passive, uninformed consumer for its growth potential.
Concurrently, those websites enabling Bitcoin‘s conversion to profits
manifested in traditional currencies often meet the threshold test for
investment contracts. These determinations provide a ready entrance for

325. Bitcoin in China: A Dream Dispelled, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21600736-chinese-regulatorsmake-life-hard-crypto-currencies-dream-dispelled (revealing China‘s dual expulsion of the
virtual currency from commerce, both as a virtual currency and as barter for ―middlemen
between business and credit-card networks‖).
326. Brustein, supra note 282 (it has been noted that ―launching an exchange that
would function like the New York Stock Exchange‖ would serve to legitimize Bitcoin).
327. Compare Brian Brus, Bitcoin only worth what people think it is worth, J. REC.
(Oklahoma City) (Mar. 20, 2014), withWhy Financial Services Firms Should Prepare for
Bitcoin, supra note 90.
328. See Diekmann, supra note 2 (―That led one state regulator I spoke with to
conclude that for now Bitcoin isn‘t a currency but an (anonymous) payment stream.‖);
Todd, supra note 323 (quoting Banking Commissioner Charles Cooper: ―At this point a
cryptocurrency like Bitcoin is best viewed like a speculative investment, not as money.‖).
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the Securities and Exchange Commission, the statutory agency that has
protected the sheep from the financial wolves better than any other
watchdog for the past eight decades. And, in 2014, an active SEC is
truly a popular notion in the United States.329
A final note: in July, the New York State Department of Financial
Services announced a proposed regulation that would require possession
of a ―BitLicense‖ by all entities converting Bitcoins.330 The measure is
intended to both promote ―consumer protections‖331 and thwart
cyberattacks.332 The SEC thus runs the risk of, once again, being beaten
to the punch by a state regulator, 333 a usurping of authority many had
hoped was rendered unlikely by the federalization of the securities laws
over eighty years ago.334 The Commission needs to act now where so
many have remained reticent.335 Regulatory activism is required for the
new threat of Bitcoin, an investment that simultaneously threatens
Investors both young336 and elderly alike.337 Such regulatory activism
329. See, e.g., Commissioner Luis A. Aquilar, Speech to North American Securities
Administrators Association: Outmanned and Outgunned: Fighting on Behalf of Investors
Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections (Apr. 16, 2013), available at
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515400 (noting with authority that
―84% of Americans want the federal government to play an active role in protecting
investors.‖).
330. Evan Weinberger, NY Regulator Proposes 1st-Ever Bitcoin License,
LAW360(July 17, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/558444/ny-regulatorproposes-1st-ever-bitcoin-license.
331. William Jackson, NY Seeks Bitcoin Exchange Regulations, INFO. WK. (July 22,
2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/ny-seeksbitcoin-exchange-regulations/d/d-id/1297469 (reporting that New York‘s proposed
regulation would mandate background checks on Bitcoin dealers to ensure business that
would be conducted ―honestly, fairly, equitably, carefully, and efficiently.‖).
332. Id.
333. In 2003, the State of Oklahoma became the first regulator to charge Bernard
Ebbers of WorldCom disrepute, prompting a mild protest by the SEC. SeeMCI Hit with
Criminal Charges/Oklahoma Attorney General Charges Ebbers, Sullivan, Others with 15
Counts of Violating State Securities Laws, CNN ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2003, 4:53 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2003/08/27/technology/mci_charges (―The SEC said in a statement
that it was ‗disappointed‘ it was not contacted by the Oklahoma Attorney General about the
criminal charges filed Wednesday.‖).
334. SeeCHARLES GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 229 (1997) (―But even when
combined with the state . . . [blue-sky laws, stock exchange listing rules] were not able to
prevent the crash and the hundreds of corporate bankruptcies that followed.‖).
335. See GAO REPORT, EMERGING REGULATORY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION CHALLENGES 37 (2014) (noting, in its review of the efforts of a
dozen federal agencies, that ―[a]lthough there are numerous interagency collaborative
efforts that have addressed virtual currency issues . . . , interagency working groups have not
focused on consumer protection issues‖).
336. Id. at 22 (―Additionally, an SEC official told us that virtual-currency-based
securities may be attracting individuals who are younger and less experienced than typical
investors.‖).
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has been a hallmark of the American financial system since it rose from
the embers of the Great Depression.338 Such flexible application of the
securities laws has been consistently rewarded by federal courts, and
would be greatly appreciated by the American populace, who seem to
be once again in need of a champion on a White Horse.
--J. Scott Colesanti, LL.M.
February 6, 2015,

337. Commissioner Luis A. Aquilar, supra note 329 (referencing an SEC guide for
senior investors, who are vulnerable to Bitcoin Ponzi schemes).
338. David Heymsfeld, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time,
Wash. Law., 42 (June 2014) (―In the United States, the New Deal never abandoned the
concept that the economy should be regulated under laws passed by Congress . . . .The later
New Deal returned to the concept of a competitive economy, constrained by some
regulation designed to protect consumers and workers.‖).

